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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ORIGINS OF ACCOUNTABILITY:
EVERYTHING I KNOW ABOUT THE SOVEREIGN’S IMMUNITY, I
LEARNED FROM KING HENRY III
GUY I. SEIDMAN*
Tha t the kin g can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental
principle of the English Constitution.1
Princeps Leg ibu s S olutu s Est. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of Western civilization, one central question of
political organization concerns the limits of sovereign power: Whether the
sovereign, formerly the king, is accountable to man’s law and judgment. One
of the principal aims of modern representative governments has been curbing
the authority of absolute monarchs. The fundamental question of how
effectively to curb the excesses of public officials, however, remains. This
question lies at the core of administrative and constitutional law even if the
sovereign who we now seek to control no longer wears a crown or carries a
scepter.
The basic question posed throughout history, which still puzzles us today,
concerns the availability of effective remedies against wrongdoing by
government officials: If the government unlawfully refuses to honor
obligations, what remedies are available to the subjects/citizens? What forum
can address their grievances? Which judges, if any, will review the
government’s actions and what machinery of government will enforce verdicts

* Assistant Professor, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel; Searle Scholar, Northwestern
University, Chicago (2003–2004). I have benefited from comments to earlier drafts of this
article, presented at the University of Chicago, Northwestern, George Mason and Chicago-Kent
law schools. I am grateful to Professor Gary Lawson (Boston University Law School) for his
advice and support. I also appreciate the research assistance of Sarah C. Rispin and Antoine
Cousin and library resources made available to me at the University of Chicago and Northwestern
University. Any mistakes contained in this article are, of course, clearly my own.
1. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254, available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/blackstone/blacksto.htm.
2. Literally, “the emperor is not bound by statute” DIG. 1.3.31 (Alan Watson ed. & trans.,
1985).
393

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

394

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:393

handed down against the sovereign, especially when the result is not to the
sovereign’s liking?
An enormous volume of writing examines mechanisms for assuring the
political accountability of the ruler, including what steps subjects may
legitimately take in order to bring change in government when the government
wrongs the people. Modern democratic regimes have elaborate mechanisms to
ensure political accountability,3 though the sheer size of the modern
administrative state raises serious questions about the actual effectiveness of
these mechanisms of political control. Apart from political mechanisms, other
means exist for promoting government accountability, including monetary
liability for “private law” based wrongs. The most notable of these means are
private actions in tort and breach of contract actions. In modern American
legal culture, the effectiveness of these private-law legal remedies is directly
affected by a seemingly undemocratic vestige of ancient times, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity, and its later-developed companion doctrine of
official immunity, is a legal principle that sharply limits the use of the court
system to control government conduct. Sovereign immunity, as applied to the
federal government,4 does not allow suits against the government without its
consent.5 Official immunity, as embodied in modern American law, confers
similar, though in some respects more limited, immunity on individual
government actors.6 These immunities have long been thorns in many a
3. In the United States, for example, these mechanisms are based on at least three principal
premises: first, that sovereignty lies in the people, for whose benefit government is constructed
and by whom the government is elected; second, that the enumerated powers of government are
divided between three separate institutions; and third, all government officers are, in principle,
accountable for acts and omissions conducted in their official capacity, which flows from the
lofty but ill-defined idea of a government subject to the rule of law. That is clearly the case with
elected and impeachable officials. The accountability of the modern administrative bureaucracy
requires complex oversight mechanism. See BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE (3d ed. 1998). For more on the origins of impeachment, see
infra Part III.C.
4. That is the immunity of the federal government from suit, as distinguished from the
question of state sovereign immunity.
5. See generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230–270. Sovereign
immunity is defined as
[a] judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government without its
consent. Founded on the ancient principle that “the King can do no wrong,” it bars
holding the government or its political subdivisions liable for the torts of its officers or
agents unless such immunity is expressly waived by statute or by necessary inference
from legislative enactment.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
6. See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers,
State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195 (2003); Barbara E.
Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1998).
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commentator’s side. Sovereign immunity, in particular, is one of the most
consistently criticized doctrines in American law.7 It is easy doctrine to attack
and hard to defend. On its face, it seems clearly inconsistent with democratic
government. It has nonetheless withstood both the withering criticism and the
trials of time and remains valid law.8
The origins, scope, and constitutional pedigree of federal sovereign
immunity in the United States lay among the greatest mysteries of the early
republic.9 In a subsequent work, this author hopes to explore the basic
question whether and to what extent either sovereign or official immunity were
properly part of the original design of American government. In this Article,
this author lays the groundwork for that inquiry and clears away some
interfering debris by exploring the development of the concept of
governmental accountability in pre-eighteenth-century English law. The
Americans of the late 1700s, after all, were very familiar with English legal
and historical events in the late 1600s, most notably the so-called Glorious
Revolution of 1688.10 Those events, in turn, can be understood only in light of
developments that began four centuries beforehand in the thirteenth and
7. Generations of legal scholars have engaged in examining, and mostly criticizing, all
aspects of sovereign immunity, often calling for its abrogation. “Since the end of the last century,
learned members of the legal profession have been continuously attacking the roots and branches
of [sovereign immunity’s] judicially planted growth.” Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions From The PublicLands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970). See id. at 867 n.1–2 for a long list of critical articles.
An eminent scholar declared “[y]es, sovereign immunity must go.” Kenneth Culp Davis,
Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 383 (1970) (providing a detailed rationale
for such conclusion). Indeed, as one prominent scholar observed, “[n]o scholar, so far as can be
ascertained has had a good word for sovereign immunity for many years.” Roger C. Cramton,
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of
Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387,
419 (1970). This opinion seems equally valid today: “Sovereign immunity is a rotten idea.”
David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 548 (1997). For a
recent concerted attack on sovereign immunity, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign
Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001).
8. True, over the past two centuries Congress has waived sovereign immunity in a wide
variety of contexts. Each of these statutes raises, in turn, questions concerning the scope of the
waiver. For general discussion see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
18.6 & ch. 19 (4th ed. 2002) (tort liability of governments and their employees). Congress has
never entirely abolished the doctrine and neither has the U.S. Supreme Court. Both seem unlikely
to do so anytime soon.
9. “There are ghosts that haunt the early republic. . . . Sovereign immunity is one of the
most infamous.” Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication
in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1998).
10. They were also very familiar with Blackstone’s COMMENTARIES, published between
1765 and 1769. The COMMENTARIES synthesized the state of English law on the eve of the
American Revolution in a compact and accessible form. On Blackstone’s COMMENTARIES and
their influence on the Founding Fathers, see infra Part IV.D.
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fourteenth centuries. The concept of governmental accountability has a long,
distinguished, and fascinating genesis in English law. Understanding that
genesis is a necessary first step toward understanding the mechanisms for
accountability that were likely to have been constructed, or assumed, by the
founding generation in America.
In particular, this Article explores the ancient, and often misunderstood,
maxim that “the king can do no wrong.” The maxim proves to have played a
vital role in the development of governmental accountability in England,
sometimes serving precisely the opposite function that a casual reading of the
maxim might suggest. The maxim has actually stood for four different
propositions at various points in English legal history.11 The first is that the
king is literally above the law and cannot do wrong by definition. This
understanding of the maxim reached its zenith in the seventeenth century under
the banner of the “divine right of kings.”12 A second meaning is that even if
the king’s actions are not lawful by definition, there is no remedy for royal
wrongdoing through ordinary legal channels.13 One might term this a
procedural or remedial understanding of the maxim. A third meaning, which
actually represents the true historical origin of the maxim, is that the king has
no power or capacity to do wrong.14 This was literally the case with Henry III,
who assumed the kingship while in his minority.15 The fourth meaning is
precisely the opposite of the first. It means that the king is eminently capable
of doing wrong but cannot do so lawfully.16 One can meaningfully combine
this understanding with the second, procedural understanding to yield a legal
regime in which royal acts can meaningfully be described as unlawful but are
not subject to remedies by the ordinary law courts. In such a scheme, however,
subordinates who follow the king’s orders may act at their peril.
One can develop a good understanding of England’s struggles with
governmental accountability, and therefore the background understandings that
would have been available to America’s founding generation, by tracking the
differing interpretations of the maxim as they appeared at various points in
English legal history. For much of its life, the maxim actually served as an
essential tool in wresting powers away from the Crown and in establishing the
rule of law in England.17 The maxim “that the king can do no wrong” helped
define the shifting borders of governmental accountability in Anglo-American
11. See generally 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459–65 (3d ed.
1923).
12. See infra Part IV.D.1.
13. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 465.
14. CLAYTON ROBERTS, THE GROWTH OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN STUART
ENGLAND 4–5 (1966).
15. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 464.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 459.
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history: the expansion of government functions, the transformation from
personal to constitutional monarchy, the transfer of powers from king to
Parliament, and the rise of judicial review of government action through civil
and administrative litigation.
A number of important factors complicate our contemporary understanding
of this story, which sweeps across five centuries. The terminology employed
by actors at those various times does not necessarily correspond well to
modern legal categories. And perhaps most importantly, many of the key
terms that are essential to the telling of this story are equivocal. For instance,
the seemingly simple (at least to modern American sensibilities) term “the
king” (or “the Crown”) had two distinct meanings during much of the relevant
period of English legal history.18 It could mean either the royal person, that is,
a concrete individual, or it could mean the abstract sovereign powers invested
in a government. The phrase “the king can do no wrong” takes on very
different significance depending upon what precisely “the king” means.
Similarly, the concept of immunity can mean either the personal immunity of
the individual who is king or the immunity of the institution. This roughly
corresponds to the modern distinction between official (personal) and
sovereign (institutional) immunity. Finally, one must always keep clear the
distinction developed above between political accountability and
accountability through legal mechanisms arising out of or derived from private
law remedies. There are numerous threads to keep distinct while weaving this
tableau, but the inquiry is vital in order to understand the appropriate role of
governmental immunity in the American constitutional order. This Article
contains three distinct parts.
Part II introduces the thirteenth-century legal and historical landscape in
England, from which the basic concepts of government structure and
accountability grew. As a matter of history, the early years of the thirteenth
century presented English kingship at an extreme low point. Faced with great
pressures, England’s weak King John suffered enormous losses in terms of
both lands and royal powers in favor of his foes, internal and external. By the
time John died, in 1216, England had lost its vast territories in France, while
both the papacy and the English barons had gained a direct hold over royal
power.19 King John had sworn fealty to the pope and placed his signature on
Magna Carta.20 Worse yet, the minor new King Henry III had no legal
authority; the barons and a papal legate held all powers of the realm. This was
a troubling state of affairs because of the intensely personal nature of early

18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See COLIN RHYS LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 111–12
(1962).
20. Id. at 112–13.
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English government. The entire government developed out of the royal court,
financed out of the king’s pocket.21
As English citizens sought to limit and harness the earthly powers of the
king—thirteenth-century English history made this a realistic political policy to
achieve—they could find somewhat differing solutions in each of the four
different legal traditions that flourished in medieval England: Roman, Canon,
Tribal and Feudal laws.22 These legal traditions, of course, existed elsewhere
in Europe, but England’s unique constellation of social forces allowed for
meaningful struggles over political power between the king and his subjects.
Such struggles initiated with the barons and were engaged by an increasingly
representative Parliament. The early English kings, unlike many of their
continental counterparts, had to learn the art of compromise, which has
obvious implications for royal accountability.
Part III begins with the medieval origins of sovereign immunity,
suggesting that it originated in feudalism, under which feudal lords and vassals
agreed to litigate at the court provided by the feudal lord’s overlord. The king
did not have a feudal overlord in England. It was illogical to expect the king to
allow cases into his court against his will. Also, allowing such would have
been immoral because it would make the king potentially a judge in his own
case. At the same time, the English believed their king was capable of wrong
and expected the Crown to provide remedy for its wrongdoings.23 Feudalism
was also the basis for the Crown’s fiscal constraints. The king had to apply to
Parliament to increase the funding available for his personal and public
activities. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries we can observe several
other attempts to constrain royal powers and make public ministers
accountable to Parliament and “the nation” rather than to the king alone. With
the increase in government activities and the advent of the ministerial
responsibility doctrine, royal agents carried out all the work of government.24
Whereas the king was immune from suit, his agents were not, and they could
be held accountable for alleged wrongdoings either before a court of justice or
in Parliament, through impeachment proceedings.25
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the tools developed in medieval
days to contain royal power and make government bureaucracy accountable
mostly fell into disuse. The Tudor kings used the royal prerogative carefully.
They cooperated with Parliament, combining royal authority with popular
consent. The growth of government administration increased the Crown’s
21. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
22. The development of English legal history, said Maitland, had been continuous and “there
has been no violent breach between ‘folk-law and jurist-law.’” FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 14 (1898).
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See infra Part III.C.
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financial needs and royal dependence on Parliament, which held the power
over the purse strings.26 Things changed in the sixteenth century, when the
Stuart kings sought to increase royal powers and steer the English constitution
towards absolute monarchism.27
Part IV examines three aspects of the tumultuous seventeenth-century
England. First, this author suggests that by the seventeenth century the
doctrine called “the king’s two bodies” had established that the king, in person
and the government, were two separate entities. This development had many
beneficial effects. There was now continuity in government when the king
died. Government bureaucracy would in time become accountable to
Parliament, not the king. Finally, it is possible to observe two different
sovereign immunities in English law—that of the royal person and that of the
English government, accountable to Parliament.
Second, this author suggests that Parliament and the common law jurists
resurrected the medieval constructs in their struggles against the Stuarts. The
Magna Carta was rediscovered and interpreted as a bill of rights, while
Parliament revived the practice of impeachment after centuries of neglect.
After the seventeenth century, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility was
greatly developed. A cabinet headed by a prime minister would lead the
administration of England. Completing the process that began with the
personal monarchy and the growth of government from the royal household,
the English kings gradually became uninvolved in English government, as the
ministers became fully accountable to Parliament.
Finally, this Commentary discusses the “divine rights of kings” theory.
This author suggests that the theory did not generally apply in England.
Rather, the Stuart kings raised it in support of their claims of greater royal
powers. A coalition of common law jurists and parliamentarians rejected the
idea of divine rights of kings in favor of popular sovereignty and the more
balanced regime of a constitutional monarchy.
In Part V, this Commentary notes that a generally accurate state of English
law regarding sovereign immunity and the accountability of government was
available to the Founding Fathers through Blackstone’s Commentaries, which
were enormously popular in North America.
II. MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the

26. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 172.
27. Id. at 172, 231.
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grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.28
A.

Introduction

England was not the only country in the fourteenth century that faced basic
questions of governmental organization, such as who is the rightful ruler of the
land and who has the final word in law.29 Social and political conditions in
England presented unique opportunities for limiting royal power. Accordingly,
governmental accountability was a livelier topic in England than on the
continent because those seeking limitations on royal power in England had a
genuine chance to succeed.30
In England, an island at the edge of the European continent, power
struggles were mostly between the king and his barons (and later Parliament).
Continental princes had also to contend with strong claims of authority from
the Church in Rome, from neighboring rulers, and from the Holy Roman
Emperor, who from the tenth century claimed jurisdiction over a broad band of
Western Europe.31 Consequently, England managed to produce a working
model of government that eluded its continental counterparts, one that has a
powerful and effective government to improve the nation’s predicament while
not surrendering to it all sovereign powers and still keeping effective checks
over it, thus limiting royal ability for misdeeds. The seeds of this process,
completed in the seventeenth century, are clearly present in the thirteenth
century.32 Indeed, references were famously made (rightly or wrongly) during
28. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
187 (1920). Is this the case with the maxim “that the king can do no wrong” and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity? This is another way to view the issues discussed in this article (and in paper
II, relating to American jurisprudence).
29. 2 S.E. FINER, THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES 1024 (1997).
30. Precisely how and why England became a democracy is the subject of voluminous
literature and is well beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article attempts to present
some of the legal tools, developed around the fourteenth century and revived in the eighteenth
century, that were used in the service of efforts to place constitutional limitations on royal
powers. More specifically, this author wishes to explain the role, positive for the most part,
played by the concept of sovereign immunity and the maxim “that the king can do no wrong” in
England’s path to constitutional monarchy, then to parliamentary democracy.
31. See SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT
ATHENS TO TODAY 116 (1999).
32. That the king is below the law is a doctrine which even a royal justice may fearlessly
proclaim. The theory that in every state there must be some man or definite body of men
above the law, some ‘sovereign’ without duties and without rights, would have been
rejected. Had it been accepted in the thirteenth century, the English kingship must have
become an absolute monarchy, for nowhere else than in the person of the king could the
requisite ‘sovereignty’ have been found.
1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 181–82 (2d ed. 1911) (emphasis added).
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the seventeenth century Parliamentary struggles with the king to such
thirteenth-century instruments as the Magna Carta.33 Also, the standoff
between Lord Coke and the monarch was compared to that of Bracton with
Henry III.34 Many of the tools employed in the seventeenth century, and since,
in the struggle between the legislative and the executive branches, such as
impeachments and ministerial responsibility, have their origins in the thirteenth
century. Some basic notions of administrative review over the executive are
similarly traceable to this period.
Most significantly, the thirteenth century presented England with a
constitutional crisis that forced serious consideration of questions of royal
power and accountability. The key elements in this story are the emergence of
the Magna Carta as a concrete manifestation of the principle of limited royal
power and the “kingship” of Henry III, who assumed the throne at the tender,
and legally incapacitating, age of nine.35 To understand the importance of
these developments, one must first understand the basic historical events and
then grasp the diverse array of legal sources available to thirteenth-century
legal actors trying to cope with an unprecedented series of events redefining
the course of English constitutionalism and establishing the national identity of
the English people.
In this part of the commentary, this author describes the historical and
intellectual circumstances of this constitutional crisis and then identifies the
legal framework that was employed to address it. Section B sketches the legalhistorical background of the Magna Carta and its aftermath in the minority of
Henry III. These events of the early thirteenth century are uniquely important
as it is possible to trace back to them the tools subsequently developed to
ensure royal accountability. Section C presents the essential legal thinking that
medieval English jurists would have been familiar with when considering the
limits of royal powers. Linking the historical events with the intellectual
background, this author will, in the following part, show how the English
doctrine of governmental accountability was formed. This doctrine, which reemerged in the seventeenth century to form the basis of the English tradition,
would have been most accessible to the American founders.

33. See generally WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 120–21 (2d ed. 1914).
34. See generally GORDON, supra note 31, at 253.
35. Shael Herman, Legacy and Legend: The Continuity of Roman and English Regulation of
the Jews, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1781, 1825 (1992).
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Royal Accountability—A Sketch of Medieval History
1.

King John

The classic starting point for English Medieval history is 1066 A.D., when
Norman Duke William “The Conqueror” took over the English throne. A
century later, the Norman-Angevin line came to power.36 The dominant King
Henry II, the first of Angevin kings (1154–1189) took the title of “King of
England” and stabilized the throne.37 However, both he and his heirs remained
essentially French dukes, vassals of the French king, steeped in French
traditions and language.38 England provided the Angevins a base of operation
and rich resources, but they prized their vast domains in France, considering
them of paramount importance.39 Fabled English King Richard I the LionHearted, like his father, was a French prince. He had little interest in England,
save for its money.40 Richard’s protracted absences from England, when he
occupied himself with the Crusades, put royal powers in the hands of his
brother John.41 In this position of power, John conspired against Richard.
Ultimately, his coup attempts failed.42 In 1199, however, Richard I died, and
John became King of England, Duke of Normandy and holder of all other
Angevin possessions.43 John’s reign (1199–1216) was a dismal failure, as he
failed to uphold royal power and assets.44 It had, however, profound and longlasting implications on English legal history.
King John’s reign was troubled on three fronts: His misjudgment of feudal
law and politics allowed the French king to forfeit English land holdings in
France; in need of papal support, John agreed to become vassal to Rome; and
his mishandling of relationship with the barons brought England to the brink of
36. See generally ANDRÉ MAUROIS, THE MIRACLE OF ENGLAND 82–84 (Hamish Miles
trans., 1937); BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
228–30 (2d ed. 1980).
37. See generally MAUROIS, supra note 36, at 82–84; LYON, supra note 36, 228–30.
38. MAUROIS, supra note 36, at 83.
39. The Angevin English kings, as vassals to the French king, possessed more land and
wealth than their overlords. See LOVELL, supra note 19, 53, 71–73; LYON, supra note 36, 119–
22, 138–39, 228–33 (2d ed. 1980).
40. In his ten-year reign (1189–1199), Richard I visited England twice, for a total of six
months, and only to secure money for his wars. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 99–100; LYON, supra
note 36, at 229, 234–235; 1 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
534, 550 (6th ed. 1903); see also Richard I Coeur de Lion, at http://www.britannia.com/history/
monarchs/mon27.html.
41. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 99.
42. LYON, supra note 36, at 236–37.
43. E.g., Richard I Coeur de Lion, at http://www.britannia.com/history/monarchs/
mon27.html; Richard the Lion-Hearted, at http://www.carpenoctem.tv/military/lionhearted.html.
44. PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CORONATION 54–55 (Leopold G.
Wickham Legg trans., 1937).
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civil war and forced him to provide written assurances of his subject’s rights,
the Magna Carta. The following section explains these developments and their
impact in detail.
In 1202, John was summoned to stand trial in the feudal court of Paris in a
dispute with one of his French vassals.45 John ignored the summons, and
French King Philip Augustus seized the opportunity, declaring the royal vassal
a traitor and pronouncing the forfeiture of all his fiefs.46 John made no spirited
defense when the lands were physically invaded. By 1206, almost all Angevin
domains in France were lost.47 This episode led to centuries of dispute and
animosity between England and France, but it also nurtured a sense of
individual nationhood in both lands.48
The loss of lands in France firmly centered the kingdom in England. As
England became territorially defined, the residents of England began to
consider themselves different from the French. They were becoming
Englishmen. From now on, they would expend their energy primarily upon
insular projects. As England was becoming a nation-state, the king became a
national leader, the King of England.49 John returned to England in 1206 and
remained there almost continuously until his death.50 His successors would
devote, thereafter, most of their time to England. The barons who held fiefs in
both England and France now had to choose between them, and their decisions
determined whether they became English or French.51
The origin of papal claims toward the English king was in promises made
by John’s predecessors when in need of Rome’s support.52 But from the
conquest until the reign of King John, the Norman and Angevin kings of
England firmly held their ground against papal claims.53 It was John’s
misfortune to have stood against Innocent III (pontiff 1198–1216), arguably
the greatest pope of the middle ages, who was pursuing the idea of supporting
45. LYON, supra note 36, at 238.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 238–39; LOVELL, supra note 19, at 111.
48. See J.M. ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF EUROPE 174, 177 (1997).
49. As Englishmen they “entered upon that stage of development that was to differentiate
their institutions from others of Western Europe.” LYON, supra note 36, at 239; 1 STUBBS, supra
note 40, at 557–58. But cf. NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 357 (1996) (noting that at this
point it was “doubtful whether England or France had any sense of their later national identities”).
50. LYON, supra note 36, at 239.
51. Id.
52. In need of papal support for his claim of the English throne, William the Conqueror was
obliged to recognize the supremacy of the pope, yet later refused to pay feudal homage and fealty
to the pope. SCHRAMM, supra note 44, at 34; LOVELL, supra note 19, at 68, 70; DAVIES, supra
note 49, at 339. In 1171 Henry II promised Pope Alexander III that Ireland would pay, from that
time on, ‘Peter’s pence.’ SCHRAMM, supra note 44, at 34, 53. Conquest and lordship over
Ireland was confirmed by papal bull. LYON, supra note 36, at 304–05.
53. SCHRAMM, supra note 44, at 54.
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the Church’s universal position by a system of subordinate fiefs.54 Until his
death in 1205, Hubert Walter, Chancellor and Archbishop of Canterbury,
helped the king maintain an alliance with the clergy.55 The election of a new
archbishop sparked a battle between John and the pope.56 Royal plunder of
Church property and the driving of clergy into exile were met with a papal
interdict that, in 1208, theoretically suspended all ecclesiastical services in
England and a 1209 papal excommunication that absolved subjects from
allegiance to the king.57 Until 1212, John enjoyed general support of his
subjects, especially the barons, who were relieved of taxation while John lived
off the Church and temporarily relaxed the pressure on his feudal tenants.58
The tide then turned. Faced with baronial revolt, the threat of deposition by
the pope, and the prospect of a French invasion, John surrendered in 1213. He
accepted the papal candidate for Archbishop of Canterbury, reinstated the
exiled prelates, and compensated the Church for all its losses. More
alarmingly, the king handed over England and Ireland to the pope and received
them back as fiefs upon the performance of homage and fealty.59
The barons who chose to live in England were unlikely to forget who was
responsible for their enormous land losses. After 1206, King John had often
prepared to lead an expedition to win back his lands in France, but he
repeatedly postponed the mission.60 The barons alleged various other royal
infringements on their rights and privileges. Toward the end of John’s reign,
the Church and the barons joined forces against the king.61 The barons swore
that if the king delayed the restoration of laws and liberties any longer, they
would withdraw their (feudal) allegiance and make war upon him until he
would confirm the concession by a sealed charter.62 The barons wanted to
force the king to sign a document that would stipulate in specific terms the

54. Id.; LYON, supra note 36, at 306; 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 558.
55. LYON, supra note 36, at 306.
56. See id. at 240, 306; LOVELL, supra note 19, at 111–12; 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 558–
59.
57. LYON, supra note 36, at 240–41.
58. Id. at 240–41, 306–07.
59. This meant making an oath of homage to the pope, which he made binding on both
himself and his heirs. John also agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Holy See, in addition to
“Peter’s pence.” See SCHRAMM, supra note 44, at 54–55; LYON, supra note 36, at 240, 306–07;
LOVELL, supra note 19, at 112; 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 559–61; see also MCKECHNIE, supra
note 33, at 24.
60. See LYON, supra note 36, at 240–41; 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 557, 560, 562–64;
MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 27–28.
61. 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 568.
62. The bishops did not take part in the baronial oath; “they were one in counsel with the
barons, but had not been compelled to break off relations with the king.” 1 STUBBS, supra note
40, at 567–68; see also MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 31–32.
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laws and customs by which he would govern.63 The king finally set the great
seal of the realm in 1215 to the Magna Carta. Thus, King John came to be
unwittingly credited with the great Charter of Liberties, which would limit the
royal prerogative and serve as the cornerstone of modern democracy and with
the start of statutory law in England.64
The reason why the barons found it necessary to take severe steps to secure
the Magna Carta seems clear. Feudal law made the king accountable to
overlords in Paris or Rome but not in London. As we have seen, it is quite
possible that no court was available in England for the barons to pursue their
claims against the king.65 It soon turned out that King John was no more likely
to keep his promise, written and sealed, than he was to fulfill his feudal
obligations to the French king or the pope. Soon the barons, aided by the
French king, and John, supported by the pope, were aligning themselves for a
civil war.66 As the clouds of war gathered, both Pope Innocent III and King
John died in 1216.67
2

The Minority of King Henry III

Henry III was only nine years old when he ascended the throne in 1216.68
John left his son a kingdom in great disarray. The three major conflicts John
had opened with the French king, the pope, and the barons were left unresolved
and would take centuries to run their course.69 Even more significantly, the
63. In reality, they wanted to turn the clock back to the days of Henry I. John’s plan was to
dodge this commitment through the support of his ally, the Church, but he was bitterly
disappointed to find that not even his bribes could “bring over the Church from the barons’ side
to his own.” See LYON, supra note 36, at 241–42; 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 568–69;
MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 32–33.
64. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND—A COURSE OF
LECTURES DELIVERED 15 (1919) [hereinafter A COURSE OF LECTURES]; 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 179; J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT
289 (1985); LOVELL, supra note 19, at 118.
65. For in that hierarchical world of medieval England, the king wielded almost omnipotent
power. He was under the law insofar as he was morally obliged to obey the law, but he
was not legally bound to do so: ‘the king can do no wrong.’ That is, the king could not be
sued, prosecuted, nor punished by anyone. If he broke the law, punishment must be left to
God.
HENRY J. PERKINSON, FLIGHT FROM FALLIBILITY: HOW THEORY TRIUMPHED OVER EXPERIENCE
IN THE WEST 37–38 (2001).
66. LYON, supra note 36, at 242.
67. Pope Innocent III died on July 16. Pope Innocent III, at http://historymedren.about.com/
library/who/blwwinnocent3.htm. His death was followed, on October 19, by the death of King
John. MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 46–47.
68. Herman, supra note 35, at 1825.
69. In brief: (a) territorial claims: English monarchs maintained claims for French lands for
centuries. The height of the conflict was reached in the 1420s. After its victory in Agincourt, in
1415, England controlled large parts of Northern France; fortunes turned in 1429, when a maiden,
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young king was left defenseless against baronial and papal claims for
dominance over royal powers. For the first time since the Norman Conquest,
the personal government was formally in the hands of a minor.70
The new pope found himself at an unusually strong position of influence at
this time. Before his death, King John implored the pope to grant his heir and
his kingdom papal protection.71 Young Henry III had little choice but to renew
his father’s obligations to the pope, whose protection he needed against
France.72 In addition, the unprecedented minority raised unique legal
questions about which the pope’s opinion was persuasive.73
King John’s request of the pope meant that wardship of the underage heir
legally belonged to the papacy. The pope, however, allowed the appointment
of a baron, William Marshall Earl of Pembroke as rector regis et regni,
allowing him to become the principal force in the kingdom during Henry’s
early minority, while the papal legate was recognized as the presumptive head
of the government.74 The barons and the papal legate then attempted to
stabilize their joint regime. The Magna Carta really took hold during the
minority as it was reissued under the king’s name and papal sanction.75 This
step brought in greater baronial support for Henry and secured his throne in
1217 against a bid by the French crown.76
The minority brought England into intimate contact with Rome, as Henry’s
legal capacity to govern was judged by traditional Roman legal standards.77

Jeanne d’Arc led the Dauphin into military action and to his coronation at Reims. England’s
fortunes would never be revived, and the conflict then gradually waned, coming to an end in
1453. See ROBERTS, supra note 48, 176–77; DAVIES, supra note 49, at 420, 426, 545; (b) Magna
Carta: the document was repeatedly reissued and reconfirmed after 1215, yet it did not play a
major role in English public life until the seventeenth century. MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at
120–21, 139, 155–59; LOVELL, supra note 19, at 118; LYON, supra note 36, at 310; A COURSE OF
LECTURES, supra note 64, at 15; (c) on papal influence in England, see infra notes 72–76 and
accompanying text.
70. D.A. CARPENTER, THE MINORITY OF HENRY III 123 (1990).
71. Herman, supra note 35, at 1825.
72. Henry did so in the most public manner on his coronation day, when, after taking the
traditional oath, he did homage for England and Ireland to the papal legate, and promised to pay
the annual tribute in future. See SCHRAMM, supra note 44, at 55; Herman, supra note 35, at 1825;
2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 18–19 & n.2 (1906).
73. The pope’s opinion was also possibly even dispositive. Thus, only the papacy could
determine the age at which the king would acquire full capacity to govern the fiefdom. See
Herman, supra note 35, at 1825–26.
74. See id. at 1826; 2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 20.
75. This was tantamount to an official declaration that the minority had ended. See
CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 2 (footnote omitted).
76. The French prince was supported by a foreign army and a large faction of the English
barons. The papal sanction brought over clergy and barons to the royal side. See MCKECHNIE,
supra note 33, at 140–41, 145; 2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 22–26.
77. Herman, supra note 35, at 1826.
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Under these, the king was in pupilage, a tutor’s youthful charge, until he was
fourteen and was to attain his full majority at the age of twenty-five.78 Yet
under the third clause of the Magna Carta, inserted in 1216, barons came of
age at twenty-one, “and the consensus was that this rule should also apply to
the king.”79
Henry assumed full regal powers in January 1227 at age nineteen and three
months.80 The Council authorized Henry to issue writs stating that, from that
time on, royal grants must be confirmed under the king’s seal.81 There was
wide support for the recovery of royal power because many expected a
moderate form of kingship that the elites could limit and control, a compromise
implicit in the Magna Carta itself.82 While now nominally in power, the young
king proved unable to shake off the control of the governing council. He was
heavily influenced by the rivalry between its two dominant figures, Peter des
Roches, the French-born bishop of Winchester, and Hubert de Burgh, a native
of Burgh in Norfolk.83 Both were former servants of King John.84 Between
1232 and 1234, Des Roches presided over a regime that threatened to restore
many of the worst practices of King John, including seizure of private
properties.85 A baronial rebellion resulted. In 1234, des Roches was toppled.86
For the first time since his accession and now aged twenty-seven, Henry III
was free to wield undisputed sovereignty. However, his chosen advisors
78. At age fourteen Henry was recognized as having exceeded the age of a pupil and was
free from the custody of his tutor, the Bishop of Winchester. In Roman law terms, he had passed
from puertia to adolescentia. Besides limiting the power of the king, his coming of age had
major property implications, for at that moment the tenure of offices and custodies would come
up for cancellation or renewal. It is also reported that William Marshal felt barred from making
grants in perpetuity as long as Henry was under the age of majority. See Herman, supra note 35,
at 1826 n.154–55; CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 123, 257. On Roman law, see, e.g., JANE F.
GARDNER, FAMILY AND FAMILIA IN ROMAN LAW AND LIFE 146–48, 165–69, 172 (1998).
79. See Herman, supra note 35, at 1827 (quoting CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 123).
80. Id. at 1827.
81. If the pope had not considered Henry mature enough to govern, he could have stood in
his way, yet he did not. Id. By letters dated April 1223, Pope Honorius declared his ward to be
of full age, under certain reservations, and a bull of Gregory IX of April 1227 confirmed that the
minority had ended. MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, 153, 156 n.1. The king was appreciative of the
early papal support, and this allegiance sometimes placed him at odds with his magnates. See
Herman, supra note 35, at 1827 n.159.
82. Magna Carta sought to limit rather than destroy the king’s sources of revenue, and
expand rather than contract the king’s role as the dispenser of justice. Even the barons realized
that unless the rights and revenues of the crown were secure, the king could not guarantee and
safeguard his subjects’ rights and would lack the power and authority to maintain peace and
dispense justice. See CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 3.
83. See Herman, supra note 35, 1828; Nicholas Vincent, Henry III, HISTORY TODAY, June
2002, at 12.
84. Vincent, supra note 83, at 12.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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continued to dominate him for many years.87 The matter of papal influence
remained dormant for some time, until Parliament put an end to papal claims
of homage in 1366 A.D.88
C. Legal Landscape at 1215: Endless Possibilities on the Horizon
1.

Introduction: Four Vectors Tugging in All Directions

The basic legal issue in the thirteenth century was (and in some sense still
is and has always been) whether the prince is subject to man’s law, i.e., could
limitations be set on powers of government? One might expect that the
thirteenth-century answer would be simple and perhaps Hobbesian: There are
no limitations and the king’s will is supreme. That supposition is wrong, or at
least overstated. In order to understand the theories of government employed
by thirteenth-century English thinkers, however, one must identify the sources
of law on which they drew.
Those sources were quite diverse. In medieval England, and on the
European Continent, we can identify at least four distinct and relevant legal
traditions, each of which made its own distinctive contribution to theories of
governmental power and responsibility. To the modern mind, of course, the
idea that four different legal regimes might be applicable to the same problem
seems like a blueprint for chaos. The medieval legal mind, however, did not
sharply differentiate these sources of law and structured them hierarchically.89
Thirteenth-century legal actors were quite content to have overlapping legal
systems, each with its own distinctive sphere of application. In the Middle
Ages, especially on the Continent, a multi-jurisdictional legal structure was
common and familiar.90
Two of these sources of medieval law are referred to as the “learned laws”:
Roman law, which enjoyed a revival since the mid-twelfth century rediscovery
of the Justinian Code, and Church law, the law of the Catholic Church, which
infused Judeo-Christian and Roman traditions.91 Roman and Church law had a
weaker influence in England than on mainland Europe, but, as shall be seen in
the discussion of the Magna Carta, by 1215 they both had advocates and
influence in England.

87. “From 1234 to 1258, Henry was to become notorious for the way he allowed policy to be
dictated by whichever faction at court he was . . . inclined to trust” at any given time. Id. at 13.
88. During the reign of Edward III, Parliament unilaterally renounced the obligation and
declared it unlawful because the people had not given their consent to it and because it was a
breach of the royal coronation oath. By this time, the position and fortunes of the church had
been significantly changed. See SCHRAMM, supra note 44, at 55–56, 61.
89. Cf. GORDON, supra note 31, at 116–18.
90. Cf. id.
91. See HOLT, supra note 64, at 167.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

THE ORIGINS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

409

Two other sources of legal norms were less learned in nature but perhaps
more humane and practical. One was the traditional-customary-tribal law, the
conventions by which the European tribes ruled themselves from the fall of
Rome in the sixth century until the re-emergence of Roman law in the eleventh
century.92 The other was the law of the feudal system, which reflected
medieval socio-economic realities of governance and were applied in England
by the Norman Kings.93 The four sources of law are interconnected, sharing
ideas and influencing one another. They offer rich and varied sources of
norms, all of which were relevant and applicable at medieval times,94 yet they
may lead to possibly divergent solutions to problems of defining and
controlling royal power.
2.

The Learned Laws: Pope and Emperor

The conflict between the papacy and the Holy Roman Emperor dominated
European politics for centuries, but it also enriched (if not fully clarified)
medieval Europeans’ concepts of kingship and sovereignty. Sometimes these
conflicts were played out on the battlefield; other times they were fought by
lawyers, who both popes and emperors employed to further their claims to
power.95 The laws most frequently invoked during these struggles stemmed
from ecclesiastical and Roman law.96 This author will briefly introduce each
source.
a.

Ecclesiastical law

It is difficult to understate the importance of the Catholic Church in
European legal history. One author described the medieval Church as “a
quasi-state” that “comprised the nations of the present European Union.”97
Another suggested “medieval Europe” and “Christendom” were essentially
fungible terms.98 The Church played an enormously important role in
European public life in at least two forms.
92. See LOVELL, supra note 19, at 3–7; see also LYON, supra note 36, at 185.
93. The question whether the Normans had in fact introduced feudalism to England or
whether England was about to reach feudalism of its own accord is unclear and subject to
academic discourse. See infra note 183.
94. Cf. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 116 (rewriting Roman law on marriage
and divorce, adding some Germanic elements in the ecclesiastical system).
95. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 86–87 (1983).
96. See id. at 85.
97. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 15 (2002);
see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 116 (“The Medieval church was a state.”);
George L. Haskins, The First American Reform of Civil Procedure, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW:
ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 212 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1964).
98. Robert S. Wood, History, Thought and Images: The Development of International Law
and Organization, 12 VA. J. INT’L L. 35, 38 (1971) (“In effect, Christendom and Europe became
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First, it provided religious leadership and guidance and a singular form of
unified common law applicable all across Europe.99 The vehicle for promoting
its values and imposing some measure of order was ecclesiastical law, or canon
law, as it is sometimes called. Ecclesiastical law claimed subject matter
jurisdiction across Europe, particularity over marriage and family law, and
personal jurisdiction over all cases involving Church personnel.100 The Church
discharged its justice “through a refined system of canon law and ecclesiastical
courts.”101 It is significant to note that, in the twelfth century, canon and
Roman law were very close, with canon law borrowing much in form,
language, sprit and substance from the civil law.102 Yet unlike the codified
Roman law, canon law did not constitute a closed corpus but continued to
grow by both legislation and judicial decision.103 In the thirteenth century,
“canon law began to think that she could shift for herself and to give herself
airs of superiority.”104
Second, the Church was a potent political force. While the Church was
“not really a state”—with no army, citizenship or fixed territory—it was an
organization of enormous power and resources, with an “aim . . . to guide the
faithful to salvation.”105 As a major political actor, power broker in European
politics, and significant property owner across the continent, the Church found
itself in a position to challenge the great secular authorities. During the
eleventh through fourteenth centuries, a series of conflicts occurred between
kings and popes, rulers who aspired to supreme spiritual and temporal
powers.106 The most famous episode of this struggle is the investiture
increasingly interchangeable and the center of Europe’s political gravity came to rest in Western
Europe.”).
99. Cf. John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions is
Changing the Character of “International” Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 605 (1994) (stressing the
nature of religious law as an international “law of nations”).
100. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 125–27.
101. John Witte, Jr., A New Concordance of Discordant Canons: Harold J. Berman on Law
and Religion, 42 EMORY L.J. 523, 553 n.91 (1993) (“After the sixteenth century, jurisdiction over
marriage and family life shifted to the [increasingly strong national] state, yet the church retained
a formidable formal role in marriage and family law.”). See also Head, supra note 99, at 610–11;
VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 97, at 14–16; Haskins, supra note 97, at 213 (claiming jurisdiction
over all questions of church organization, administration and property, over matters concerning
family law including wills and contracts based on good faith and over some aspects of criminal
law); Sarah Hanley, “The Jurisprudence of the Arrêts”: Marital Union, Civil Society, and State
Formation in France, 1550–1650, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2003).
102. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 111.
103. Id. at 112–13.
104. See id. at 215–17.
105. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 97, at 16. It is this trait that most clearly distinguishes
between the Church and “a state.” Id.
106. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH & STATE 1050–1300, at 1 (1964)
[hereinafter THE CRISIS].
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controversy. It lives in memory as the tableau of the German Holy Roman
Emperor Henry IV, humbly standing in the snows of January 1077 in the
Italian stronghold of Canossa, before Pope Gregory VII finally relented,
receiving the king back into the communion of the Church.107 The next
episode, when the king had revenge, forcing the pope into exile, is less
familiar. What is of profound import is not the fact that kings and popes
clashed, and not even the precise details of their battles,108 but the nature and
contents of the claims made by both sides for plenary legal supremacy. Both
sides expounded the arguments supporting their mutual claims of supremacy.
This affected the Church’s position in both its religious and political capacities,
for what it would preach in its moral/religious form would affect its political
ambitions.
The starting point was the Church’s staunch backing of monarchy, the
dominant form of government in medieval life. The Church supported this
political structure by adopting a strongly theocratic view of the kingship.
Modeled on Biblical kingship, the Church recognized and consecrated the
coronation ceremonies.109 The doctrine held that by the consecration the
107. Id. at 54–55.
108. In a thumbnail, the investiture controversy began with the appointment, in 1049, of Pope
Leo IX by Emperor Henry III. The pope began a cleansing reform of the Church. At the core of
the reform lay an ideal of an independent Church free from lay interference. Thus began a fierce
struggle over the hitherto uncontested lay interference in the appointment and promotion of
clergymen, even the pope, within the Church. It was this that gave its name to the long quarrel
over lay “investiture,” namely over who rightfully appointed a vacant bishopric or abbacy—the
temporal ruler or the Church. The famous conflict took place in 1075, when, after twenty-five
years of agitation and propaganda by the papal party, Pope Gregory VII—himself elected without
Imperial assent—declared the political and legal supremacy (in both legislative and judicial
power) of the papacy over the entire church and the independence of the clergy from secular
control. Pope Gregory was the German monk called Hildebrand, who was a leader of the papal
party in the period after 1050; as pope he also asserted the ultimate supremacy of the pope in
secular matters, including the authority to depose emperors and kings. The emperor—Henry IV
of Saxony—responded with military action. Initially, the pope had the upper hand. Aware of his
powerful enemies in Germany, Emperor Henry IV (ruler 1056–1106) came in humiliation to
Canossa, yet Henry soon returned to his habit of lay investiture, and after a long civil war in
Germany and Henry’s second excommunication, a synod of imperial bishops elected an
“antipope,” Clement III. The imperial party then captured Rome, forcing the pope to escape with
the help of his Norman allies into exile, where he died. Civil war between the papal and imperial
parties raged sporadically throughout Europe until 1170. See UTE-RENATE BLUMENTHAL, THE
INVESTITURE CONTROVERSY: CHURCH AND MONARCHY FROM THE NINTH TO THE TWELFTH
CENTURY (1988); 4 SIR R.W. CARLYLE & A.J. CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEORY IN THE WEST 49–60 (1921); ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 126–28; 2 FINER, supra note 29,
at 889–90, 941.
109. Not only did the king receive his insignias and the crown from the bishop, he was also
anointed by him with consecrated oil. All anointed kings thereby became new “King Davids,”
consecrated by new “Samuels.” 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 884. This model of kingship,
significantly, had little in common with the Germanic notions of monarchy based upon popular
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Church marked the prince as God’s vicar on Earth, a divinely ordained
magistracy.110 The Church thus advocated obedience to the king and provided
legitimacy to his rule.111 Yet the resultant expectations of Church and king
were different. The Church expected royal gratitude and was of the opinion
that the king, while not subject to any secular law, was accountable to God and
his servants, the pope and the bishops.112 After all, it was the Church that
elevated the king to his royal station. Surely, the Church would argue from the
mid-eleventh century onward, the anointer was superior to the anointed.113
Kings viewed the situation differently. First, for the most part their claim
to the throne lay in tribal law—through blood ties with the ruling family or
selection by the elders.114 Second, they had the physical power to rule their
world, Church agreement notwithstanding. Finally, a point of simple logic: If
the king possesses sanctified powers, as argued by the Church itself, how could
this power possibly be limited to secular matters only? Surely, the king has
authority over the Church and all of its interests.
The New Testament specifically provided ample theological sanction to
the doctrine that the divinely sanctioned king “can do no wrong.”115 Yet,
similar to Judaic faith, the Church viewed the state as existing for the purpose
of transforming ethical rightness into binding positive law. Hence, the true
ruler can be recognized only by his fitness to fulfill the divine mission of the
state and rule according to the law.116 The Church’s prime concern—whether

election and blood-right. See S.B. Chrimes, Introduction to FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN
xviii–xix; KERN, supra, at 7–11, 34; 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 861–62.
110. See KERN, supra note 109, at 26–27.
111. See Chrimes, supra note 109, at xix.
112. Id.
113. See 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 884–85.
114. Cf. KERN, supra note 109, at 27–28 & n.15, 33–34, 50 (explaining legitimacy on the
basis of kin-rights, election, and Church consecration).
115. MORRIS ADLER, THE WORLD OF THE TALMUD 136 (2d ed. 1963) (“‘The Powers that be
Are Ordained of God’ (Romans 13.1 ff.)”). The idea is “repeated many times in the New
Testament (Titus 3.1; I Peter 2.13 ff.; Matthew 22.21).” Id. Judaic law provides kings with
extensive powers, but the general view is that the king is not above the law; like all men, he is
subject to the law and “‘must not stray from the commandment, to the right or left’ (Deuteronomy
17.15 ff.).” Id.
116. The Church, in approving a ruler, was thus less concerned with his legitimacy than his
suitability, that is, in his possession of both “the goodwill and the power to put God’s law into
practice.” See KERN, supra note 109, at 28–34. This explains the Church’s objection to the right
of minors and illegitimate children to the throne. Id. at 29. Next to the baptismal vows, it
became the first requirement in a ruler’s eligibility for the throne. Id. at 29, 33. Early in Christian
Rome, from the tenth century, birth in wedlock became the second canonical requirement of
kingship. Id. at 28–34. For the theory and its application to how theocratic principles often
defeated the secular right of the mediaeval ruler to the throne, see id. At the height of papal
theocracy, in the twelfth through thirteenth centuries, it was even alleged that a prince’s descent
from a dynasty hostile to the Church was sufficient to destroy his eligibility to the throne. See
THE MIDDLE AGES
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political or religiously mandated—was that kings be subject to some form of
legal code of restriction, and if not the one legislated by humans, then the law
variously termed natural law, faith or conscience, or a legal and moral check
on royal behavior authoritatively interpreted by God’s emissaries on Earth.117
The revival of Roman law in the eleventh and twelfth centuries only
reinvigorated this argument.
Ecclesiastical law thus provided ammunition for those who would limit
royal power by identifying moral and legal limitations on the authority of
temporal rulers.118 If kings could be accountable to popes, why could they not
be accountable to other institutions as well?
b.

Roman law

After the fall of Rome in 476 A.D.,119 the Catholic Church enjoyed a
virtual monopoly over culture and literacy in western Europe and served as
perhaps the single tie to Europe’s civilized, unitary past. In Constantinople,
the eastern Roman Empire, Emperor Justinian produced in the 530s A.D. the
Coprus iuris civilis, the great compilation of Roman law.120 However, it had
only limited influence for many centuries.121 During the early Middle Ages,
no serious study or development of the Justinian compilation was undertaken
in the West. Knowledge of Roman law had mostly disintegrated into tribal
memories as customary law.122 In England, a remote province even at the
height of the Roman Empire, knowledge of civil law “seems to have been of a
minimal and crude sort.”123
All this began changing in the late eleventh century. The rediscovery of
the Justinian Code around 1076 in Bologna came at a time of economic

WILLIAM A. CHANEY, THE CULT OF KINGSHIP IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND: THE TRANSITION
FROM PAGANISM TO CHRISTIANITY 24 (1970) (stating that in the eighth century the Church
paralleled, in effect, the royal office with the priestly, into which only one born in wedlock could
enter).
117. 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 861–63.
118. See ADLER, supra note 115, at 136.
119. This conventional date, suggested by Edward Gibbon, is when the Germanic Odoacer
deposed the last emperor ruling from Rome. It marks the end of classical history of the beginning
of the Middle Ages in European history. At the same time, the date 476 A.D. marks the final
stage of a centuries long process during which Rome was weakening. See 3 EDWARD GIBBON,
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 258 & n.125 (1845).
120. 1 R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE CANON
LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597 TO THE 1640S, at 82 (2004).
121. In the eastern empire, the main obstacle was language: The code is written in Latin,
while most people in the Byzantine empire over which Justinian ruled spoke Greek. Id. at 82–83.
In the West, the collapse of Roman imperial institutions limited the impact of the code. Id.
122. Id. at 83.
123. Id.
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awakening, political consolidation, and movement and discussion in Italy.124
A new and more sophisticated law was required. This was, therefore, more
than the revival of a neglected text—it was a revival of jurisprudence.125
Moreover, the sentiment was widely shared: In the following years,
universities where secular studies became possible were established all across
Europe.126 English ecclesiastics also studied law in Bologna in the twelfth
century, and they brought their knowledge home, but their influence was
limited because of an initial royal ban on the study of Roman law and the
rejection of Roman law by the royal courts.127
Study of Roman law brought about the reformulation and codification of
canon law.128 Roman law also armed the papacy with a political theory of
Church supremacy. On the other hand, perhaps as early as the time of the
Norman Conquest, canon law had lost some of its affinity for Roman law, and
popes were beginning to question that part of Roman law that made the will of
the secular emperor supreme.129 Yet, the treasures of Roman law were
extensive enough to allow imperial and royal Roman lawyers to produce
opposing arguments.130 “Roman law,” as Professor Haskins remarked, “was to
prove a strong bulwark of absolutism”131 and would serve lawyers on both

124. See Haskins, supra note 97.
125. That is, a revival and extension of Roman system and Roman methods of thought.
Historians no longer accept the legend of a miraculous discovery of the Digest. See id. at 194–98,
207.
126. The most significant development occurred in the lay school of the commune of
Bologna, where pupils began to study Roman law. 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 860–61. The
Church regarded this venture suspiciously, at first, but then realized its importance and began to
sponsor the revival of the study of Roman law. Id.; Haskins, supra note 97, at 21–23, 193–222
(revival of culture in Italy; revival of Roman jurisprudence), 368–96 (the beginnings of
universities).
127. So the study of Roman law “led to no career.” 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32,
at 122. Moreover, Roman law in England had no independent existence apart from canon law—
indeed, their close association seems to have been the cause of its original disfavor with the
English king; English common law was disadvantaged by not being taught at universities. See
Haskins, supra note 97, at 210–12, 219–20; see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at
117–25.
128. Commentators especially note Gratian’s synthesis of canon law in the mid-twelfth
century. GORDON, supra note 31, at 116–17. One historian of late medieval political theory
believes that Gratian “aimed at nothing less than establishing a basis for a Church-dominated
society.” Id.
129. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 70 (“For a time the papacy actually forbade clerics to study
Roman law, in spite of the canon law debt to the principles of Roman law.”).
130. See 2 FINER, supra note 29 at 861.
131. See Haskins, supra note 97, at 208; cf. 5 GIBBON, supra note 119, at 222 (“The recent
discovery of the Pandects had renewed a science most favorable to despotism . . . .”), available at
http://www.worldwideschool.org/library/books/hst/roman/TheDeclineandFallofTheRomanEmpir
e-5/Chap1.html; see also KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200–1600:
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camps—papal and imperial. The century between 1150 and 1250 was marked
by a series of clashes between the papacy and the emperors, but now the issues
at stake are more overtly political than those involved in the investiture contest,
and the terms of engagement more legalistic.132
Throughout the twelfth century, the popes attempted to establish that they
were the overlords of the emperors, the latter being mere vassals of the
papacy.133 Some emperors were receptive to this idea.134 Holy Roman
Emperor Frederick Barbarossa (1152–1190), “vigorously resisted such
pretensions by the popes.”135 Barbarossa, whose empire was the most
powerful state of twelfth-century Europe, became interested in Roman law.136
“The first emperor to recognize the importance of Roman law and the jurists
for shaping a theory of empire,” in justifying his rule, in serving the imperial
administration, and in defining his powers, Barbarossa took interest in the law
school of Bologna.137 He called upon professors of law to participate in his
government and awarded the law school in Bologna special privileges.138 The
Bolognese jurists, in turn, “busied themselves with twelfth-century imperial
ideology,”139 and proved Roman law amenable to claims of royal
superiority.140
Justinian’s Corpus Juris contains numerous statements appearing to
support the doctrine that the emperor had absolute and unlimited power. In
particular, two fragments from the Digest, both attributed to the great jurist
Ulpian, are often cited as reflecting Roman law. The first is “Princeps legibus

SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 10–11 (1993) (analyzing
Gibbon’s statement).
132. THE CRISIS, supra note 106, at 97. Professor Kenneth Pennington develops these themes
in his seminal work. He perhaps overstates the case in suggesting that, “[i]n the twelfth century,
the Roman and canon lawyers, the most important political theorists of the time, confronted an
uncharted terrain: the relationship of the prince and the law. Gradually they mapped it . . . .”
PENNINGTON, supra note 131, at 2 (emphasis added); see also Charles J. Reid, Jr., “Am I, by
Law, the Lord of the World?”: How the Juristic Response to Frederick Barbarossa’s Curiosity
Helped Shape Western Constitutionalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1646 (1994) (book review). The
debate did raise the level of intellectual debate and bring about extreme claims of supremacy.
133. THE CRISIS, supra note 106, at 99.
134. Id. at 99–100.
135. Id. at 100.
136. See PENNINGTON, supra note 131, at 9–10 (“[H]is court, his chancellors, his poets, and
his jurists were the most sophisticated of their time.”); THE CRISIS, supra note 106, at 99–101.
137. See PENNINGTON, supra note 131, at 12–13.
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id. at 14; see also Haskins, supra note 97, 207–08 (explaining that Barbarossa was quick
to use the arguments of ‘our Roman laws’).
140. “The emperor,” claimed the notary and chaplain for the court of Frederick Barbarossa,
the greatest emperor of the twelfth century, “was the living law; he could grant, abrogate, and
establish laws.” PENNINGTON, supra note 131, at 11.
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solutus est,” meaning “The emperor is not bound by statute,”141 and the second
is “Quod principii placuit legis habet,” meaning “What pleases the prince is
law.”142
The glossators, the interpreters of the Justinian Code after its rediscovery,
read these phrases as meaning that the ruler of the land is not subject to any
law. If an accurate interpretation, this could be attributed to the shortcomings
of classical Roman law that is notoriously thin on public law and to the fact
that it rose to its supreme heights—like the Empire itself—in the second and
third centuries, which were times of absolutist imperial control and growing
unrest.143 Yet these views of Roman law never stood unopposed. In medieval
jurisprudence the latter statement stood for an understanding of the law as the
law of king, or the law of the kingdom, and this was contrasted with other
views of the “law of the land.”144 In its entirety, Ulpian’s second statement
reads, “The will of the Emperor has the force of law, because by the passage of
the legis regia the people transfers to him and vests in him all its own power
and authority.”145 This fragment can be linked to other sources in the digest
that suggest that the people are the source of political authority, such as the
maxim “Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur,” meaning “What touches
all must be approved by all.”146 Indeed, the maxim was cited in the royal writ
by which King Edward I (1272-1307) summoned England’s first parliament in
1295.147
Moreover, some of the glossators shied from an interpretation of Roman
law as providing the emperor with absolute and unlimited power. Noted jurist
Accursius (1182–1260) construed the code as meaning that there was no
superior magistrate who could force the prince to respect the laws and customs
of the community, but he was still “internally” bound by conscience and

141. DIG. 1.3.3 (Ulpian, Ad Legum Iuliam Papiam 13); GORDON, supra note 31, at 117.
142. DIG. 1.4.1 (Ulpian, Libro Primo Institutionum); GORDON, supra note 31, at 117.
143. For an overview of Roman law and classical jurisprudence, see PETER STEIN, ROMAN
LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 12–22 (1999).
144. Jeremy Waldron, Legislation by Assembly, 46 LOY. L. REV. 507, 517 (2000). Medieval
jurists referred to that concept of “law” “as something held in common among the more important
inhabitants of the land, law as something that structured and articulated the relations of relatively
independent centers of power and authority on the ground.” Id.
145. Johan D. van der Vyver, State-Sponsored Proselytization: A South African Experience,
14 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 779, 779 & n.1 (2000).
146. GORDON, supra note 31, at 117. The question, in Roman law, whether the people have
permanently ceded their political authority to the prince predates similar, and perhaps presently
more familiar, debates in seventeenth-century scholarship. The point, however, is that the
question was under contention. See id. at 117–18.
147. Id. at 118 (“It also played an important role in the development of the movement, within
the church, to increase the power of the general councils vis-à-vis the papacy.”). See also BRIAN
TIERNEY, ORIGINS OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY 1150–1350 (1972).
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recognition of the divine origin of all law.148 Modern commentators have been
more critical. One legal historian has argued that the glossators had perverted
a doctrine of classical constitutional law that merely exempted the emperor
from the observance of certain legal rules into a general principle of
irresponsible absolutism.149
Finally, it is interesting to note that the question whether the king is “the
lord of the world” troubled jurists schooled in Roman law particularly in the
context of private property, which some believed was beyond the purview of
the royal powers because the origins of private rights were derived from
natural law.150
Roman law, as understood by medieval scholars, thus tended, albeit
equivocally, towards absolutism. It was less clear about precisely whose
power was absolute, but it was not supportive of claims for governmental
accountability.

148. See GORDON, supra note 31, at 117 & n.4.
149. Esmein suggested that French constitutional lawyers of the sixteenth century struggled
against this doctrine, yet its acceptance allowed for various abuses in French public life. See A.
ESMEIN, La Maxime Princeps Legibus Solutus Est Dans L’ancien Droit Public Français, in
ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY 201 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1913). The English experience has been,
of course, different, and, as Tierney put it—“Esmein accordingly took advantage of the occasion
[an address to an international conference in London] to congratulate his English hosts on having
escaped the glossators’ baneful influence.” Brian Tierney, “The Prince Is Not Bound by the
Laws.” Accursius and the Origins of the Modern State, 5 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 378, 378
(1963). For a comprehensive study of Ulpian (193–235 A.D.) and his legal scholarship, see
TONY HONORÉ, ULPIAN: PIONEER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (2d ed. 2002) (stating Ulpian’s work
was rooted in his ideology that was cosmopolitan and egalitarian). The term “glossators” refers
to the group of schoolmen who annotated law books, mostly Roman and Canon, with brief
marginal notes. They flourished chiefly in twelfth-century Italy. See, e.g., http://www.ku.edu/
~medieval/melcher/20000301/msg00351.html.
150. See PENNINGTON, supra note 131, at 24; Reid, supra note 132, at 1650–51. To round
up, the point observes: first, that since “the American Revolution was [waged mostly] against
perceived abuses of public power (the British government and colonial authorities).” Martin A.
Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States, 49 ME. L. REV. 21,
23 (1997). The U.S. Constitution provides for the taking of private property by the government
provided it is needed for public use and just compensation is paid. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Second, that “the French Revolution [of 1789] was directed primarily against private oppression
(the remnants of the feudal system and the power and privileges of the Church and aristocracy)
and the judicial class that was its bulwark.” Rogoff, supra, at 23. Third, it is interesting to note
that under Islamic law everything is God’s property, and God has deliberately created the
disparities in the distribution of goods in this world. Hence, no one may claim more than he has
earned. The results are most significant. Property rights are sacred; theft is an interference with
the divine plan and is punished very severely. At the same time, God urges people to do charity,
and some trade practices such as usury are forbidden. FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES,
III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND RETURN 53–69 (1998).
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Customary and Feudal Law: King and Tribe

Against this backdrop of Roman, and to a lesser extent ecclesiastical,
authoritarian legal doctrine, it is important to note the influence in medieval
Europe of customary and feudal law, which provided considerably less succor
to defenders of royal absolutism. These sources of law could hardly be called
“democratic,” but they envisioned some degree of accommodation between
kings and other actors and thus contained the seeds from which principles of
royal accountability could grow.151
a.

Tribal-Traditional-Customary law:

“Law, of course, there always existed, even in the darkest of the so-called
Dark Ages.”152 For more than five centuries, the great tradition of learned law
in Europe was reduced to local folk memories and some preservation in the
high forts of the Church.153 Yet even in this long period, from the fall of Rome
to the rediscovery of Roman law, the so called “Dark Ages,” the tribes that
occupied western Europe developed some form of law, which is known as
tribal or traditional law or customary law, and formed a third layer in premedieval European legal consciousness.154 This customary law largely
disappeared on the continent following the re-emergence of Roman law.
However, it had a more lasting influence in England, where Roman law never
took firm hold.
While every tribe had its own laws, the legal orders that they developed
from the sixth to the tenth centuries were remarkably similar, based on kinship
and trust within tribal households.155 At the peak of their sophistication in this
period, the tribes converted their customs into the so called “barbarian codes,”
compilations of tribal laws produced across western Europe during the second
half of the first millennium.156 The codes were written and administered by
jurisprudential laymen and had no claims of universal applicability—merely of
provincial validity.157 In private law, the codes took their influence from

151. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, Kingship Under the Impact of Scientific Jurisprudence, in
SELECTED STUDIES 151, 151 (1965).
152. Id. “Indeed, at no time in their history did the peoples of Western Europe lack a legal
order.” BERMAN, supra note 95, at 49. “The early centuries of the Middle Ages had plenty of
law . . . .” Haskins, supra note 97, at 194.
153. The closer the territory to Rome, the greater the retention of Roman laws in customs.
England, of course, was a far outpost even at the height of the Roman Empire. See Haskins,
supra note 97, at 195–96.
154. BERMAN, supra note 95, at 52.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 53.
157. Among the most famous are the Dooms of the Anglo-Saxon kings, the Lombard edicts,
the Visigoths law collections, and the Capitularia of the Carolingians. KANTOROWICZ, supra
note 151, at 151; Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law and the State: A History, 38
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Roman law (to the extent that it remained in memory and local customs).158 In
public law, the influences of tribal customs and church doctrine are much more
prominent. It is particularly worthwhile to look at the traditions of the
Germanic tribes of Europe because of these tribes’ dominance in Europe and
because the unbroken continuity of English constitutional history would begin
with the Anglo-Saxons, rural Germanic tribes that came from central and
western Germany.159 When we look at Germanic customs and codes, we can
make several observations pertinent to the role of the king in society.
The first concerns the political status of the king in the tribe. The social
organization of Germanic tribes was probably a primordial form of kingship.
Germanic law was acutely aware of the centrality of its own local leadership,
the leader/king and a council of elders around him.160 “Primitive” states were
essentially families, and their original bond of union was real or feigned blood
relationship.161 By the sixth century, tribal leaders considered themselves not
just tribal chiefs, but kings.162 Yet Germanic kings were not all that
powerful.163 Moreover, they customarily owed their position to an act of the
community or its representatives,164 the crown being, very often, elective and
not fully hereditary.165 That said, in most cases, kin-right was undeniably
supported by the vastly superior power and wealth of the royal house, and by
considerations of political expediency, counseling against a purely elective

HASTINGS L.J. 195, 207–10 (1986); Haskins, supra note 97, at 195–96; see also Henry Mather,
The Medieval Revival of Roman Law: Implications for Contemporary Legal Education, 41 CATH.
LAW. 323 (2002).
158. See BERMAN, supra note 95, at 53.
159. “Few if any traces of the old Celtic Society survived their invasions, and the 350 years of
Roman occupation failed to introduce into England any forms of government or law strong
enough to withstand the impact of Anglo-Saxons in the fourth and fifth centuries.” LOVELL,
supra note 19, at 3. See also J.E.A. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND: FROM THE ENGLISH SETTLEMENT TO 1485 (1937).
160. BERMAN, supra note 95, at 52.
161. See WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE: ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL
POLITICS 3–5, 7 (1892). It is only in modern times that one can state, that as a form of polity, the
tribe was an “evolutionary dead end.” Patricia Crone, The Tribe and the State, in STATES IN
HISTORY 67 (John A. Hall ed., 1986); see also 1 FINER, supra note 29, at 2.
162. On the transformation of migratory tribal chief to kings, see WILSON, supra note 161, at
154–55.
163. The Germanic king was far from an autocrat; his powers were neither unlimited nor
arbitrary. See CHANEY, supra note 116, at 7–10, 14–15, 28–33; KERN, supra note 109, at 9, 14,
25.
164. Thus, in principle, he was never established only by divine right or grace, but always
also by the people. See KERN, supra note 109, at 12, 60. Cf. BERMAN, supra note 95, at 62–67
(Christianity appealed to Germanic tribes as it supported tribal kingship).
165. See KERN, supra note 109, at 12.
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monarchy.166 By the fourteenth century, the old Germanic elective idea had
sunk into insignificance as the hereditary principles rose to prominence.167
The second observation concerns the social function of the king in tribal
settings. Kings provided tribal society with an integrating principle. As
Professor Berman explained, “in Europe, until the latter part of the eleventh
century, the basic contours of the folklaw remained tribal and local, with some
feudal elements. The kinship bond continued to provide the primary definition
and the primary guarantee of a person’s legal status.”168 “Where the kingship
was powerful, a coherent political system emerged,” such as in England,
Sicily, and France.169 “Where it was weak, the regnum dissolved into a
congeries of petty principalities, free cities, and even city republics: such was
the fate of ‘Germany’ and Italy.”170 England’s history as a nation state owes
much to its heritage of powerful centralized kingship.
The third, and most critical, observation concerns the relationship between
the king and the law. Looking at tribal codes, we find notions that seem
remarkably like “the rule of law” over the Crown: The king did not have the
legal power to do “wrong.” This is the impression we get from looking at one
of the most evolved codes, the seventh-century Visigothic Code. It blends
local traditions of that Indo-Germanic tribe that settled in southern France and
Spain, with Roman law and fierce Roman Catholic faith. The Visigoth Crown,
long elective and unsuccessfully attempted to be made hereditary, was first
bestowed by the votes of the entire people but then became dependent upon the
choice of the clergy.171 The Code contains a rule stating that “The Royal
Power, as well as the Entire Body of the People, should be Subject to the
Majesty of the Law,”172 even when another section clearly states that “The
Business of the King shall First be Considered, then that of the People.”173
In the tribal law setting, the leader was mostly unable to make serious
claims to unlimited power or political superiority, as would the Holy Roman
Emperor or the pope in the early Middle Ages. The tribal king seems more
like a “first among equals” than an absolute monarch.
166. KERN, supra note 109, at 14–15. But this does not entirely explain the strength of the
belief in such notions as royal magic, royal blood, and the exalted character of the ruling line. Id.
167. See id. at 25–26. For in early medieval times, the ruler, as heir of the family, received
his mandate from God and, as an elected prince, also received it from the community. Id. Yet, as
Chaney points out, “the tribal election of the sacral ruler was not a ‘democratic’ institution, as
nineteenth-century constitutional historians” portrayed it. CHANEY, supra note 116, at 16–17.
168. BERMAN, supra note 95, at 68.
169. 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 896.
170. Id.
171. See THE VISIGOTHIC CODE: FORUM JUDICUM (S.P. Scott trans. & ed., 1910); see also
Bibliography of the Visogothic Laws and their Context, at http://www.nipissingu.ca/department/
history/muhlberger/orb/vglaws.htm (last updated Jan. 18, 2001).
172. THE VISIGOTHIC CODE, supra note 171, at 12.
173. Id. at 13.
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Feudal Law

Feudalism was the basis for the social and economic structure of early
medieval Europe. By this time, the tribes were well-settled in their territories,
land ownership was the determinant of social order, and agriculture was the
basis of the economy. Feudalism provided a mechanism for financing the
government. It is important to understand that Feudalism was a two-way
agreement under which the feudal overlord granted rights in return for food,
military service, or religious support.174 The vassal was required to swear
obedience and loyalty to the lord, in return for obligations of protection of
maintenance. This mutual contract was binding for life and renewed
generation after generation; neither side could change or vary it in any way.175
Both parties could denounce and terminate the relationship if they felt the other
failed to keep his end of the deal, but although “defiance and divestment were a
matter of legal right, it [could] (and often did) take military power to enforce
the right.”176 Remedies were available in feudal courts in case of infringed
feudal contracts between overlord and vassal.177 In England, this meant that
the great barons were at a disadvantage in any dispute with the king because no
court in the land was available in which they could bring their contentions
against the king’s behavior.178 Although there was a time when both the king
of France and the pope were the feudal overlords of the English king and could
provide remedy for his feudal wrongs, for the most part the barons were
without recourse against the king.179 This state of affairs brought about, in
part, the Magna Carta in 1215, as described in detail below.
The explanations for the emergence of feudalism are varied. Feudalism
compensated for the fragmentation of political authority, the absence of
centralized administration, low literacy rates, and extremely limited
bureaucratic resources—all assets that the Roman Empire had that allowed it to
rule directly over large territories. Feudalism thus reduced kingship to the
simple role of overlordship. The king was not an absolute monarch, having
“had no immediate subjects except the greater barons and the vassals on his
own baronial estates.”180 Only in his own personal estates did the king
174. See Id.
175. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 53.
176. 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 866. In addition, the economy was not money-based at that
time; feudalism was also favored because it made use of ingrained customs of the Germanic
peoples. See WILSON, supra note 161, at 156–57; LOVELL, supra note 19, at 53; see also LYON,
supra note 36, at 128–29, 133 (describing a method “of obtaining service from land rather than
from money”).
177. 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 865.
178. See discussion infra notes 266–77 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. “And the greater barons were obedient only when he had armed power sufficient to
compel them to obey.” WILSON, supra note 161, at 158–59.
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exercise direct rule in such secular matters as defense, law and order, taxation,
justice, and general regulation of the community through his own appointed
and revocable agents.181 In due course, England and Sicily would become
notable exceptions to this state of affairs, as they developed particularly strong
kingships.182
The extent to which England was prepared for an onslaught of feudalism in
1066 is a fascinating, if very academic, question.183 What is clear is that the
Normans established a feudal system in England,184 that English feudalism was
different from its European counterpart, and the system was never absorbed
into English law in its entirety.185 Perhaps this was because continental
feudalism was generated more directly by territorial connections independent
of leadership and following, while in England the polity was based on personal
allegiance and relations of the leader with the great barons.186
Feudalism, as it developed in England, had various features that were vital
to the development of the English constitution, paving the road to the
accountable government. The first critical feature is the idea that the feudal
relationship, while unequal, was a contract. It required some form of consent
to participate and provided a two-sided relationship. This promised a measure
of fairness because both sides enjoyed some rights and were subject to some
obligations and neither was allowed to change the contract.187

181. 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 865.
182. Id. at 896. Elsewhere matters lay in the hands of territorial magnates and others down
the feudal chain could only be reached through their immediate masters. Feudalism, in its
essence, was a system of personal obedience and subordination, founded on land-ownership, not
of general obedience to a common law. Id. at 865.
183. The question is whether feudalism was a foreign system imposed in England or whether
England was approaching a feudal system on its own. There is disagreement on this as a matter
of constitutional history and as a measure of the strength and continuity of the Anglo-Saxon
communal traditions in the face of the Norman invasions. See LOVELL, supra note 19, at 16–17,
19–21, 25–35, 52–53 (discussing feudalism as foreign imposition); LYON, supra note 36, at 138
(claiming Normans adopted and evolved the Anglo-Saxon kingship); CHANEY, supra note 116, at
7; JOLLIFFE, supra note 159, at 51, 56–57, 78–79, 99–100 (taking a middle ground position).
Modern researchers increasingly discount the “long-accepted assumption that the land tenure
system was imposed by the Normans,” suggesting that most of the “basic elements” of this were
already in place at the time of the conquest. Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform,
Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439, 1442 n.7 (1994).
184. Cf. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 52–53.
185. Feudalism had a most enduring effect over land law, but many feudal rules, such as
taxation and much of the administration of justice, were rejected by English law. See A COURSE
OF LECTURES, supra note 64, at 154–55, 161–64.
186. See WILSON, supra note 161, at 149, 156–57; 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 273–80;
LYON, supra note 36, at 136–37. “Speaking generally then, . . . ideal feudalism . . . pretty
completely realized in France . . . was never realized in England.” A COURSE OF LECTURES,
supra note 64, at 163.
187. See 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 866.
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The second feature concerns remedies for infractions. There were, at least
in theory, some remedies available for infringements of a feudal contract in
feudal courts.188 Providing a court for the settlement of legal disputes was part
of the feudal obligation of an overlord to the people under his protectorate.
The overlord, however, was not subject to suit in his own courts.189 Under the
feudal agreement, overlord and tenant agreed that a remedy should only be
sought in the court provided by the overlord’s feudal master. The king, of
course, generally had no feudal master.190 This meant that persons holding
directly of the king—specifically the barons—uniquely had no judicial
recourse for claimed violations of the feudal contract, unless the king
consented to a suit in his court.191 The barons thus had a strong incentive to
seek out alternative mechanisms for addressing disputes with the king.
Third, the unique development of the English common law courts comes
from the king’s breach of the feudal structure. Royal courts started providing
legal services to the entire population, which placed them in (largely
successful) competition with the local seigniorial courts.192 By authorizing this
extension of royal jurisdiction into baronial affairs, the king was violating
feudal rules and enraging his vassals, mostly in an effort to increase his
revenues. The perhaps unintended result, as royal courts became dominant,
was the creation of a single law, common to the entire kingdom, and a direct
jurisdictional link between the king and the general population.193
Fourth, English government developed out of the household of the king, in
his capacity as a feudal lord. This last feature requires some detailed
discussion.
4.

English Feudalism and the Personal Nature of the Crown

The development of English government demonstrates well the
contribution of English feudalism and tribal-customary kingship to the
evolution of the accountable government. The personal nature of the medieval
English Crown is one feature of its history that seems particularly foreign to
American legal thinkers. Of course, the whole notion of a monarch as head of
government is anathema to American constitutionalism. American authors
often note that the President of the United States is not a king. Unlike the
English king, the President can do wrong and is accountable for his actions.194
188. See id. at 870.
189. See Ludwik Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown (1216–1377), in 6 OXFORD
STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 24 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1974).
190. See id.
191. See Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 23.
192. See 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 902–03.
193. See id.
194. “‘A government of laws and not of men’ was the rejection in positive terms of rule by
fiat, whether by the fiat of governmental or private power. Every act of government may be
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The founding generation was particularly familiar with the eighteenth-century
English kings, monarchs who shared power over government with Parliament.
The medieval and personal origins of national government would surely have
alarmed them; government administration began as part of the royal household
and grew from the tribal and medieval powers of the king.195 In the remainder
of this section, I wish to explain why English government developed out of the
king’s estate and the essential results of this evolution.
The personal nature of the monarchy meant that the institutions of English
government bureaucracy evolved out of the royal administration, initially
developed for the specific purpose of maintaining the royal household.196 By
the end of Henry III’s reign (1216–1272) there was already an administrative
machine in operation.197 The entire administration was under the control of the
crown. It was for the king to appoint, pay, discipline, and dismiss.198 The
struggle to limit the royal power—described in more detail below—essentially
meant that the barons wanted to have greater say in the appointment of officers
as they began to see that king and government were not necessarily one and the
same thing.199
Nevertheless, in the thirteenth century, the personal and the official
capacities of the crown were yet undivided and were both vested in the royal
person.200 The reason for this lies in the feudal nature of early medieval
kingship. On the one hand, the English kings were already by far the most
powerful actors in the territory, and they would later use their power to break
feudal restrictions and form the national kingship, at the helm of a central
government. On the other hand, the medieval English king was considered

challenged by an appeal to law, as finally pronounced by this Court.” United States v. United
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
195. See 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 899–900.
196. See LYON, supra note 36, at 254–56.
197. Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 19–20.
198. See id.
199. See Gaillard Lapsley, Some Recent Advances in English Constitutional History (before
1485), 5 CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 119 (1936); see also JAMES CONWAY DAVIES, THE BARONIAL
OPPOSITION TO EDWARD II: ITS CHARACTER AND POLICY: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY (1967). Interestingly, the coronation oaths of both Henry III and Edward I, probably
contained a “non-alienation clause” by which the king swore not to alienate the rights of the
Crown and to revoke what had been alienated, this not being part of the standard oath. ERNST H.
KANTOROWICZ, Inalienability: A Note on Canonical Practice and the English Coronation Oath
in the Thirteenth Century, in SELECTED STUDIES, supra note 152, at 138, 138–39 (1965).
200. Indeed, the unique national role of the king was not fully developed and recognized for
several centuries. By the thirteenth century, there was already the beginning of a “sense of an
institutional, as contrasted with the personal, character of kingship.” Ehrlich, supra note 189, at
18.
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“very like a feudal lord writ large,”201 with vassals below him and overlords
above.
Given the personal nature of government, the English expected the king to
carry out his public duties as protector regni from his own pocket; the king had
to bear the full cost of administering his territories, imposing his peace, and
conducting measures of “public weal.”202 There was initially no distinction
between national and royal revenue; it was all the king’s pocket money, to
spend or save as he pleased.203 By the end of Henry II’s reign, there was
already a nascent distinction between public and private funds.204 These
conventions were the source of great tension between king and Parliament in
the following centuries as it became apparent that the king was no mere feudal
nobleman but the head of an extensive government.205
Even as the Crown’s role expanded, English law disregarded the very
public nature of the royal undertakings. The king was treated like any other
nobleman who provided various services in his province.206 Like everyone
else, the king was expected to “live of his own,” even if that meant financing
Fourteenth-century legislation repeatedly
the entire government.207
incorporated this principle.208 At the same time, the king’s public role was
greater than that of any feudal baron, including his position as the “author of
justice,” head of the legal system, supreme judge and lawgiver of the realm,
and of course an active chief executive.209

201. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 460. “His powers were the powers of other feudal
lords magnified” and “[t]he organization of the average manor was the organization of the
kingdom in little.” Id.; see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 512 (commenting on
the “ordinariness” of royal powers).
202. No one was prepared to admit, even as late as the seventeenth century, that there might
be expenses for the king in his public capacity beyond those of an ordinary lord. LOVELL, supra
note 19, at 13, 248. See also 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 887; F.W. Maitland, The Crown as
Corporation, 17 L. Q. Rev. 131, 132 (1901) [hereinafter Corporation].
203. A COURSE OF LECTURES, supra note 64, at 94. Only much later was there any
“machinery for compelling the king to spend his money upon national objects.” Id.; 1 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 518 (stating that there was no line drawn between proprietary
rights of the king as king from those which he has in his private capacity).
204. See Martin Loughlin, The State, the Crown and the Law, in THE NATURE OF THE
CROWN 33, 51–52 (Maurice Sunkin & Sebastian Payne eds., 1999).
205. See LOVELL, supra note 19, at 174.
206. See RALPH V. TURNER, THE KING AND HIS COURTS: THE ROLE OF JOHN AND HENRY III
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1199–1240, at 235 (1968).
207. 2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 543.
208. This principle originated in 1311 and has been described as “constantly recurring.” 2
STUBBS, supra note 40, at 543 & n.1.
209. TURNER, supra note 206, at 235. In addition, the king was also a private person with
vast powers and resources. Id. In more florid terms:
The king was . . . the wielder of primæval quasi-priestly magic, the Lord’s anointed and
the transmitter of the wonder-working blood royal, the tribal leader and protector in time

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

426

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:393

This situation was not the result of legal oversight or of keeping antiquated
practices. It was the result of carefully considered policy by the English
Parliament.210 Control over taxation was a prime method to attain royal
accountability. The reason was quite simple; while the king had considerable
income,211 it was not unlimited, and the cost of the royal household—financing
both private and public expenditure of the king—was very significant. The
king could not really afford to impose his will on his barons without reliance
on the goodwill of others, as he simply could not afford to keep an army big
enough to quell all opposition.212 Moreover, the king needed the consent of his
barons for any change in the terms of the feudal contract—that is, for an
increase in his income.213 At the same time, the king lacked the power to force
the barons to consent to increases in taxes. In fact, it was generally true that
“no medieval monarch was ever fiscally absolute. Indeed, precisely the
reverse.”214 By the eleventh century, it was already established that the king
could not take the property of any freeman without his consent—or at least that
of the magnates, who were generally assumed to speak for their inferiors.215
The king could not impose taxes unilaterally; he had to ask the barons—later,
Parliament—for any additional income.216 The result was that English
monarchs were constrained in terms of monies available to them, and their
need of money to finance their government provided Parliament with a
practical and efficient restraint on royal powers.
The personal nature of early English government had significant
consequences. First, this phenomenon explains the very personal link between
the king and the royal court system. These were, in every sense of the word,
the king’s courts, staffed by his employees, operating at his expense.217 These
institutions fulfilled the king’s feudal obligations, even when the king used
them as a vehicle to both enhance his revenues and replace feudalism with a
of war, the feudal overlord of all the land, the fountain of justice and of honour, the
guardian of “the king’s peace”, the sovereign giver or declarer of the law, the bearer of the
secular sword on behalf of [the] Holy Church, and . . . the main switch in an
administrative machine that was later to be called the State.
CHRISTOPHER MORRIS, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND: TYNDALE TO HOOKER 12 (1953).
210. See LYON, supra note 36, at 550.
211. See 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 887; LOVELL, supra note 19, 5459, 7576, 83; LYON,
supra note 36, at 129–30.
212. 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 887.
213. See id.
214. Id. “This is [the] central feature of the medieval kingship.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
215. Id.
216. By 1340, Parliament passed a statute that abolished extra-parliamentary taxation of every
kind. For the history of the requirement of Parliamentary consent for taxation, see id. at 887; A
COURSE OF LECTURES, supra note 64, at 92–94; LOVELL, supra note 19, at 13, 69–71, 75, 83–84,
100, 111, 249; LYON, supra note 36, at 118, 135; 2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 544–49.
217. See 2 FINER, supra note 29, at 886–87.
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central, national government.218 This lends a deep logic to the notion that
under feudal law, the king was not suable in his own court against his will.219
The king was immune before his courts not because he was not under the law,
but because royal courts were not a forum that could act against the king’s
interests. Any attempt to hold the king accountable before his own courts
against his will was simply impractical. It was also legally unacceptable, for it
would make the king the judge of his own case.220 It is true that medieval
English kings used the royal courts well beyond the feudal constraints. Royal
courts extended their jurisdiction to the entire country, challenging the feudal
seigniorial courts, increasing the Crown’s revenues and producing a law
common to the entire kingdom―the common law.221 At the same time, the
feudal origins of the royal courts gave rise to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The king could not be sued in his central courts of law, “for no
feudal lord could be sued in his own court.”222 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
the United States has recognized that “[t]he [k]ing’s immunity rested primarily
on the structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the
[k]ing could do no wrong.”223
Second, the personal monarchy had very serious shortcomings, and
circumstances such as the minority of Henry III made these inadequacies
abundantly clear. Because medieval English government operated as part of
the king’s personal business, the king’s death or other legal incapacity had a
destabilizing effect on English law and government.224 Upon the king’s death,
government administration ground to a halt as appointments expired.225 The
king’s death would bring about the dissolution of Parliament and adversely
affect private law transactions requiring royal approval.226 Perhaps most
problematically, criminal cases would expire. This was because in early
medieval times the basis for royal courts’ general jurisdiction was the need to
maintain “the [k]ing’s [p]eace,” referring to the peace of the actual royal

218. See id.
219. Given that the king could actually sit in judgments in his own courts, some sources
suggested that the real objection was that of not having the king rule in a case to which he was a
party.
220. And so, while the English king is the “fountain of justice” and is presumed—so the
fiction goes—to be present in all his courts—“he cannot per[s]onally di[s]tribute ju[s]tice. His
judges are the mirror by which the king’s image is reflected.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *260.
221. See generally LYON, supra note 36, at 432–46.
222. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 465. See also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note
32, at 516.
223. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979).
224. See generally SIR MAURICE AMOS, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 90–96 (1930).
225. See id. at 94–95.
226. See id.
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person.227 Continuity of legal acts would have been beneficial, but “[t]he
medieval king was every inch a king, but just for this reason he was every inch
a man . . . . You did not ascribe to him immortality . . . or such powers as no
mortal can wield.”228 This explains, for example, why the Magna Carta,
signed by King John, had to be repeatedly reissued and confirmed by later
monarchs, as each had to make his own personal commitment to uphold the
grants and promises contained in the document.229
The case of Henry III demonstrates another hazard of personal
government, as the underage royal figurehead lost government powers to
unaccountable ministers and Rome’s representative. During the minority,
Henry III could not utilize the enormous powers that the English kingship
wielded at his time. Others in his stead and under his banner and name used
these powers. This was a matter of major legal concern, not merely an
anecdote of history.230
As the powers of the national government grew, it became clear that it was
both costly and dangerous for the kingdom to have the continued operation of
the administration depend on the well-being of a single human being.231 There
227. Id. at 94–96.
[T]he [k]ing’s death dissolved Parliament, his writs of summons having lost their virtue,
the commissions of the judges and the appointments of Privy Councillors [sic] terminated,
all judicial proceedings fell to the ground, and there was apparently at one time a
prevalent opinion that charters granted to boroughs, and legislative proclamations (when
the [k]ing still had power to make them) lost force at his death, and required to be
renewed by his successor. The “King’s Peace” also came to an end, and, until it was
proclaimed anew by the new Sovereign, it was said that “every man that could forthwith
robbed another.”
Id. at 94–95.
228. Corporation, supra note 202, at 132.
229. Originally sealed in 1215, the document was reissued three times by John’s successorson, Henry III, in 1216, 1217, and 1225, with some revisions and changes made to the charter’s
contents. GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 141–43 (1934).
After the close of Henry’s minority, the charter ceased to be reissued but rather came to be
confirmed; Henry III republished the charter in 1253 and reconfirmed it in 1265, and his
successor Edward I affirmed the charter by statutes in 1267 and did so several more times. By the
time of Edward III (k. 1326–1377), it became customary to confirm the charter at the opening of
every Parliament. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 15; MCKECHNIE, supra note 33,
at 139, 15759; LOVELL, supra note 19, at 118; SCHRAMM, supra note 44, at 202–03.
230. The time was one of grave national crisis, civil war, and foreign enemy presence in the
land—”not a time for constitutional dissertations.” 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at
15. But cf. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 464 (“It was recognized in Henry III.’s reign that
the king could be under age, and was entitled to the privileges of minority.”). Pollock & Maitland
suggested that the coronation of “[a] child but nine years old” must have “put the old theory of
the kingship to a severe strain,” in that it “showed that a king capable of ruling was no necessity;
all that a king could do might be done by a regent and a council in the name of an infant.” 1
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 522.
231. See generally 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 518–22.
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were various ways by which the king could be legally incapacitated—death,
minority, or mental disturbance for example—and it was necessary to secure
the continued operation of government in all these cases.232
This author explains in detail infra the main method used to achieve this
result was the concept of “the king’s two bodies,” recognizing the crown’s dual
legal capacities: the natural person of the king and the government of the
kingdom. English jurists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries developed the
concept of the “king’s two bodies” to explain why the king can never die and
“the king is never a minor.”233 The American Founding Fathers were most
likely familiar with these conventions of English law, well-established by the
eighteenth century, as carefully described in Blackstone’s Commentaries.234
These changes, however, came much after the times of Henry III. In the
thirteenth century, the minority presented very real hardships. During the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, English law provided a more effective
measure for controlling government ministers; the English cabinet became
accountable to Parliament, that is to the nation, not the king.235 Modern
English kingship has come full circle then, from the times of Henry III,
because the monarch has no powers in matters of government, only a formal
role as head of state.
Significantly, the hardship brought upon government during the minority
of Henry III had some positive doctrinal results. Ministers’ unaccountability
during the minority evolved into a system of significant and effective
constraints on the royal administration.236 During the minority, acts taken
under the name of the king were clearly those of his ministers.237 Hence, any
mistakes and wrongdoings were clearly theirs.238 This factual situation
allowed for a significant conceptual step forward; action taken on behalf of the
Crown could be in error (and as we shall see, the king was not permitted to do
wrong), and royal blunders could be ascribed to his ministers and would be
under the nascent theory of ministerial responsibility.239
D. The Legacy of Henry III: Lessons from Early Medieval England
English jurists of the thirteenth century were familiar with at least four
legal traditions from which they could draw ideas about the extent and limits of
royal power. The scholastic Roman and Church law seemed to point to
232. See generally id. at 524–26.
233. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 464.
234. See infra Part IV.D (on Blackstone’s Commentaries and their influence on the Founding
Fathers).
235. See infra Part III.C.
236. See infra Part III.C.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

430

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:393

theoretical extremes of authoritarianism. The more “grounded” Feudal and
tribal traditions, however, recognized the reality that the medieval kings simply
could not go it alone.240 Feudal law essentially limited the king’s jurisdiction
to his personal possessions and the barons, his immediate vassals. Tribal
traditions required some form of popular—i.e. baronial—support for royal
decision making.241 The reigns of King John and his minor son were patently
unsuccessful in that they exposed the limitations of royal powers. In failing to
maintain a firm hold over government, John and Henry established
constitutional conventions that would make the English government
increasingly accountable.242 King John placed his seal on the Magna Carta, a
baronial effort to force the king to acknowledge his feudal obligations under
the prevailing law.243 It is during the minority of Henry III that we find the
earliest English record of the maxim “that the king can do no wrong,” a
statement of factual truth during the minority, as the king had no legal powers
and could do neither good nor evil.244 From its humble beginning, the maxim
grew “by degrees . . . until it became a cardinal principle of the [English]
constitution.”245
III. MAKING THE KING ACCOUNTABLE
If one sets out to make a king in some way legally accountable for his
actions, there are two methods for achieving this goal. First, one can make the
powers of the king subject to direct legal limitations and enforce those
limitations through review, preferably by an independent (court) system.
Second, one can pry powers away from the king and vest them in other legal
entities, which in turn are subject to some form of legal review and control.
There are foreshadows of both methods in the history of democratic
evolution generally.246 English legal history pursued an especially complex
strategy for controlling royal power. The processes that developed in the
thirteenth and fourteenth century only came to fruition in the seventeenth

240. See supra Part II.C.3.a.
241. See supra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
243. See supra notes 63–64.
244. See 1 A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 27 (1908).
245. Id.
246. The research of Brian Tierney suggests “that the canonists of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries developed sophisticated theories of rights . . . that had far reaching, if little noticed,
influence on the development of western jurisprudence.” Reid, supra note 132, at 1661–62.
These rights “needed protection from arbitrary deprivations[,]” which was fully available in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries; only when the pope grounded litigants’ rights in natural law
could the claim be made that the sovereign is powerless to remove such rights. See id. See
PENNINGTON, supra note 131, at 145, 147–60, 189–200; see, e.g., GORDON, supra note 31 for
more extensive treatment.
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century, but they signify quite clearly the path that England would take
towards democracy. The initial debates concerned whether the king was
subordinate to law and whether legal limitations on the king were cognizable
in royal courts. The final resolution, reached by the fifteenth century, was that
the king is immune from suit in his own courts, though that resolution had
more to do with feudal principles than with an ideology of royal absolutism. In
addition, even after the principle that the sovereign is immune from suit was
established, equitable remedies were mostly available. At the same time that
English law recognized the king’s direct immunity from suit, the king
gradually lost the power to carry out the affairs of state in his own name, as
ministers became the main actors of administration. Those ministers were not
immune and could be subject to challenge in both court and Parliament. The
maxim that “the king can do no wrong” played a central role in the
development of this regime of ministerial accountability.
To understand this complex development, and to assess its significance for
seventeenth and eighteenth century understandings of governmental
accountability, we must turn once more to the formative thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries.
A.

Origins of Medieval Sovereign Immunity
It is stated . . . [t]hat until the time of Edward I the [k]ing might have been sued
in all actions as a common person.247

Could the king of England, not a minor and in full control of royal powers,
be sued in his own courts? The literature offers two contrasting views on this
question.
One important view comes from the thirteenth-century English judge,
clergyman, and scholar Henry Bracton.248 Bracton attempted to blend
elements of Roman and common law in his treatise The Laws and Customs of
England.249 The difficulty for this synthesis, as we have seen, was that the two
247. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437 (1793) (Iredell. J., dissenting). Edward I
(1239–1307) was the eldest son of Henry III; he was King of England from 1272–1307.
248. Henry Bracton, also known as Henry of Bratton or Bretton (Henricus de Brattona or
Bractona), lived from 1210 to 1268. Harvard Law School Library, Bracton Online, at
http://hlsl.law.harvard.edu/bracton (last reviewed April 2003) [hereinafter Bractin Online].
Biographic information is sketchy; it suggests that in part of his career Bracton was part of the
king’s immediate circle between 1248 and 1257. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 231–36.
Bracton apparently heard pleas before the king himself, and his signature attests that he witnessed
the signing of royal charters. Id.
249. In the original: De Legibus Et Consuetudinibus Angliæ. EDWARD S. CORWIN, The
“Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 & 365
(1928–1929), reprinted in EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 27 (1955). Maitland described this work as “the crown and
flower of English jurisprudence.” Bracton Online, supra note 248. The outstanding importance
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were pulling in different directions. Also, like other medieval legal scholars
working in England and on the Continent,250 Bracton had to find a way to deal
with the legacy of Roman law’s dictum “Prin ceps Legibu s So lutu s
Est.” 251 As a royal judge in the king’s court he could reasonably and
conveniently have incorporated into English law “Roman authorities, and hold
the view that the common law was the king’s law.”252 He could also have, as
Holdsworth terms it, gone for “the older Teutonic traditions, adapt them to the
new situation created by the grant of Magna Carta, and so strengthen the old
idea that law is a rule of conduct independent of the king.”253 Indeed, “[o]ne of
the maxims of medieval English political theory was that the king was under
the law.”254
Bracton’s starting point was the theory of the “two swords,” dividing
jurisdiction between two vicars of God: the pope, the spiritual ruler, and the
king, the temporal ruler.255 These “divine rights” give the king “an exalted
position but impl[y] clear duties: the king had only such powers as were
conferred on him by the law; for it was the law that gave him his position.”256
Bracton differed from predecessors and contemporaries in his positivistic
concept of law that rests on “the common sanction of the body politic.”257
“[T]he king is supreme in his realm” and cannot be held accountable in his
courts except at his pleasure—yet “royal power should be exercised subject to
the law . . . and . . . the law should be passed by the counsel and consent of the

of the work rests in the fact that for the first time it brought the rising common law into direct
contact with Roman and medieval Continental ideas of a higher law. Holdsworth admitted that
“[i]t is from Bracton that we get almost all our knowledge of this critical period in the history of
our law.” 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 231.
250. Bracton lived a generation after of Frederick II Barbarossa, who, legend has it, posed the
question “Am I, by law, the lord of the world?” to his legal advisors while riding horseback with
them. See discussion supra note 132 and accompanying text.
251. See infra Part II. Roman law influence on Bracton’s writing is substantial. See 2
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 267–86; HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS
CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 79
(1864), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/econ/mainea04.htm (suggesting that
what Bracton presented “as a compendium of pure English law [was] a treatise of which the
entire form and a third of the contents were directly borrowed from the Corpus Juris”).
252. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 252.
253. Id. at 253 (footnote omitted); see also Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 39 (discussing political
pressures Bracton had to contend with).
254. TURNER, supra note 206, at 235 (emphasis added). The conception was at the heart of
Magna Carta and was clearly expressed by Bracton. Id.
255. Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 40.
256. Id. This early theory of divine rights of kings is not quite that suggested in the
seventeenth century and discussed below.
257. CORWIN, supra note 249, at 28. “It embraces various elements: customs (unwritten
laws), decisions of prudent men, which in like cases should be treated as precedents—’[i]t is good
occasion to proceed from like to like’—and finally the law made by the King in Council.” Id.
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‘the magnates’ after due deliberation and discussion.”258 The rationale is that
only the almighty cannot err, and it is only befitting that the king should
respect the law. Furthermore, the law gives the king his royal estate, and so he
and his servants rule according to a law that binds all members of the kingdom,
whether high or low.259
It is unclear to what extent Bracton’s model of royal accountability means
that the king can be sued. It is possible to read Bracton, as has Professor
Ehrlich, to say that “the king can do no wrong” means “the king must not, was
not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong.”260 The problem then becomes one of
remedy. Most scholars read Bracton as saying that it is not for the king’s
courts to provide a remedy261 and that, in the final analysis, the sole redress
against tyranny is reliance on divine vengeance.262
Modern critics call Bracton’s work “scholastic and unworkable,”263 noting
the seemingly self-contradictory concept of a kingship at once above and
below the law,264 and the lack of clarity as to which authority can apply the
checks on the king.265 Nonetheless, Bracton’s work is a landmark in English
legal history and reflects the tension and ambivalence in thirteenth-century
thought about royal accountability.
Ehrlich suggests that Bracton, even given his ambivalent understanding of
royal amenability to suit, was “rather apt to err on the side of exaggerating the
king’s exemption from human judgment.” 266 Professor Ehrlich has argued that

258. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 253 (footnote omitted). This clearly follows the
Teutonic traditions. Id.
259. Significantly, “[t]he king’s servants did their work not merely as royal deputies
depending solely on the king, but as the dispensers of a law which binds all within the realm—
king and subject alike.” 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 254.
260. Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 42.
261. According to Bracton, “ordinary remedies are not available against royal injustice” in the
royal courts. CORWIN, supra note 249, at 29. Moreover, if the king “orders an official to do
wrong, the official can plead the royal order . . . and shares the royal immunity from jurisdiction.”
Id. English law developed very differently in later centuries, as we shall see. “Bracton has, in
brief, no idea of the modern concept of the ‘rule of law.’” Id.
262. Id. (“[T]hough doubtless this might operate through human agency.”).
263. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 143 (1957) (citation omitted).
264. The famous passage is translated as:
The [k]ing himself . . . ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and to the law,
for the law makes the [k]ing. Let the [k]ing then attribute to the law what the law
attributes to him, namely, dominion and power, for there is no [k]ing where the will and
not the law has dominion.
CORWIN, supra note 249, at 27; Loughlin, supra note 204, at 49 (calling this “paradoxical
reasoning”).
265. See summary of critique. Loughlin, supra note 204, at 49–51 (providing a summary of
modern critiques).
266. Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 9.
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in thirteenth-century England the king was clearly under the law,267 even
though the king clearly had special rights and prerogatives both as a feudal
overlord and as the center of the nascent government.268 According to Ehrlich,
the king’s claims were, as a rule, judged according to law, and furthermore,
“[t]he lawyers of the thirteenth century did not shrink from declaring that the
king, either by himself or through his servants, had committed a wrong.”269 At
the same time, even Ehrlich suggests that the king could not be sued against his
will for such wrongs and recognized that his broad view of the king’s
amenability to suit was decidedly temporary.270 Soon after the thirteenth
century, even on Ehrlich’s reckoning, English medieval law developed the idea
that the king is not amenable to suit.271 Yet he emphasizes that this
development of royal immunity did not result from a strong reading of the
maxim “that the king can do no wrong.” English law at that time had no
difficulty viewing the king as a potential wrongdoer.272 Ehrlich traces the use
of the maxim to the reign of Edward I and its initial legal meaning to be that
the king was under the same obligation as his subjects to act lawfully.273
Holdsworth similarly explained that, to the authors who argued in the
thirteenth to fifteenth centuries that law was a rule of conduct binding all
members of the state including the king, this limitation was no diminution of
the royal power. “It merely limited the king’s power to do evil, and this was
no limitation—an idea which is perhaps one of the roots of the later doctrine
that the king can do no wrong.”274 Thus, the immunity that even Ehrlich
acknowledges was to develop shortly after the thirteenth century must have
stemmed from some source other than a belief in royal infallibility. In the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, “Englishmen . . . believed that their [k]ings

267. Ehrlich concludes that “[f]rom the study of the original documents of the time we derive
an impression of a legality, real or pretended, pervading the whole system of relations between
the king and his subjects.” Id. at 12.
268. Id. at 18–19. Ehrlich concedes that royal powers were tremendous and that recovery
against the king was carried out by the king’s officials, hence, at his pleasure. Id.
269. Id. at 14 (“On the contrary, the wrong which we should consider the one most
corresponding with a modern tort . . . punishment was inflicted in the case of ordinary persons,
was recognized, in very many cases, as the king’s act.”).
270. On the contrary: Ehrlich identifies an early medieval concept that “where the king’s
interests were involved, recourse must be [made] to him”—in person—and that “made ordinary
suits against the king impossible. But alongside of it, stood the principle that a wrong committed
by the king or his servants remained a wrong.” The king “would seldom openly defy a request
for justice simply on the ground that he had the power to do what he pleased.” Id. at 25–26.
271. See id. at 14.
272. Id.
273. Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 61–62, 139–40 (stating that “the king was no more allowed to
do it, than a subject was allowed to commit a trespass or a felony”).
274. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 435.
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could do, and often did, wrong.”275 Article Sixty-One of the Magna Carta,
permitting the barons to take action to secure their rights is surely a crowning
piece of evidence. 276 As late as the fifteenth century, the council found it
within its power to remonstrate the king for his wrongdoings.277
It is commonly understood that the king’s immunity from suit ultimately
came instead from another basic doctrine governing the legal position of the
crown—the notion that “as the apex of the feudal pyramid, the [k]ing could not
be sued in his own courts.”278 As a seventeenth-century commentator put it—
”[t]he [k]ing cannot be sued by [w]rit, for he cannot command himself.”279
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about thirteenth-century law on
these matters. There is some historical authority suggesting that until the reign
of Edward, the king might have been sued in all actions as a common
person.280 At the same time, many scholars doubt whether “even Saxon
England was so democratic as to admit of the king’s being sued in the same
way as a subject, but it is practically certain that there was always some legal
remedy for injuries due to the act of the crown.”281 Holdsworth calls these
suggestions simply a fable;282 Pollock & Maitland describe such ideas as “a
pious legend of Westminster Hall.”283 It is more likely that what happened in
fact was that a remedy—an effective and useful one—evolved in cases of
claims against the Crown; this is the general cause of action called the petition

275. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 4. See also 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 465.
276. See ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 4. For a time after Magna Carta, the barons were still
contemplating forcibly correcting the king’s wrongs. A 1308 declaration suggests that “‘when
the king cares not to remedy an error and remove that which is harmful for the [c]rown and
obnoxious for the people,’ the error must be removed by coercion.” KANTOROWICZ, supra note
263, at 364–65; Cf. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 465 & n.11.
277. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 464–65 (referring to the reign of Henry VI; 1422–61;
1470–71).
278. Tom Cornford, Legal Remedies Against the Crown and its Officers Before and After M,
in THE NATURE OF THE CROWN, supra note 204, at 233, 235.
279. JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 457 (London 1785). In
contemporary words, “the courts, being the king’s own, could have no jurisdiction over him.”
12(1) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Crown Proceedings and Crown Practice, ¶101 (4th ed.
Reissue 1998) [hereinafter HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND].
280. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 516. Cf. Ehrlich, supra note 189, at 60.
Borchard strongly supports Ehlich’s study, suggesting that the maxim “was misunderstood even
by Blackstone and Coke.” Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2
n.2 (1924).
281. Charles Chauncey Binney, Origin and Development of Legal Recourse Against the
Government in the United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 372, 376 (1909).
282. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 465 (refusing to believe “that there had been a time
when the king was sued in his own courts like an ordinary person.”).
283. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 516 & nn.4–6 (citing Bracton to the effect
that writs do not run against the king).
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of right, in which the king consented to have a case against the Crown heard in
royal courts.284
Eminent British historian Holdsworth suggested that the maxim “that the
king can do no wrong” was finally settled as shielding the king from personal
liability only as late as 1485.285 It was admitted that there were certain acts,
which the king could not do, but “if he did wrong, the subject would have no
remedy.”286
So, could a thirteenth-century English king be sued? Perhaps. By the
fifteenth century, however, the king was clearly unaccountable in his courts
and action could only proceed against the Crown under royal permission.287
This was not the result of any theories of governmental infallibility, but rather
a result of remedial considerations arising from the structure of the court
system. But did these remedial considerations apply as well to suits against
agents of the king? This raises the profound question of whether royal officers
performing the king’s business were immune. The attempts of English law to
answer that question form the next chapter in the unfolding saga of
governmental accountability.
B.

The Accountability of Royal Agents: Policy Considerations

If the king is immune from suit simply because of the conceptual structure
of the feudal court system, there is no reason to think that the king’s agents
should also be immune. They, after all, do not stand at the top of the feudal
pyramid. However, once the king is granted a measure of immunity from suit,
that immunity takes on, so to speak, a life of its own independent of its original
rationale. Even if sovereign immunity originates solely in a procedural oddity
of feudal law, there may be ripple effects from that immunity that reach
beyond the person of the king. Thus, to determine whether royal agents should
be accountable, English law had to address the nature of royal immunity and
royal agency.
It made a great deal of difference whether English law viewed royal
immunity as a personal attribute, attaching to the royal person alone, or as a
characteristic of government, immunizing all people acting (legally) under an
official capacity. We are today familiar with the latter view, but an argument
in favor of the former was quite a plausible argument in medieval times. If one
284. And it became an almost automatic consent to suit because “it was admitted that the
king, as the fountain of justice and equity, could not refuse to redress wrongs when petitioned to
do so by his subjects.” 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 8. For more detailed discussion of the
petition of right, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U.
L. REV. 739 (1999); for further elaboration of petitions against the king, see TURNER, supra note
206.
285. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 465.
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 266–77 and accompanying text.
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takes this “personal” view of immunity, it is relatively easy to justify immunity
for agents who serve the king in a private or personal capacity, such as his
chambermaid, his stable-keep, or his accountant. Those people are essentially
extensions of the royal person. The practical problem in the early medieval
period is that the king’s agents did not have tasks or functions that could
clearly be defined as “governmental” rather than “personal.” Were the royal
judges “governmental” or “personal?” On feudal principles, the line is not
easy to draw. Government was, in essence, the personal business of the king,
whose personal finances effectively paid for government.288
Once one begins to draw a distinction between the king’s person and his
public functions, however, the legal world gets considerably messier. At that
point, battles over the accountability of royal agents become battles for control
over the operations of government. He who can control the agents, whether
through political or legal means, effectively controls the state. The parties to
these battles were well aware of these stakes.289
C. Royal Agents and Parliament
Starting in the thirteenth century, Parliament made various efforts to hold
royal ministers accountable using the related doctrines of ministerial
responsibility and impeachment. Admittedly, the efforts to transfer power
from the king, marginalize his position in government and make ministers
accountable to Parliament—possibly at the price of immunizing the royal
person—proved successful only much later in time;290 yet the thirteenthcentury antecedents are remarkable and noteworthy and proved useful when
revived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

288. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
289. They were also aware that if the principal enjoys immunity, attacks against the agent
could wholly undermine that immunity. Legal action against royal agents could effectively limit
the immunity to acts the king carries out in person. Royal actions carried out by agents may be
subject to review by some forum (judicial, legislative or other) that would have the power to
second-guess the policies the royal orders reflect. Royal discretion would come under scrutiny,
which may not be acceptable. Potential suits against royal operatives might have a chilling effect,
and the king may have difficulty obtaining the services of the most qualified individuals where
they may be personally accountable. Royal agents held accountable are likely to pass on losses
sustained to the king either by raising their fees or by asking for reimbursement. Royal immunity
is thus undermined. Similar logic brought about the government contractor defense. Cf. Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1987).
290. Ministerial accountability to Parliament became so well-entrenched that when the
“administrative state” was created in nineteenth-century Britain, Parliament gave new powers to
ministers—not to the Crown—to whom powers were normally given. This was “a vital
constitutional safeguard, since the ministers had none of the immunities of the Crown.” William
Wade, The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability, in THE NATURE OF THE
CROWN, supra note 204, at 23, 26.
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The term “ministerial responsibility” stands for two separate propositions.
First, it represents the concept that ministers, as agents, are accountable to their
principal. For the greater part of English history that master was the king.
From the seventeenth century on, the liability shifted toward Parliament as the
result of major struggles discussed below. Second, it reflects the doctrine of
the “legal responsibility of every Minister for every act of the Crown in which
he takes part.”291 The origins for both of these distinct—but related—
connotations of the term ministerial responsibility are traceable to the crisis of
1340–1341, discussed shortly.292
In its path to government accountability, English law used the maxim “that
the king can do no wrong,” and to a lesser degree, the concept of “ministerial
responsibility,” in a highly sophisticated way. The mechanism contained three
essential principles: (1) the idea that the king cannot himself act in an official
capacity but must always act through a servant, which would effectively limit
the king’s immunity to his personal affairs; (2) “that a servant of the [k]ing
should refuse to execute an unlawful command[,]” i.e., that the king “can do no
wrong” because the king is not empowered to order a wrong; (3) “that a
servant cannot plead the [k]ing’s command to justify his unlawful act”—if he
carried out such act, he may be liable in law.293 The result was that for every
government wrongdoing there existed, at least in principle, an accountable, i.e.,
non-immune, government official.294 “Together these three principles free the
King from all legal responsibility for the acts of his government and place that
responsibility on his ministers.”295 But at a hefty price, as history suggests, to
royal authority.
291. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 321
(8th ed. 1920) (explaining the distinction between the two meanings of ministerial responsibility).
292. GAILLARD T. LAPSLEY, CROWN, COMMUNITY AND PARLIAMENT IN THE LATER MIDDLE
AGES: STUDIES IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 262 (Helen M. Cam & Geoffrey
Barraclough eds., 1951).
293. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 4. The corollary of the maxim that “the king can do no
wrong” in the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries was “that the King’s servants could not
rely on royal orders as a defence, even where they in fact acted on royal authority.” In re M. 1
A.C. 377, 390 (H.L. 1994).
294. See R.K. GOOCH, THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 130 (1937). Assuming there was
some forum available to plaintiffs, the historical answer is that the forum was to be the royal
courts, but this depended on the strength of the constitutional principles and the impartiality of the
judiciary. Id.
As a matter of fact, a beginning was made when the Common Law Courts asserted, as a
corollary of royal immunity, that a minister could none the less not plead a command of
the King as justification for his own wrongful act. The House of Commons possessed in
the institution of impeachment an ultimate sanction for such ministerial accountability.
Id.
295. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 4–5. Roberts believes this multifaceted understanding of the
maxim was fully developed in the fifteenth century. Id. at 4. Other sources, as suggested below,
trace its elements to earlier periods. See Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
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The strategy chosen was the targeting of individual officers of the Crown.
The king could do no wrong—but his men could, and did. They could be sued
in private law action for tort or breach of contract, impeached by Parliament,
and held officially accountable through the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility.296 Thus came about the new theory of ministerial responsibility,
explained in terms of the maxim that “the king can do no wrong”—if the king
is in error, “the guilt lies only with the Minister who ought to have enlightened
him; and this minister, even if approved by the King, deserves the
impeachment formerly reserved for traitors.”297
The tools of ministerial responsibility and impeachment vested in
Parliament were designed to secure parliamentary control over the king’s
ministers, mostly his prime agents, who did not enjoy such protection as the
royal person. Parliament wanted to influence key appointments and have the
power to impeach government officials. The latter, a judicial stratagem,
secured that only legal orders of the king be obeyed because he had no power
to make illegal orders (“the king can do no wrong”), and it would be illegal
(beyond the powers, ultra vires) for his agents to carry them out. In an age
before official immunity for executive branch personnel, “rogue” agents
exceeding their legal powers could face personal liability.
The minority of Henry III was the starting point for these doctrines that
shifted blame from the Crown and demanded accountability from royal
ministers. During the minority and for some years afterwards, this blameshifting clearly made sense: The high officers of the realm, not the king, were
responsible for policy decisions.298 Later they came to be held to account
simply because they were easier targets than the king, who enjoyed a
comprehensive immunity.299 “No matter what the dictum, it now was the king
who was doing wrong in [the barons’] eyes. Nevertheless, they persisted in the
fiction that the fault lay with ‘evil’ and ‘foreign’ advisers.”300
The medieval doctrines were clearly efforts to undermine the Crown’s
prerogative immunity. The personal nature of early English government meant
ministers were part of the royal household, and their action was closely

Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 30–31 (1926) [hereinafter Borchard VI]. Having a liable agent is better
than facing a fully immunized government. Borchard’s critique reminds us that prior to the
fifteenth century, perhaps both king and advisors were held liable. See id.
296. In later times, further developments included review of administrative action by the
judiciary. For this final stage, see EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1963).
297. MAUROIS, supra note 36, at 270 (discussing this point in the context of the 1620s
impeachments).
298. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 121.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 122. This was a fiction the barons found useful in justifying their efforts to control
the government, as they had grown accustomed to during the minority of Henry III. Id. at 121.
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indicative of the king’s wishes; any interference with ministerial action was
tantamount to interference with royal policies, without directly attacking the
royal person. On the flip side, ministers were accountable only to the king, and
Parliament would try to advance the novel idea that the public administration
was not merely part of the royal-feudal machinery and that royal officeholders
had a duty to “the nation,” not just to the king. Parliament attempted to alter
ministers’ loyalties, making them accountable to Parliament. All of this was
part of the early constitutional struggles between Parliament and the king.
It is easy to expose the legal maxims utilized as the fictions that they are,
or to note their Realpolitik implications. As one author explained, the maxim
that “the king can do no wrong” does not mean that the king is “incapable of
sinning,” but rather it signifies the Realpolitik observation:
[B]ecause the king is the indispensable axis upon which the whole realm
revolves, he cannot be punished for the acts of his government—not if the bed
of justice and the defense of the realm are to be maintained. It is the king’s
ministers who will be punished for encroachments upon liberty . . . they can do
wrong. So “the king can do no wrong” is a useful fiction—which does not
mean that it is false.301

Thomas Paine was essentially right in suggesting that the maxim that “the
king can do no wrong” puts the monarch in the same league as people of
limited legal capacity and passes the liability to the ministers.302 Yet this was
precisely the political intention for which this immunity was constructed.
Similarly, the distinction between the Crown’s immunity and its servants’
liability is criticized as highly artificial—a legal fiction—“but in the [English]
system of remedies, evolved as it was from feudal origins, it was indispensable
for reconciling the immunity of the Crown with the rule of law.”303

301. RUSSEL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 403 (1974).
302. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 163 (Penguin Books 1969) (1794). Ministers, in turn,
may be able to avoid responsibility for political actions through Parliament. Paine stated:
When it is laid down as a maxim, that a King can do no wrong, it places him in a state of
similar security with that of idiots and persons insane, and responsibility is out of the
question with respect to himself. It then descends upon the Minister, who shelters himself
under a majority in Parliament, which, by places, pensions, and corruption, he can always
command; and that majority justifies itself by the same authority with which it protects
the Minister. In this rotatory motion, responsibility is thrown off from the parts, and from
the whole.
Id.
303. Wade, supra note 290, at 26. A similar fiction exists in American law; the Ex parte
Young doctrine makes it possible to maintain the semblance of state sovereign immunity and
permits personal suits against state officials who act unconstitutionally. 209 U.S. 123, 159–60
(1908).
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D. Ministerial Responsibility Comes of Age
McKechnie and many others describe the reign of Henry III as the starting
point for the gradual rise in parliamentary influence over the appointment of
the king’s ministers.304 At the time of his majority, the common council of the
realm made a new claim, that of “the right of nominating or confirming the
nomination of the great officers of state, the justiciar, the chancellor, and the
treasurer.”305 One consequence was that the council became a “neutral
ground,” where the “conflicting interests of King and baronage might be
discussed and compromised.”306 Another more significant development was
that “[t]he King’s own ministers, backed by Parliament, became an adequate
means of enforcing the constitutional restraints embodied in royal Charters.
The problem was thus, for the time being, solved.” 307 The solution found
before the close of the thirteenth century was “in the conception of a King
ruling through responsible ministers and in harmony with a national
Parliament.”308 As the Bishop Stubbs summed up the point:
It is probable then that the events of Henry’s minority had a considerable effect
in creating the idea of limited monarchy, which almost immediately springs
into existence. It is in all events not improbable that the constitutional doctrine
that the king can do no wrong, and that his ministers are responsible to the
nation, sprang up whilst the king was a child, and the choice of his ministers
was actually determined by the national council.309

304. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 163. Lapsley notes how the early government
administration—the royal household organization—was politically used first by high officials
then by the king himself, resulting in the effective exclusion of magnates “from what they
considered their due share in the control of administration and the determination of policy.”
Lapsley, supra note 201, at 139. This resulted in thirteenth-century baronial schemes and wars.
Id. at 139–41.
305. 2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 41. Stubbs offers: “In previous times, although new
appointments would no doubt be announced in the meetings of the great council, there is no trace
of such a claim.” Id.
306. MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 163.
307. Id. This is what schemes such as the Magna Carta’s chapter 61 failed to achieve. Id.
308. Id. McKechnie states: “The ultimate triumph of the principles underlying Magna Carta
was assured not through any executive committee of rebellious barons, but through the
constitutional machinery devised by Edward Plantagenet.” Id. at 164.
309. 2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 41. And things did not end with the power of appointment:
Is not the power to vest accompanied by the power to divest? And so Parliament went on to
acquire the powers of removal from office, i.e., the powers of impeachment, of which James
Wilson had the following to say:
The doctrine of impeachments is of high import in the constitutions of free states. On one
hand, the most powerful magistrates should be amenable to the law: on the other hand,
elevated characters should not be sacrificed merely on account of their elevation. No one
should be secure while he violates the constitution and the laws: every one should be
secure while he observes them.
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This description may well be too generous, and it was certainly not an
irrevocable state of affairs. With the king regaining his powerful position, the
barons were looking for a more permanent solution to the tough question of
taming the king. How could the king’s commitment to uphold the Magna
Carta be certified? How could the barons turn royal promises into law, which
both the king who made them and his successors would have to obey? The
Magna Carta was a major achievement, but its enforcement mechanism was
crude and extreme; further advances were made during the reign of subsequent
kings through the fourteenth century, in several steps.310 McKechnie credits
Edward I with starting the constitution on this line of development.
Edward I (b. 1239, k. 1272–1307) followed the long reign of his father,
Henry III (k. 1216–1272). The solution devised was quite ingenious: a
doctrinal use of the king’s elevated (and immune) legal position to distance
him from the daily acts of government—in essence, purposefully creating an
“agency problem,” in modern parlance, where it did not previously exist.311
Royal agents now carried out all official action, yet did not enjoy immunity;
the barons (and later, Parliament) found them easier to influence and control
than the king.312 The solution found was that the barons used the king’s own
administrative machinery and the king’s own servants to control him.313 As a
tool of democracy, whether intended or not, the maxim would be “made to
mean that the king in his own name can do nothing at all. For every wrong
done by the executive, a minister may be punished.”314
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 425 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). He also notes that
impeachments were known in Athens, among the ancient Germans, and in England. Id. It is
about England that he makes the following comment, without citing any authorities:
Previous to [the separation of the two houses of Parliament], the national council was
accustomed to inquire into the conduct of the different executive officers, and to punish
them for malversation in office, or what are called high misdemeanors. The king himself
was not exempted from such inquiry and punishment: for it had not yet become a
maxim—that the king can do no wrong.
Id. at 426. Cf. 1 FINER, supra note 29, at 346–47, 363–67 (1997) (discussing impeachments in
ancient Rome).
310. See Lapsely, supra note 199, at 139 (explaining that the Magna Carta was a forerunner
of future, periodic reforms).
311. See MCKENCHIE, supra note 33, at 475.
312. See id.
313. MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 475.
The principle was slowly established that the sovereign could perform no single act of
prerogative except through the agency of a particular officer or organ of the royal
household; while very gradually the doctrine of ministerial responsibility grew up,
compelling each officer of the Crown to obey not only the law of the land, but also the
Commune Concilium, fast changing into the modern Parliament.
Id.
314. Jesse Macy, The English Crown as an Aid to Democracy, 7 POL. SCI. Q. 483, 487 (1892)
(reflecting the nineteenth-century century understanding of English constitutional law).
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At the center of Edward I’s scheme was the “national king, achieving
national ends, [with] the funds necessary . . . contributed by the nation.”315
The system of taxation that he devised for this purpose, and that was meant to
fill the Exchequer while avoiding unnecessary friction with the taxpayers,
involved broadening the basis of Parliament.316 It was under his reforms that
the feudal Commune Concilium of the Angevin kings, attended only by Crown
tenants, matured into the “nobler ideal of a national Parliament containing
representatives of every community and every class in England.”317 A third
body, the permanent council, or inner royal council—the future Privy
Council—now emerged as the link between the king and Parliament, allowing
for the peaceful daily administration of the land.318 “The king’s personal
advisers [now began] to have a recognized position as a distinct and organized
body, of which the administrative officers, the judges, and other ministers of
state and household form[ed] only a part.”319 “The council had long been
increasing in power, in prestige, and in independence” and the minority of
Henry III only quickened the process.320 McKechnie depicts this council as
supported by the powerful Parliament, usually acting in alliance with the
leaders of the baronial opposition, and recruited of Parliament’s members.
When, in 1301, Parliament made a special demand for the removal of the
treasurer—the precursor of impeachment—King Edward I firmly rejected any
notion of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, stating “[t]hey might as well
take his Kingdom as interfere with his choice of his servants.”321
Throughout the troubled reign of Edward II (b. 1284, k. 1307–1327, son of
Edward I) “the problem of controlling the king pressed for a solution.”322

Instead of the twenty-four barons of Magna Carta to compel the monarch to do right,
there is the thoroughly established principle of the constitution that every royal act which
can affect the rights of the citizen or the well-being of the nation must bear the name of a
minister; it must be advised by a minister, and the minister is held responsible for the act.
That ancient legal phrase, “the king can do no wrong,” which had its origin with the
notion that the king, being the source of law, was above the law, is now made to mean
that the king in his own name can do nothing at all. For every wrong done by the
executive, a minister may be punished.
Id. But cf. PAINE, supra note 302, at 163 (noting reservations on whether such accountability
exists in fact).
315. MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 162.
316. Id.
317. Id. (noting that “[t]his implied no sudden dramatic change, but a long process of
adjustment, under the guiding hand of Edward”).
318. Id. at 163.
319. 2 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 40–41.
320. MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 163.
321. JAMES H. RAMSAY, THE DAWN OF THE CONSTITUTION: OR, THE REIGNS OF HENRY III
AND EDWARD I (A.D. 1216–1307) 476 (1908).
322. Lapsley, supra note 199, at 141
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As before, the opposition put administrative reforms in the first rank, but new
tendencies [were] observable. The baronage began to show a definite political
ambition, and from 1316 onward sought to realize it by securing a permanent
position in the council, enlisting the support of representative parliaments and
seeking to deprive the king of the control of the civil service which he
exercised through the household.323

The central department of government, the Chancery, was itself “a pioneer
in the development of government.”324 “From being simply the king’s
secretariat, the chancery became also a great office of administration and a
great court of equitable jurisdiction, working in both capacities without
immediate contact with the king.”325 During the thirteenth century, the
Chancery developed a system of written authorizations for departmental
action; this almost completely displaced the prior system of informal verbal
administrative commands, paving the way for the development of “clear
notions of ministerial responsibility” and rise of a professional bureaucracy.326
The myriad services that the Chancery provided the public meant that it no
longer could be physically at the king’s side.327 The combined effect of
Chancery reforms and parliamentary efforts to control the executive—
especially using statutes—was very significant. Many early statutes reflect
Parliament’s displeasure with royal action and policies; others attempt to
restrain illegal practices on the part of royal officers.328 The effect of such
statutes was limited until later times, but the statutes did bring about “the
common law principle that executive officers who act beyond their powers are
personally liable to an action at law.”329 “This principle was not applied to all
royal officers in the thirteenth century; but . . . it was consistently and
constantly applied” against relatively lower-ranked officials.330 Holdsworth
stresses that once the doctrine of ministerial responsibility reached its zenith,
centuries later, it was applied to all officials—high and low alike.331 There

323. Id.; see id. at 139–41 for Lapsley’s summary of the period.
324. 3 B. WILKINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1216–1399) 16 (1958).
325. Id. at 114.
326. Id. at 16.
327. Id. at 16–17. This is why, in addition to the “great seal” of the nation, kept in Chancery,
a “privy seal” was created by the twelfth century and kept within the royal household. See id. At
this time in history (but not for long), both seals signed documents representing the king’s will.
Id. at 17.
328. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 449.
329. Id. (emphasis added).
330. Id. These officials included sheriffs, holders of franchises, and collectors of subsidies—
and not the “more exalted servants of the crown.” Id.
331. Id. at 449. As Chief Justice Wilmot said in 1769, when awarding heavy damages against
the Secretary of State: “‘the law makes no difference between great and petty officers. Thank
God they are all amenable to justice.’” Wade, supra note 290, at 26.
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was, however, one more weapon that Parliament could use against the kings’
closest and favorite servants: impeachment.332
E.

Impeachment

Why impeachment? The need for the procedure of impeachment arose
because the actual battles were fought between Parliament and the king’s
ministers. Simply put: “The king ruled the courts and judges did his bidding.
Impeachment—after Parliament gained sufficient strength to employ it
independently—was an instrument by which the legislative branch could rid
the government of lawbreaking ministers or of judges who sheltered them at
the king’s behest.”333
As a matter of history, we must look first at an episode that occurred in the
1340s. The next steps came in the administrative crisis of 1340–1341 and in
the crisis of 1376, both occurring during the long reign of Edward III (b. 1312,
k. 1327–1377).334 King Edward III prepared to depart for the continent with
his entire household.335 Administrative arrangements, made by form of
ordinances, would make the king and his immediate advisors supreme and
invest the household with executive control over all offices of state.336 The
unity of command might have been advisable from an administrative
standpoint, but this was politically and constitutionally problematic: It
perpetuated the old tradition, or rather the old aim of governing the country by

332. The link between the two is well-established: “The practice of impeachment rested
clearly upon the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, as does modern cabinet government . . . .”
GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 209 (1921). See also
LAPSLEY, supra note 292, at 31; MAUROIS, supra note 36, at 135 (stating that “[t]his rudimentary
form of Ministerial responsibility was to be styled ‘impeachment’”).
333. IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 10–11 (1972).
334. King Edward III, at http://www.history-uk.com/england/monarchs/edwardiii.htm. The
son of Edward II, Edward III, became king in his minority under troubling circumstances.
Edward II let a knight named Piers Gaveston run England, antagonizing the barons. Edward II
(1307–27 AD), at http://www.britannia.com/history/monarchs/mon31.html [hereinafter Edward
II]. In 1310, the barons forced Edward II to accept the rule of a twenty-one member council of
Lords Ordains.
King Edward II (1284–1327), at http://www.stonewallsociety.com/
famouspeople/king.htm [hereinafter King Edward II]. The Council immediately banished
Gaveston; in 1321 they had Gaveston killed. Id. The barons were led by the king’s cousin
Thomas of Lancaster, who wielded real power in England until 1322, when King Edward II
regained control of the country. King Edward II, supra. The king recalled his new favorite,
Hugh la Despenser the Young, who was exiled by the barons. Id. Edward’s queen Isabella then
joined the exiled barons and, having secured possession of the young Prince Edward, landed in
England in 1326. Id. The queen and her lover, Baron Roger Mortimer, took control of the land.
Id. They had Hugh captured and executed. Id. As for the king—he fled but was captured and
forced to resign the crown; in 1327 he was murdered in prison. Id.
335. Lapsley, supra note 199, at 143.
336. Id.
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the king’s will and in his interest, like a private estate.337 However, it could
not be carried out as an administrative measure, and it was seriously
challenged.338
Spurred on by Archbishop Stratford, in 1341 Parliament demanded that
ministers of state answer to it for their conduct in office.339 State papers
exchanged between the king and the archbishop suggest Stratford first argued
that ministers are only responsible to the king collectively when there has been
no departure from a policy framed in council and authorized by Parliament.340
It seems the opposition, led by the archbishop, then wished to go further:
requiring that royal ministers and officers be appointed by the consent of the
magnates, take an oath in Parliament, and be answerable to Parliament for their
conduct during their term in office.341
With this unprecedented demand, Parliament made clear the political
alliance formed between Lords and Commons342 and had “launched into
English constitutional history a claim that it was to pursue with inconstant but
undiminishing zeal for five centuries.”343 During this time, “progress towards
ministerial responsibility was uneven.”344 As history recalls, the baronial
effort of 1341 culminated in a statute, which provided that the king’s ministers
and officers should be appointed by the consent of the magnates.345 This the
king accepted under political duress and later repealed.346 The next major step
came in 1376, when a new method was employed to secure Parliament a
means of control over the conduct of ministers in office: impeachment.347
The process of impeachment gave the House of Commons a way to control
royal ministers through a judicial process conducted outside the regular royal
courts. It breathed life into the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Over the
long run, it brought about the modern English constitutional structure: The
English cabinet, led by a Prime Minister, is accountable to the sovereign
Parliament and operates through its parliamentary majority.

337. Id.
338. Id. Other researchers identify an episode of 1330 as the first instance of impeachment.
See BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND
THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 1–3 (1998).
339. Clayton Roberts, The Growth of Ministerial Responsibility to Parliament in Later Stuart
England, 28 J. MODERN HISTORY 215, 215 (1956).
340. Lapsley, supra note 199, at 143–44.
341. Id. at 144.
342. And it made clear the break in their alliance with the Crown. See 2 WILKINSON, supra
note 324, at 204–05 (discussing the political background).
343. Roberts, supra note 339, at 215.
344. It was “precarious and halting.” Id.
345. Lapsley, supra note 199, at 144.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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The idea of the responsibility of the king’s ministers to the nation as well
as to the ruler, probably rejected or evaded in the 1340s, became effective
(despite royal opposition) in the 1370s when impeachment was used by
Parliament in a direct attack on the ministers and advisers of the Crown.348
The conceptual basis of this parliamentary attack was twofold: the supremacy
of the lex parliamenti by which ministers could be tried and loyalty to an
impersonal Crown.349
That Parliament had a judicial function was a given. In the fourteenth
century, a principal function of the House of Lords (the upper house of
Parliament and the successor of the feudal great council) was the dispensation
of justice.350 The House of Lords, as the High Court of Parliament, was the
supreme court of the realm.351 As such, it had a supervisory jurisdiction over
all inferior courts in common law, but it was also a court of first instance in
any case that the king decided to lay before it.352 It was as a feudal court—“a
court where royal vassals were triable under feudal law, that the House of
Lords was most prominent.”353 Toward the end of the fourteenth century,
Parliament acquired a significant privilege, when “the House of Lords became
a court where royal ministers were impeached.”354 Members of Parliament
realized that they could impeach—indict, accuse—royal ministers and other
royal officers for public misconduct, i.e., for offenses against the crown that
constituted high treason.355
The procedure consisted of an indictment by the Commons and trial by
peers in Parliament. The impeachments of 1376 were a daring novelty, and
their appearance had much to do with the unusual social and political
circumstances of the time, especially Parliament’s dominance during the
minority of Richard II.356 In 1376, the Commons laid before the Lords a series

348. 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324, at 53.
349. 3 id. at 120 (second emphasis added).
350. LYON, supra note 36, at 541.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. LYON, supra note 36, at 558. See also LOVELL, supra note 19, at 184–88 (explaining the
division of Parliament in the fourteenth century into two houses and their functions); CHARLES
HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 109–256 (1910)
(giving general information on the Parliament as a court); 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324, at 258
(stating that the impeachment proceedings of 1376 and 1386 were “the first formal and public
definition of the High Court of Parliament.”); ROLAND YOUNG, THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT 182–
84 (1962) (discussing how Parliament objected to King Edward III’s demand that his chancellor,
the Archbishop of Canterbury, be tried in royal courts and stating that peers, whether ministers or
not, can only be tried in Parliament before their peers).
356. In addition to the minority, the social and economical ravages of the Black Death were
very significant. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 192. From 1377 to 1389, during the minority of
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of charges against eight or nine persons, all in some way concerned with the
king’s business.357 It proved a significant constitutional advancement, another
step toward the ultimate goal—securing Parliament’s sovereignty.358 Highprofile impeachments followed in 1386 and 1397. In the first instance,
Parliament convicted five of the king’s closest advisors for treason under
pressure from five magnates (called the “Lords Appellant”); in the latter, it was
the king who coerced Parliament to sentence three of the Lords Appellant to
death, banishing the other two.359 Also in 1397, “the commons stated ‘before
the king in full parliament that they intended by his leave to accuse and
impeach any person or persons, as often as seemed to them good in the
parliament then sitting.’”360
It is important to note that medieval impeachments were far from an
impartial trial; often the Commons “were tools of the king or powerful barons
in their efforts to bring down political opponents.”361 Some commentators
Richard II (k. 1377–1399), Parliament essentially had control over government. Id. Determining
how impeachments came about “is still a considerable problem.” 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324,
at 205. Wilkinson discusses impeachments possible origins, including the “petition of right.” Id.
at 205–209. For biographical information on Richard II, see generally Richard II (AD 1377–
1399), at http://www.britannia.com/history/monarchs/mon33.html [hereinafter Richard II].
357. Richard II, supra note 356.
358. See Lapsley, supra note 199, at 145. See also RONALD BUTT, A HISTORY OF
PARLIAMENT: THE MIDDLE AGES 349 (1989) (suggesting that “the Commons acting as one . . .
were therefore not vulnerable to a countercharge of false accusation as an individual might have
been.”); 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324, at 209 (discussing the events of 1376 and whether the trial
of King’s ministers was a concern of Parliament because it “touched the welfare of the whole
kingdom”). In 1376, two royal ministers were “accused of financial malversation and found
guilty by the House of Lords.” LYON, supra note 36, at 558. “[Lord] Latimer was imprisoned,
fined, and deprived of his position as king’s chamberlain and councillor. Richard Lyons was
condemned to imprisonment and forfeiture of goods.” Id.
359. Richard II, supra note 356.
360. LYON, supra note 36, at 558. In 1386 the Commons impeached Michael de la Pole, the
chancellor of Richard II. Id. The older nobility was “resentful of the high places attained by the
upstart merchants of the De La Pole family.” LOVELL, supra note 19, at 192, The king was
powerless to help, and the earl was convicted and jailed. Id. at 192–93. The Lords Appellant had
acted against the king’s ministers until 1389. Id. at 193. “When Richard II came into power in
1397, he arranged for his supporters in the House of Commons to impeach his old enemies the
Lords Appellant.” LYON, supra note 36, at 558. He may have been too generous—”[o]ne of the
exiles was Henry Bolingbroke, the future Henry IV.” (k. 1399–1413). Richard II, supra note 356.
Henry returned to England in 1399 and was elected king by Parliament. Id. Richard was
deposed, captured, and murdered while in prison, “the first casualty of the War of the Roses
between the Houses of Lancaster and York.” Id. For further background, see also BUTT, supra
note 358, at 385–86, 397–98, 432–35; 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324, at 205–14, 252–69 (giving
a legal-historical account of the 1386 crisis and a discussion of the various techniques used by
Parliament against royal advisors); The Tragedy of King Richard the Second (A History), at
http://www.online-literature.com/shakespeare/richardII/ (summarizing Shakespeare’s famous
literary account).
361. LYON, supra note 36, at 559.
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stress the lack of principle and illegality behind the fourteenth-century
impeachments,362 while others have termed the new procedure “little better
than lynch law.”363 For better or worse—the barons were making a new kind
of law that was “not the king’s law . . . [but rather] was intended to be the law
of parliament.”364 In this sense, the barons were not imposing a regime of
lawlessness but refusing the dominance of the king in law; moreover, they
were making clear the distinction between the crimes against the person of the
king and those against the welfare of the realm.365
A process of political trial had been devised that was to be used ruthlessly
in the future as a means of getting rid of politicians who could not be removed
in any other way.366 “It would be some time before the commons would act
independently when they impeached royal officers before the House of
Lords.”367
Clayton Roberts suggests that medieval parliaments sought to enforce
ministerial responsibility by
impeachments, lords appellants, and acts of attainder, but their efforts led not
to a precocious constitutionalism but to a Tudor despotism that denied
parliament any control over ministers of state.
Yet the efforts of these medieval parliaments were not wholly in vain.
When the Eliots and Pyms of early Stuart England set out to enforce
ministerial responsibility anew, they seized two chief weapons from the
medieval arsenal: the doctrine that the king can do no wrong and the right of
the impeachment. The doctrine that the king can do no wrong had become the
law of the land in the fourteenth century, when successive parliaments sought
to make ministers, who could be punished, responsible for criminal acts
ordered by a king, who could not be touched. The parliament of 1376 devised
the power of impeachment in order to prosecute ministers of state whom the
king refused to prosecute.368

362. Wilkinson concludes that “personalities, not principles, dominated the struggles of
1388.” 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324, at 254.
363. ANTHONY STEEL, RICHARD II 152 (1962). The barons “departed, in 1388, from any
existing legal system. They adopted dangerous and unconstitutional methods . . . in imposing
their new concept of law upon the king.” 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324, at 257.
364. 2 WILKINSON, supra note 324, at 257.
365. Id. at 257–58.
366. This could “equally be used against any other of the king’s subjects.” BUTT, supra note
364, at 349. See also LYON, supra note 36, at 559.
367. LYON, supra note 36, at 559.
368. ROBERTS, supra note 339, at 215. But both of these devices “proved inadequate for the
purposes of early Stuart parliamentarians.” Id.
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IV. THE ENDGAME: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY
A.

Bridging the Gap Between the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

The advances made in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries fell by the
wayside of history. Magna Carta was almost forgotten, the impeachment
procedure fell into disuse, and the king had significant control of government,
with ministers being appointed by the Crown and being accountable to it.369
Then, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, everything changed.
England struggled through the turmoil of war and revolution. The result was a
new constitutional order, with a greatly strengthened Parliament and a muchweakened king. The means included a revival of ancient documents and
practices, favorable to Parliament’s claims—such as Magna Carta,
impeachment, and ministerial responsibility.370
Most American scholars are particularly familiar with this period in
English legal history, and for good reason. The English civil war is portrayed
as the heroic struggle between Parliament, fighting on behalf of the people, and
the reactionary kings, fighting for a “divine rights”-based absolutist monarchy.
Americans could sympathize with the anti-monarchist sentiment and with the
notion of a struggle for popular rights, especially as it mirrors their own fight
for independence a century later. At the same time, Americans, especially the
Founding Fathers, could define their constitutional beliefs by comparison to
the English regime.
A full account of the English constitutional struggles of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries is beyond the scope of this article. Part V therefore
revisits three essential themes of government accountability developed in
earlier parts. The author develops each theme, explaining the main changes
that have occurred in each since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the
position in eighteenth century English law, a period contemporary and familiar
to the Founders.
First, this Article examines the changing legal status of the English Crown.
The medieval perception of the personal kingship gave way in the sixteenth
century to a dual concept of the Crown containing both the personal attributes
of the king and the corporate function of government. This duality explains
why English law developed two forms of sovereign immunity: that of the royal
person and that of the government.
Second, the Article examines how seventeenth-century anti-monarchists
resurrected documents and practices originating in medieval times in an effort
to curb the excesses of royal powers. Magna Carta was presented as an
369. See generally MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, at 120.
370. Magna Carta’s appeal re-emerged during Parliament’s struggle with the first two Stuart
kings, “as a fundamental law too sacred to be altered—as a talisman containing some magic spell,
capable of averting national calamity.” MCKECHNIE, supra note 33, 120–21.
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authority on royal accountability, and the newly revitalized doctrines of
impeachment and ministerial responsibility were employed in a form similar to
their medieval antecedents. The question of whether the seventeenth-century
actors were faithful in reviving the old documents and practices is intriguing.
Modern historians suggest that Magna Carta owed much of its “greatness” to
its revivers and interpreters of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, rather
than to its thirteenth-century origins.371 It is possible that the seventeenthcentury parliamentarians only mistakenly found that Magna Carta “put the
king under the law, limited his actions by the collective will of the nation,
provided that there would be no taxation without parliamentary consent, and
guaranteed . . . that all men of England should have due process of the law and
trial by jury.”372 But this is a moot question. The historical document and
doctrine proved successful and had long-lasting effects. Royal powers were
limited, and government became accountable to a representative Parliament.
Third, the Article examines to what extent the “divine rights” theory was
valid in English constitutionalism. The short answer is that this theory never
took hold in England. The Stuart kings advanced this theory in support of their
claims of political supremacy, but it was rejected by English legal scholars,
then soundly defeated by Parliament. While some commentators associate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity (and the maxim that “the king can do no
wrong”) with the divine rights theory, this is unwarranted. Divine rights is
clearly a failed theory in England, a rejected blueprint for English government.

371. Until the late nineteenth century, Magna Carta was held in great esteem. LYON, supra
note 36, at 311. Blackstone called it the “bulwark of English liberties[,]” and the elder William
Pitt referred to Magna Carta as the “Bible of the Constitution.” Id. Bishop Stubbs wrote that
“[t]he whole of the constitutional history of England is little more than a commentary on Magna
Carta.” 1 STUBBS, supra note 40, at 571. Some twentieth century historians, however, think
differently. See generally Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV. 260 (1904);
LOVELL, supra note 19, at 112 (calling Magna Carta “one of the most notoriously misinterpreted
documents in English history,” due to succeeding generations reading into it “meanings relevant
to their own times”); HUBERT LISTER PARKER, MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW: AN
ADDRESS BY LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON, JAMESTOWN, VIRGINIA, JUNE 15, 1965, at 3
(1965) (suggesting that Stubbs “perhaps exaggerated”); DORIS M. STENTON, AFTER
RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA IN THE MIDDLE AGES, at v (1965) (referencing the modern view of
“the myth of Magna Carta”).
372. LYON, supra note 36, at 311.
Such interpretation was inaccurate; it was based upon what the common law lawyers and
parliamentarians wanted to find in Magna Carta rather than on what it actually said. In
effect, these men so modernized and so transformed Magna Carta to make it work for
them in the seventeenth century that it became a document quite unlike that of 1215.
Id.
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The King’s Two Bodies and the Two “Sovereign Immunities”

Seventeenth-century English kings were very powerful and essentially
immune from legal liability. Had the Stuart kings stood unopposed, England
might well have become an absolute monarchy, where the king enjoys
unchecked personal powers and is completely unaccountable. However, this
was not to be. By the early seventeenth century, when James I Stuart became
King of England, Parliament and its supporters were strong enough to block
royal attempts to expand royal powers. Moreover, the legal position of the
Crown had changed significantly. English law was moving away from the
medieval “personal monarchy” model to a dual model of the Crown, holding
the real person of the king and the corporate function of the national central
government. The reasons for this change and its implications in terms of the
accountability of the Crown are explored in this section.
The starting point was that medieval English common law was quite literal
in its treatment of legal subjects. The king, though he was the head of state,
was regarded as a natural man.373 He could be under age, and he could die.
“You did not ascribe to him immortality . . . or such powers as no mortal can
wield.”374 Contemporary canonists had no difficulty in turning the kingship
into an abstraction, but “English lawyers were not good at work of this kind;
they liked their persons to be real.”375 The powers of the thirteenth-century
king, explain Pollock and Maitland, were not an institutional or theoretical
matter, but those powers that the king could wield in fact. However, in “time
we see the beginnings of a doctrine of public or official capacities.”376 There
was a growing realization in English law that there was something to
“government” that was more than the legal capacity of the actual people
partaking in it. In 1365, we already find reference suggesting that Parliament
373. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 468.
374. Corporation, supra note 202, at 132. “And there was little cause for ascribing to him
more than one capacity.” Id.
375. Id. (noting a canonist notion from the time of Edward II that the king’s crown is always
under age and adding that most of the historical evidence suggests that the king was treated
“strictly and literally” as a man, “an Edward or a Henry”). The idea of double capacity was not
unfamiliar in England—but its application was very limited. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at
467. For example, the theory was put forward that the Archbishop of Canterbury has one
capacity as a cleric and another as an ordinary person. Id. at 467 n.2; see generally id. at 469–90
(explaining the concept of the “incorporate person” in England); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 32, at 523–24 (discussing the idea of the king’s “dual personality”); Loughlin, supra note
204, at 52 (discussing the idea that the Church’s conception of Christ’s two bodies—where the
Church was the mystical body of Christ— referred less to the ancient distinction between human
and divine and more to that between “the individual and collective, the personal and the
corporate, and the natural and the mystical body.”); id. at 59 (blaming centuries of difficulty in
the development of a coherent nature of the crown to “the traditional antipathy of English
common lawyers towards abstract thinking”).
376. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 523.
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“represents the . . . whole realm.”377 By the sixteenth century, we begin to see
indications of the recognition in English law of a possible difference between
the person and the office of the king; we find statements suggesting that “the
parliament of the king and the lords and the commons are a corporation”
wielding public power.378 What is lacking is an admission that the corporate
realm may be the subject of private rights.379
Holdsworth suggests that Englishmen would not let go of their vision of
the king as a natural man until “feudal ideas . . . ceased to influence politics”
and Englishmen began “to think of their ruler as the national king of a modern
state.”380 Recognizing that the king had a dual capacity—natural and politic—
helped in the sixteenth century to express “his new position as head and
representative of the state.”381
There was another difficulty with the concept of king as a natural person.
As noted earlier, in time it became very apparent that the personal nature of
kingship, while deeply rooted in common law tradition, had detrimental effects
on English governance.382 With the king’s death ending legal acts begun
during his reign, jurists were looking for a legal way to allow for continuity of
legal action, royal commission, etc. One way was to provide for such effects
by statute,383 another, was to make the Crown—if not the royal—immortal.384
This explains, in part, the unusual terminology and analysis employed by
English jurists from the Tudor period explaining “the king’s two bodies.”385
For example, Blackstone writes that the common law ascribes the king “in his
political capacity, absolute perfection. The king can do no wrong . . . . [and is]
incapable of . . . ever . . . thinking wrong . . . in him is no folly or
weakness . . . . in the king is no minority.”386 This language seems unusual and
377. Corporation, supra note 202, at 133.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 468.
381. 4 id. at 203.
382. Cf. Corporation, supra note 202, at 136. “The purely natural way in which the king was
regarded in the Middle Ages is well illustrated by the terrible consequences of . . . a demise of the
Crown.” Id.
383. Id. at 136 & n.4 (this process beginning when Edward VI came to power in 1547); 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 468 (explaining that in the reign of Henry VII Tudor (k. 1485–
1509) “a statute was needed to make it clear that faithful service to a reigning king was no treason
to a successful claimant to the throne”).
384. Maitland observes that the legal difficulties arising from the demise of the king were still
relevant when Queen Victoria came to power in 1837—military commissions needed to be
renewed. Corporation, supra note 202, at 136.
385. Id. at 134.
386. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238–41 (emphasis added). The king is also
invisible. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 263, at 4–5. Many of the Blackstonian statements are
as applicable, in some part, in contemporary English law. See 12(1) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF
ENGLAND § 48.
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is easy to ridicule and criticize, but it is more subtle and complex than is
immediately apparent and full appreciation of it requires some preparation.387
It is in the mid-sixteenth century that we observe the first distinctions
between the king’s “body natural and [his] body politic together indivisible . . .
these two bodies are incorporated in one person and make one body.”388 The
distinction between the natural and political capacities of the king were
elaborately stated in the several cases reported by Edmund Plowden. The
famous case of the Duchy of Lancaster (1562), concerned the validity of acts
made by King Edward VI when under age.389 The Crown lawyers all agreed
that the royal act was valid. The reason: the king “has in him two bodies.”390
His natural body is mortal and subject to infirmities and old age; his “Body
politic . . . cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government,
and constituted for the Direction of the People, and the Management of the
public weal.” 391 “[T]his body is utterly void of Infancy, and old Age, and
other natural Defects . . . which the Body natural is subject to.”392 As reported
by Plowden, in a 1559 case, Justice Southcote explained that the so called
“body politic” is a corporation containing both the royal subjects and the king
as their head.393 Lord Coke provided us with more familiar terms, classifying

387. Maitland does this in his essay, pointing out the odd results of this perception of the
king. See generally Corporation, supra note 202. But Kantorowicz refutes this in his book. See
KANTOROWICZ supra note 263, at 3–6. On the difficulty of reading Blackstone, see Brian A.
Snow & Willian E. Thro, The Significance of Blackstone’s Understanding of Sovereign Immunity
for America’s Public Institutions of Higher Education, 28 J.C. & U.L. 97, 105 (2001) (noting
Blackstone’s “use of tautology, such as the ‘king could do no wrong’ for the ‘the king is
incapable of doing wrong’ as a method for establishing legal maxims under a closed system of
logical peculiar to the law [and] his dependence upon legal fictions for the reconciliation of
obsolete legal practices with a more democratic system of justice”).
388. Corporation, supra note 202, at 134 (quoting EDMUND PLOWDEN, COMMENTARIES OR
REPORTS 213 (1816)).
389. During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I (q. 1558–1603), the legal question concerned the
validity of a lease of lands of the Duchy made by King Edward VI (b. 1537; k. 1547–1553) while
under age. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 263, at 7.
390. Id. (quoting PLOWDEN, supra note 388, at 212).
391. Id. (quoting PLOWDEN, supra note 388, at 221). The body politic is often also referred
to as the king’s “mystical body,” which is the politico-ecclesiastical terminology. Id. at 15–16.
392. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 263, at 7 (quoting PLOWDEN, supra note 388, at 213).
Holdsworth notes that jurists were applying the terminology that they were familiar with when
applying to the king the distinction between natural and corporate personality. See 4
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 202–03; KANTOROWICZ, supra note 263, at 7–9; Loughlin,
supra note 204, at 55.
393. Willion v. Berkley, 75 Eng. Rep. 339, 356 (K.B. 1559). With the king’s demise—the
body politic is removed “from one body natural to another.” Id. For this and other cases see
Loughlin, supra note 204, at 52.
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persons as either “natural” or “artificial,” the latter possessing the very
qualities missing in a “natural person” and so detrimental in a human king.394
Having made this distinction,395 however complex and inaccurate,396
sixteenth-century jurists attempted to give it content, that is explain what
powers the king had in each of his capacities and what limitations were placed
on his authority to exercise such powers.397 Some royal prerogatives, such as
the right to appoint justices of the peace and pardon crimes were termed
“inseparable,” meaning a right or power peculiar to the king and to the king
only.398 Similarly, while the king’s prerogative was subject to the law, “there
was a wide sphere within which the king could act as he pleased.”399
Seventeenth-century monarchist lawyers deduced from this distinction a theory
that the king had, inseparably attached to his person, a general absolute
prerogative to act as he pleased—but this, suggests Holdsworth, is not what
sixteenth-century jurists and statesmen had in mind. The king had a political
capacity as head and representative of the state; to that capacity, certain powers
inseparably attached (“they were . . . implicit in the idea of kingship, and
therefore inseparable from the person of the king”).400 The exercise of these
“absolute” powers—unlike the king’s “ordinary” powers—could not be called
in question in law court.401 At the same time, note that it was typically the
“ordinary prerogative” that was involved in conducting the government, and
those powers were regulated and bound by the rules of law. “The absolute

394. See Sutton’s Hospital Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612). “[F]or a corporation
aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the
law . . . . They cannot commit treason, nor be . . . outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no
souls, neither can they appear in person but by attorney. A corporation aggregate . . . is not
subject to imbecilities, death of the natural body, and divers other cases.” Id. (citations omitted).
395. The distinction is itself foreshadowed by doctrines of political theology referring to the
human and divine parts of kingship. The issue is discussed, in part, in this Article in the sections
regarding the power struggle between the papacy and princes and in part in the section on the
“divine rights of kings” theory. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 263, at 87–97.
396. There is a great deal of scholarly critique about the concept of the “king’s two bodies.”
See, e.g., Loughlin, supra note 204, at 53–54.
397. Cf. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 32, at 511.
398. The details are a lot more complex. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 204–05.
399. Id. at 206–07. The terms used for this distinction were “absolute” and “ordinary.” Id.
400. Id. at 207.
401. Id. “The English king therefore was far from being the sovereign power in the state.”
Id. at 208. On the current state of English law, see Wade, supra note 290, at 30 (explaining that
under current case law, reviewability of an administrative action does not depend upon the source
of the power but upon its nature and that prerogative power is reviewable, provided it is not nonjusticiable for some special reason).
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prerogative was unsuitable for everyday use and should be held in reserve for
unusual occasions.”402
In the sixteenth century, the king’s two “bodies” were usually deemed
inseparable.403 In Calvin’s Case, the court stated that while the king has “two
bodies,” the king has only one person. Therefore, any attempt to separate the
king’s political capacity from “the person of the king” is a “damnable and
damned opinion” which could lead to “execrable and detestable
consequences.”404
The seventeenth-century struggles accentuated the artificiality of the king’s
“two bodies” and the split between the two became apparent when Parliament
was fighting the king’s natural body by name of his body politic. Now, it was
Parliament that revived the medieval view of the king as a natural person and
the king who stressed his position as head of state and high authority through
the absolute prerogatives. In May of 1642, the Lords and Commons went as
far as to issue a declaration to the effect that the king’s body politic was
retained in and by Parliament whereas the king’s body natural “was, so to say,
frozen out.”405 The constitutional convention that was established from that
time on was that of the “King in Parliament”: The king—if only in his seal
image—together with the Lords and Commons constitute the political body of
the realm.406 Similarly, in 1649 when Parliament succeeded in having King
Charles I (k.1625–1649) convicted of treason and executed, they clearly meant
to execute the king’s natural body—“without affecting seriously or doing
irreparable harm to the King’s body politic.”407
The resulting constitutional convention is that the king, the House of
Lords, and the House of Commons acting together—and described as “King in

402. CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON & JANELLE RENFROW GREENBERG, SUBJECTS AND
SOVEREIGNS: THE GRAND CONTROVERSY OVER LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY IN STUART ENGLAND 11–
12 (1981).
403. However, in political terms, the political body was superior. Id. at 11.
404. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 390 (K.B. 1608); Loughlin, supra note 204, at 57.
405. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 263, at 21; see also MCILWAIN, supra note 355, at 352. For
more detail, see WESTON & GREENBERG, supra note 402, at 47 (describing the 1642 action by
the Long Parliament of “first separating the king’s two capacities and then claiming to control one
of them, namely his political capacity”). The two houses asserted the right and power to bind the
king in his political capacity despite opposition from his natural person. Id. (discussing further
the sufficiency of symbolic presence of the king and the royalist claim that Parliament cannot act
without the physical presence of the king).
406. KANTOROWICZ supra note 263, at 21–22. “[A]nd, if need be, even against the king body
natural.” Id. This would later be mirrored in the Puritan slogan “fighting the king to defend the
king.” Id. at 23.
407. Id. at 23 (noting the clear contradiction to the events in France when Louis XVI was
executed in 1793).
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Parliament”—constitute Parliament.408 Moreover, Professor Loughlin suggests
that modern constitutional scholars have grossly distorted history in
emphasizing parliamentary sovereignty; the sovereignty of the State, suggests
Loughlin, is more accurately represented as the sovereign authority of the
Crown acting through Parliament.409 Loughlin suggests that English jurists
were unable to develop a concept of the Crown that was disentangled from the
person of the monarch, which is why the maxim “that the king can do no
wrong” was extended to the Crown in its political capacity, thereby creating
immunity for the actions of government ministers,410 despite the motto’s
deeply personal language and original function.411
Moreover, the questions at hand are not historical; English law, to this day,
is unclear about the precise nature of the Crown. In 1608, Sir Edmund Coke
called the Crown “an hieroglyphic of the laws,” whose role it is “to do justice
and judgment, to maintain the peace of the land etc.”412 This places the king as
a legal symbol of public power but provides little detail of the exact contents of
such a position.413 In the late Victorian age, we find Maitland’s aphorism that
“the crown does nothing but lie in the Tower of London to be gazed at by
sight-seers,”414 and the question has only become more complicated in the
twentieth century as the administrative state became dramatically extended, as

408. The other branch of the English government, says Blackstone, is the executive,
“consisting of the king alone.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143; cf. DICEY,
supra note 296, at 37, 424.
409. Loughlin, supra note 204, at 47.
410. Id. at 47–48. One possible legal solution would have been to characterize the Crown as
a corporation aggregate rather than as a corporate sole, thereby including the wider government
beyond the monarch within the Crown; such ideas were employed in the 1978 case of Town Inv.
Ltd. v. Dep’t of the Env’t, 1978 All E.R. 359, 380 (H.L.) but were not widely adopted. See
Maurice Sunkin & Sebastian Payne, The Nature of the Crown: an Overview, in THE NATURE OF
THE CROWN, supra note 204, at 3–5.
411. Cf. Sunkin & Payne, supra note 410, 3–5. “Nothing seems more clear than that this
immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the King’s courts was purely personal.” Borchard,
supra note 280, at 4. In a congressional debate, controversial politician Henry Clay (1777–1852)
ironically referred to the maxim as signifying the personal immunity of the king. “The sacred
person of His Majesty must not be attacked, for the learned gentlemen on the other side are quite
familiar with the maxim, that the King can do no wrong.” Henry Clay, Why America Had to
Fight, 5 AMERICA, 131–32. For more on Clay, see http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl.index=C000452 and http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/B/hclay/hclay.htm.
412. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 390 (K.B. 1608).
413. Id.
414. A COURSE OF LECTURES, supra note 64, at 418 (suggesting the concept of the Crown
was merely “a convenient cover for ignorance” that “saves us from asking difficult questions”).
In another instance Maitland suggested that the Crown should be equated with the
Commonwealth—a corporation composed of the king and all his subjects together. See also
Wade, supra note 290, at 24–25.
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the Crown lost many of its traditional immunities,415 and as the king has
wielded little influence over the governance of England.
Sir William Wade suggested recently that the Crown means, “in truth . . .
simply the Queen, though the term is usually confined to her in her political or
constitutional capacity.”416 In modern case law, the House of Lords attempted
to clarify matters. In a 1978 case, Lord Diplock made the case for updated
vocabulary in public law; in the past, the term “the Crown” was convenient to
denote and distinguish the monarch “when doing acts of government in his
political capacity from the monarch when doing private acts in his personal
capacity, at a period when legislative and executive powers were exercised by
him in accordance with his own will.”417 In reality, the monarch’s role in
legislation has been restricted to advice and acquiescence. Therefore, instead
of speaking of “the Crown,” it is better to speak of “the government,” a term
that embraces both collectively and individually all the ministers of the Crown
and the parliamentary secretaries who direct the administrative work of the
civil service.418 In a more recent case, Lord Woolf stated that the Crown “does
have legal personality as a corporation sole or possibly a corporation
aggregate,”419 but while this statement goes some way to solve very ancient
legal questions, Professor Wade is probably correct in wondering how the
Crown can be both types of corporation.420
Taking into account the increasing gap between the “king’s two bodies,” it
seems very clear that current English law affords two separate “sovereign
immunities,” even if they are couched in similar terms, and seemingly applying
to the same entity—the Crown. The first is to the monarch in her personal
capacity. Halsbury’s Laws of England is quite clear on the matter. The
monarch’s person is regarded as inviolable and is, in principle, immune from
all suits and actions at law, either civil or criminal;421 this means, for example,
that the monarch and members of her household cannot be arrested. The
monarch is also not bound by custom and is only bound by legislation “by

415. Loughlin, supra note 204, at 35. And, especially as a result of the gradual emergence of
a concept of public law, the situation has become more confused. Id. at 61 & n.131. See also
TERENCE DAINTITH & ALAN PAGE, THE EXECUTIVE IN THE CONSTITUTION 12–13 (1999).
416. Wade, supra note 290, at 24 (footnoted omitted). For the process that led to this
conclusion, see Loughlin, supra note 204, at 36–37 & nn.11–13.
417. Town Inv. Ltd. v. Dept. of the Env’t, 1978 All E.R. 359, 381 (H.L.).
418. Id. Other Lord Justices had similar views in the same case. See id. at 386; for analysis,
see Loughlin, supra note 204, at 62–63.
419. M. v. Home Office, [1994] 1 All E.R. 377, 393 (H.L.). The case is noteworthy for many
reasons, one of them the suggestion of the Court of Appeal judges that no case could be brought
against the Crown because it lacked a legal personality—a view the House of Lords denied. See
Id.
420. See Wade, supra note 290, at 25.
421. 12(1) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 47.
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express mention or clear implication.”422 Nor is the monarch’s personal
property subject to the laws applicable in the case of a citizen.423 The
explanation given emphasizes the public nature of the monarch (“[a]s befitting
the person of the Head of State”) and is heavily indebted to Blackstonian
terminology (“[t]he law clothes the monarch’s person with absolute perfection;
hence the common law maxim that ‘the King can do no wrong’, and no remedy
lies against the monarch” because “the courts were her own and they could
have no jurisdiction over the monarch”).424 At the same time, it seems that
English law does provide remedies against the Crown in its personal
capacity.425
Under English law, the monarch “remains legally central” to the powers of
government, as she is formally the head of the executive.426 However, her
personal functions are now “restricted principally to attaching her signature to
various executive documents” prepared by government ministers, and
constitutional conventions “minimise the scope of her discretion.”427 Up until
the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, the only methods to obtain redress against
the Crown in the courts were the ancient “petition of right,” which depended
on royal permission or suits against the attorney general for a declaratory
remedy, or actions against government agencies that had been declared liable
to suit by statute.428 The Crown—in this context, the British government, not
the royal person—long enjoyed extensive immunities and privileges, in
particular immunity from liability for damages for torts committed by Crown
servants. The 1947 statute substantially altered both law and procedure.
Subject to certain exceptions, it abolished the special forms of procedure that
previously applied in civil suits by and against the Crown, and, for the most
part, the same rules now apply as in proceedings between private persons.429
Similar rules now permit suits against the Crown for breach of contract.430

422. Id. at §§ 47, 49 (emphasis added).
423. Id. at § 49.
424. Id. at §§ 47–48, 56.
425. Id. at §§ 47–49, 52–53, 56. See also id. at § 48 n.1 (noting that these statements are
more of historical than legal value). Section 56 suggests that several methods of redress that
formerly existed against the Crown presumably continue to apply in relation to the monarch in
her private capacity. Id. § 56.
426. 8(2) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 351.
427. Id. §§ 351–354.
428. 12(1) id. at § 101.
429. Id. at §§ 101, 102, 110–114. See also 8(2) id. at §§ 381–393. For text of 1947 Act, see
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/advisers/docs/lawvols/greenvol/pdf/g_0101.pdf.
430. 8(2) id. § 388.
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C. Ministerial Responsibility, and Impeachments, Again
“James [I, Stuart], like the Tudors before him, chose ministers and
favourites as seemed best to him; by the early eighteenth century ministers
could not govern without a Parliamentary majority.”431
1.

Re-Introduction

Medieval English law produced doctrines and tools that could serve to
limit royal powers and require government officials to act for the interest of the
entire nation and be responsible to a representative Parliament. However, this
is not to say these tools were used at any time soon afterward, or that they were
utilized in a fair and “democratic” manner, as we understand these terms today.
The seventeenth-century dispute between Parliament and the monarch was not
a purely idealistic struggle between supporters of democracy and a king’s
claim of a “divine right” to rule. This was a power struggle. It was deeply
personal. It was over money, fame, and glory.
The propertied classes who dominated Parliament and the local
administration opposed the development of a strong centralized government
and were reluctant to assume the additional financial burdens imposed by the
rising cost of government. By the early seventeenth century, it was no longer
possible for the king to “live of his own.”432 Hence, the impeachment of royal
ministers was not only a criticism of royal policies but also had more personal
and less-informed overtones, even when complaints were couched in terms of
protecting religious freedom or the common law.433 It was Parliament’s way to
protest a royal policy that did not admit Parliament a role in the appointment of
officers and in the framing of national policies.434 As for royal finances: “the
parliamentary opponents of the king during the reign of Charles I [(k. 1625–
1649)] insisted . . . that the finances of the monarchy be placed under

431. Steve Bachmann, Starting Again with the Mayflower . . . England’s Civil War and
America’s Bill of Rights, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 193, 197 (2000).
432. D.L. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 1485–1937, at 159
(9th ed. 1969). In the 1660s, Charles II paid into the Exchequer the cash portion of his wife’s
dowry and the proceeds of the sale of lands. Id. at 248. See also LOVELL, supra note 19, at 365–
66 (explaining that “the crown was utterly dependent upon Parliament financially”).
433. KEIR, supra note 432, at 159. “Personal and professional rivalries mingled their baser
alloy with the metal of their resistance.” Id.
434. Id. at 159–61. In Tudor days the practice existed of having privy councilor in the House
of Commons relay its “sense” to the king. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 298. “Certain of the more
able of James’s councilors, notably Sir Francis Bacon, . . . urged the King at least to consider the
views of the Commons.” Id. By 1621, “the House had little faith that the crown would act in this
manner, and it turned on those advisers of the king who seemed to be encouraging him to flout
the views” of the House. Id. In reviving the process of impeachment, the commons “acquired a
very dangerous weapon.” Id.
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parliamentary control. This principle was in part conceded at the time of the
Restoration in 1660.”435
2.

Impeachment, Again

Under the Tudors, the process of impeachment, the attempt to impose on
ministers a responsibility towards the nation as well as the Crown, fell into
disuse.436 But in the seventeenth century, after a century and a half of
desuetude, and as part of a comprehensive power struggle between the Stuarts
and Parliament, the “antiquated” procedure of impeachment was
reintroduced.437
In 1610, King James I denied a petition by both Houses of Parliament that
he allow his servants be arrested and sued as all other men.438 This was an
unprecedented, almost revolutionary request, and when the king denied the
submission, it became a watershed event in the relations between the Crown
and Parliament.439 Parliament resorted to an old weapon, long unused:
impeachment. The first instance of parliamentary impeachment in the
seventeenth century was directed in 1621 against two private individuals who
were monopolists (monopoly being a royal grant that had become a favorite
device of governmental finance).440 Once revived, the procedure was
immediately applied to the ministers of the Crown beginning with the 1621
impeachment of the Lord Chancellor.441 This most clearly signified that unlike
the Tudors, the Stuart kings could no longer protect their royal ministers; Lord
Chancellor Bacon had supported King James I’s views on the supremacy of the
monarchy and persuaded the king to ignore some demands of the Commons.442
435. VERNON BOGDANOR, THE MONARCHY AND THE CONSTITUTION 183 (1995).
436. KEIR, supra note 432, at 39. “When ministers fell from power . . . it was only because
the royal protection was withdrawn from them.” Id.
437. Id. at 160.
438. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 1.
439. Id. at 1–2.
440. KEIR, supra note 432, at 192–93. The monopolists, Michell and Mompesson, were
degraded from knighthood, fined, and imprisoned. Id. at 193. “Their patent, derived though it
was from an ancient prerogative, was resolved by the House to have been bad in law.” Id. In
1624, the prerogative to grant monopolies was restricted by statute. Id. See also ROBERTS, supra
note 14, at 25–42.
441. KEIR, supra note 432, at 193. The basis was his conduct as a judge, not a minister. Id.
Lord Chancellor Bacon (1561–1626, jurist, philosopher, and by some accounts the true author of
Shakespeare’s work) was accused of accepting presents from litigants in Chancery. Id. This
conduct was within the standards of the time and it could not be proved that the gifts in any way
influenced his decision. Id. See generally W.G. THORPE, THE HIDDEN LIVES OF SHAKESPEARE
AND BACON AND THEIR BUSINESS CONNECTION; WITH SOME REVELATIONS OF SHAKESPEARE’S
EARLY STRUGGLES 1587–1592 (1897).
442. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103
YALE L.J. 1651, 1670 (1994). “[P]hilosopher and scientist Francis Bacon, King James’ faithful
Attorney General argued–like Bodin–that monarchy” is a product and a requirement of nature;
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Now the king proved unable to persuade Parliament to spare his faithful
minister or that he be tried by a special commission; “[h]e was impotent except
to use his prerogative of pardon to alleviate the sentence of fine and
imprisonment which completed his Chancellor’s overthrow.”443
Next came the Lord Treasurer, Middlesex, impeached in 1624, and Lord
Buckingham in 1626.444 A favorite of both James I and Charles I (k. 1625–
1649), Buckingham was impeached on charges concerning acts done or
ordered by King Charles such as grant of titles and officers and measures taken
in connection with English wars.445 Allowing Parliament to conduct a trial over
the king’s apparently legal—if mistaken or unfortunate—actions would allow
the lords to pass judgment on the king, second-guess royal judgment, and
significantly lessen the king’s control over his ministers. Charles then
dissolved Parliament to prevent the trial.446 Impeachment continued to play a
major role in the tumultuous seventeenth century. In a clear effort to gain
control over governmental activity, Parliament used the impeachment process
against a series of royal advisors throughout the reign of the Stuarts.447
Parliament had the Earl of Strafford executed in 1641448 and brought ruin on
the Earl of Clarendon in 1667.449
the monarch thus is the final source of positive law—to which he himself is not subject. Id. In
1610, Bacon told Parliament that the absolute monarchy is the only stable form of government.
Id. Bacon avoided a trial by pleading guilty. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 299. He received a hefty
fine and a humiliating bar from holding public office. Id. See also EDWIN. A. ABBOTT, FRANCIS
BACON: AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND WORKS 139–43, 296–97 (1885).
443. KEIR, supra note 432, at 193.
444. Id. at 193–94.
445. Id. at 194.
446. Id. at 195. Buckingham had supported previous impeachments by Parliament to prevent
action into his own abuse of monopolies; he had lost his popularity in England for, among other
things, advocating royal marriage with a Catholic princess.
See id. at 193–94;
http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/report.asp?compid
=3468 (the 1626 proceedings); http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0809306.html
(biographical information). The romantic aspects of the Duke’s career figure largely in
Alexander Dumas’s historical novel, The Three Musketeers. See generally ALEXANDRE DUMAS,
TWENTY YEARS AFTER (David Coward ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1845).
447. Essentially—James I (1603–1625); Charles I (1625–1649), and after the restoration,
Charles II (1660–1685); James II (1685–1688); William III, Orange and Mary II Stuart (1689–
1702); Anne (1702–1714). See Monarchs, at http://www.britannia.com/history/h6.html.
448. The charge against Thomas Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford (1593–1641), perhaps the
king’s ablest and most influential advisor, was clearly couched in political terms—that he
allegedly planned to bring in an Irish army to crush Parliament. See KEIR, supra note 432, at
212–13. Strafford defended himself so well that the charges could not be established. Id.
Parliament passed a bill of attainder declaring Strafford guilty of treason without trial, and with
the king’s treacherous consent to the measure, Strafford was executed. Id. The king also
approved a law forbidding the dissolution of Parliament without its consent, turning this into the
“Long Parliament,” legally in existence until 1660, when it finally dissolved itself. Id. at 212–14;
LOVELL, supra note 19, at 316–17; The Earl of Strafford, Thomas Wentworth, 1593–1641, at
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In the 1660s, the king and his ministers still carried out the day-to-day
work of administration. In an effort to retain control, the Crown sought a
minister who would be a fine executive and a better parliamentary tactician
than his predecessors were; in the 1670s, the king found such skills in the Earl
of Danby.450 A capable financial administrator endowed with tact and social
gifts, the earl improved the financial situation of the Crown and to some extent,
won parliamentary confidence, even if, by 1675, his impeachment was
proposed.451 He also made the Lord Treasurer the most important position in
the government.452 By 1678, when it became clear that the minister preferred
the king’s interest over that of Parliament, Parliament attempted to impeach
Danby, and would not rest until he wound up jailed in the Tower of London.453
It did not seem to matter which advisors the king relied on; they all seemed
unable to protect the royal prerogative from parliamentary assaults and
encroachment. The struggle was for the ultimate prize—supremacy in the
land, “even over the Crown itself.”454 In the 1670s, the king had, overall,
preserved the royal prerogative against parliamentary encroachments. Some of
http://www.british-civil-wars.co.uk/biog/strafford.htm. For great detail of the trial see generally
JOHN H. TIMMIS III, THINE IS THE KINGDOM: THE TRIAL FOR TREASON OF THOMAS
WENTWORTH, EARL OF STRAFFORD, FIRST MINISTER TO KING CHARLES I, AND LAST HOPE OF
THE ENGLISH CROWN (1974).
449. See KEIR, supra note 432, at 249–50. Clarendon was the Lord Chancellor and the
leading figure in the government. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 365. The case is somewhat different
here because the earl (1609–1674), who was considered by Parliament responsible for various
misfortunes, found it difficult to control royal policies for which Parliament held him responsible;
by 1667 he fell out of royal grace. See KEIR, supra note 432, 249–50. Dismissed by the king and
impeached by Parliament for high treason, the earl fled to France—at the advice of the king—
rather than face trial. See generally LOVELL, supra note 19, at 365–66, 373–74. While in exile in
France he wrote his classic account of the English civil war—History of the Rebellion and Civil
Wars in England. For biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Edward_Hyde,_1st_Earl_of_Clarendon. With Clarendon’s departure, the office of Chancellor,
while still important, ceased to be the dominant one in the government. LOVELL, supra note 19,
at 373–74.
450. KEIR, supra note 432, at 253–54.
451. Id. at 254–55.
452. See generally id.
453. Id. at 256. Strapped for cash, King Charles II made secret bargains with the French king
for neutrality in return for financial aid; at the same time, the Commons favored an “actual war”
against France. Id. at 255. When Parliament became aware of the royal action, they impeached
Danby (1631–1712); the lords refused to convict Danby, and the king intervened with a
dissolution, granting the minister—who had now resigned—a pardon. Id. at 256. In the next
Parliament, the pardon was declared invalid and Danby was sent to the tower for an imprisonment
that lasted five years (1679–1684). Id. at 256; Danby, Thomas Osborne, earl, at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/da/Danby-Th.html (noting Danby’s influence during the Reign of
William and Mary (1689–1702) and Danby’s impeachment again in 1795 in connection with a
bribe from the East India Company); see also LOVELL, supra note 19, at 380–84.
454. KEIR, supra note 432, at 257.
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his greatest surrenders concerned impeachment: first, his pardon of Danby was
set aside; second, the lords had resolved that an impeachment was not
terminated by a prorogation or dissolution.455
In 1688, James II left England, leaving Parliament to declare the throne
vacant, then offer the Crown to William (III of Orange) and Mary II, with strict
conditions attached.456 Parliament then issued the Bill of Rights; a joint royal
assent made it a statute.457 Parliament has come a long way from its origins as
an agency of the Crown, summoned by sovereign.458 The procedure of
impeachment was never formally abolished but clearly went again into
desuetude. Last invoked in 1806, in light of the ministerial responsibility to
the Commons, it seems unlikely to be applied any time soon.459
3.

Ministerial Responsibility

The Bill of Rights of 1689 reduced the powers of the Crown; nonetheless,
those powers remained substantial and no politician could afford to ignore the
wishes of the sovereign.460 The appointment of ministers remained the right of
the Crown within the royal prerogative, as were many other powers, such as
foreign and colonial affairs and the administration generally, to which
Parliament paid remarkably little attention.461 Yet “in the exercise of the

455. Id. at 256–57. By the 1670s Parliament had extended its control over state expenditures
and various ecclesiastical powers and sought to extend it over diplomacy and issues of war and
peace. Id. “Prorogation” is “[t]he act of putting off to another day; esp., the discontinuance of a
legislative session until its next term.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999).
456. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 392–93.
457. Id. at 394.
458. See id. at 394–95. Mary was the daughter of James II, and William, her cousin, was son
of Mary Stuart, daughter of Charles I; both were, thus, grandchildren to Charles I. William III
and Mary II (1689–1702 AD), at http://www.britannia.com/history/monarchs/mon51.html. The
text of the Bill of Rights of 1689 is available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/england.htm.
459. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 187 n.14; KEIR, supra note 432, at 290; YOUNG, supra note
355, at 184 (explaining that “Parliament has held some seventy trials for impeachment, a quarter
of which were held in the years 1640–1642.”). Dicey explains that there is no longer a need for
this (and other) extraordinary measures to enforce the authority of Parliament because obeying
“the will of the nation as expressed through Parliament” is a basic constitutional principle, the
will of Parliament being, in essence, the law. DICEY, supra note 291, at 450. Also,
in the course of time, Parliament acquired the power and means to control the ministers
politically as well as legally. Indeed, when its control became political, its legal control
was almost altogether supplanted. If ministers must resign when their political actions are
unacceptable to Parliament, clearly they are extremely unlikely ever to reach the point
where they violate the law and become impeachable. Abundant evidence of this is to be
found in the fact that there has been no case, in more than two hundred years, of a
minister impeached for a matter related to his political duties.
GOOCH, supra note 294, at 130–31.
460. LOVELL, supra note 19, at 415.
461. Id.
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prerogative the crown would never act contrary to basic parliamentary
opinion.”462 Furthermore, Parliament alone could amend or amplify the law,
on which the validity of governmental action depended, and Parliament
supplied the bulk of the revenue required by the executive to perform its work.
Parliament could and did criticize government acts and policy, and in extreme
cases could impose responsibility through impeachment, but it could not go
further without transgressing the king’s control over the administration and
violating the principle of separation of powers.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility evolved in two ways, eventually becoming the cornerstone of
British constitutionalism.463 First, between 1714 and 1841 English ministers,
who came to operate within a cabinet headed by a prime minister, became
increasingly independent of the Crown.464 Second, the cabinet became the
central force in English politics. The cabinet was the center of government, the
executive, yet reliant on a parliamentary majority. English constitutional law
developed various methods to ensure ministerial responsibility, including
conventions governing the conduct of ministers, accountability to Parliament
and parliamentary oversight, and judicial review of administrative action.
Change was subtle, occurring gradually over time. While the royal
prerogative remained almost intact and the eighteenth-century sovereign was
clearly “no mere figurehead in the aristocratic constitution,” by 1830 no one
believed in the king’s independent exercise of real authority.465 Something had
changed significantly after 1689. The king had lost his personal rule in favor
of a more diffuse concept termed ‘the Crown,’ which had a wider meaning,
with the person of the sovereign being merely part of it.466 For one thing, it
was now clear to all that the king himself is replaceable, as well as his
dynasty.467
462. Id.
463. See Vernon Bogdanor, Geoffrey Marshall, in THE LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEOFFREY MARSHALL 1, at 8–9 (David Butler et al.
eds., 1999) (stating ministerial responsibility is still considered one of the basic elements of
English constitutionalism).
464. See BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 9.
The “preserving revolution” of the seventeenth century established the principle of
the supremacy of parliament. But, under the eighteenth-century “mixed constitution”,
power came in practice to be shared between the sovereign and parliament. “Content with
its practical assertion of the ultimate supremacy of Parliament, it left to the tact and selfinterest of subsequent monarchs the avoidance of any constitutional deadlocks that might
arise from unwise insistence on the letter of the prerogative.” The precise balance of
power depended upon the political vicissitudes of the day.
Id. (quoting JOHN B. OWEN, THE RISE OF THE PELHAMS 35 (1957)).
465. LOVELL, supra note 19, 416.
466. Id.
467. See id.
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In the early eighteenth century, the sovereign retained wide powers, which
he could exercise without parliamentary approval.468 “He or she retained, in
particular, the right to appoint and dismiss ministers and to determine general
policy.469 Indeed, until the accession of George I in 1714, it could still be said
that the “sovereign governed the country, even though required to govern
through ministers.”470
Following the 1714 death of Queen Ann, the last Stuart monarch, Prince
George I of Hanover ascended to the throne.471 The establishment as king “of
an elderly and unprepossessing German prince,” ignorant of the language and
character of England, “ushered in an age of almost unbroken internal
tranquility and external progress,” and in no small part, “precisely because of
the Prince’s disinterest in the land’s politics.”472 It was under this monarch
that the office of prime minister developed. From 1717 the king began to
absent himself from cabinet meetings.473 When he attended he was disinclined
to preside over the meeting. The senior minister took his place, and that
position became the “prime minister.”474 This high office was first acquired in
1721 by Robert Walpole and held by him for almost 21 years.475 These were
significant changes. Since the time of George I, the sovereign has attended
cabinet meetings “only on a very small number of formal occasions, or to
consider pardons, and since 1837, the sovereign has not attended cabinet at
all.”476 The sovereign role in the general determination of policy thus
gradually diminished, and a clear distinction was drawn between the head of
state, the sovereign, and the head of government, the prime minister.477 “It
followed that, if the sovereign was not primarily responsible for the
determination of policy, he or she ought not to be held responsible for the
outcome.”478 The developments in the eighteenth century gave rise to the
important convention of the responsible government479—to be responsible for
468. BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 9.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 9. It is said that before 1714 “the King or Queen governed through ministers; now
ministers govern through the instrumentality of the Crown.” 2 WILLIAM R. ANSON, THE LAW
AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION, pt. 1, at 54 (4th ed. 1935).
471. See KEIR, supra note 432, at 289.
472. Id. Queen Ann (1665–1714) was James II’s second daughter. After her death George I
(1660-1727), prince elector of Hanover, ascended the throne, his mother being the granddaughter
of James I. See generally LOVELL, supra note 19, at 416; George I (1714–27 AD), at
http://www.britannia.com/history/monarchs/mon53.html.
473. KEIR, supra note 432, at 318.
474. BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 14.
475. See generally LOVELL, supra note 19, at 442–43, 445; KEIR, supra note 432, at 320.
476. BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 14.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 14.
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all government action and accountable before Parliament and to royal courts of
law.
During the eighteenth century, the powers that the “sovereign retained
enabled him or her to exercise considerable, and sometimes a determining
influence on policy.”480 However, “these powers had to be exercised within a
framework of constitutional rules, which precluded arbitrary government.”481
The sovereign’s powers depended upon getting a responsible minister to
defend him or her in parliament. Within this framework, sovereigns still
sought to secure governments which could carry out their policies, but they
had to achieve this through methods of political management. They could no
longer interfere with elections, but they could seek to influence them. . . .
Similarly, sovereigns could no longer ignore parliament.

They could seek to influence Parliament, but they had to persuade it. “They
could not, in the last resort, overcome it.” 482 During the eighteenth century,
“the position of the prime minister . . . came gradually to rest not so much on
royal support, as upon the support of the Commons” as the power and
influence of the monarch declined.483 During the early nineteenth century, the
king lost his remaining power on policy determinations. Such decisions were
left in the hands of the government of the day with the sovereign having no
option but to accept it. There were many royal attempts to effect the election
of prime ministers. The final point was probably finally achieved in 1841
when Sir Robert Peel, “with no protest from the nation, formed a government
that did not possess the confidence of” Queen Victoria (1837–1901).484 The
principle of ministerial responsibility, or the responsible government, had
finally come to apply.485
The modern concept of ministerial responsibility builds on the medieval
notions but has much further-reaching ramifications. The British constitutional
convention is then, that the acts of the monarch must always be done through a
minister, and that all orders given by the Crown must be countersigned by a
minister when expressed in writing—as they generally are.486 In order that an
act of the Crown may be recognized as an expression of the royal will and have
any legal effect whatever, it must in general be done with the assent of, or

480. Id. at 9.
481. BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 9.
482. Id. at 10; see also ROBERTS, supra note 14, at vii.
483. BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 11.
484. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at vii.
485. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at vii–viii. “Yet the lateness of the achievement of responsible
government does not preclude the antiquity of its beginnings. As early as the year 1341
Parliament demanded that ministers of the King answer to it for their conduct in office. Five
centuries later it secured its demand.” Id.
486. See DICEY, supra note 291, at 322–23.
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through some minister or ministers, who will be held responsible for it.487 The
counter-signature feature of ministerial responsibility, “as the distinguishing
characteristic of the English Cabinet, made it possible for the traditional
position of the King to be left largely unaltered in theory, in spite of the
victory, at the end of the seventeenth century, of Parliament over the King.”488
Thus, “in the end, the position of the King became a formal one, and his
ministers became the Real Executive.”489
With the monarch’s declining control over his government came the
realization that “if the sovereign was not primarily responsible for the
determination of policy, he or she ought not to be held responsible for the
outcome.”490 At the same time, it was also clear that, “in the long run, no selfrespecting minister would consent to accept the consequences of royal acts,
unless the decision should be actually his own.”491
Thus, we have come full circle to the initial meaning of the maxim “that
the king can do no wrong” in the days of Henry III. The monarch simply has
no control over government action. British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston
explained in this principle in 1859 in these terms:
The maxim of the British Constitution is that the Sovereign can do no wrong,
but that does not mean that no wrong can be done by Royal authority; it means
that if wrong be done, the public servant who advised the act, and not the
Sovereign, must be held answerable for the wrongdoing.492

In contemporary terms, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility means
that the government must command support in Parliament,493 yet the doctrine
also means that Parliament is content with allowing the government to be in
control of the executive, in effect forfeiting its chance to take independent
action.494
The modern age brought difficulties in maintaining the doctrine, the prime
difficulty being that legal rules governing the English government focus almost
exclusively at the ministerial level. Ministers of the Crown “are ubiquitously
487. Id. at 322.
488. GOOCH, supra note 294, at 130.
489. Id.
490. BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 14.
491. GOOCH, supra note 294, at 130.
492. 3 THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA 449 (Arthur Christopher Benson & Viscount Esher
eds., 1907).
493. See YOUNG, supra note 355, at 182. Prime Minister Robert Walpole was defeated by a
majority of one vote in 1742, then again by sixteen votes, whereupon he reigned after 21 years in
office. See generally LOVELL, supra note 19, at 443–44. This incident was one of the early
attempts to enforce ministerial responsibility by compelling the minister to resign when he no
longer enjoys the support of the majority.
494. Id. at 188. “The Government is often prepared to modify its position to meet the wishes
of Parliament, yet the Government alone decides whether to accept the criticism, to reveal certain
types of information requested, or to conduct an inquiry.” Id.
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responsible for almost everything that is done in the name of Government.”495
“Not only is the Government as a whole held responsible for policy but each
Minister . . . is responsible within the orbit of his jurisdiction.”496 This means
that extensive civil service, or professional bureaucracy,497 is shielded from the
public discourse. This principle, also referred to as “civil service anonymity,”
means that any transgressions of the civil service must be explained to
Parliament by the responsible minister.498 In the age of the administrative state
this principle became almost impossible to maintain. Ministerial responsibility
was useful because it cleared the ambiguity of the word “government” by
providing it the narrow meaning of only elected politicians holding office,
namely, ministers. After all, “government” could have a much broader range,
including public organizations and civil servants.499
In an effort to increase efficiency and accountability, large ministerial
departments were reorganized into smaller agencies, and the provision of some
functions and services was privatized or based on private-sector business
methods.500 In this aspect, the British and the American models of government
share similar concerns. The English principle of “ministerial responsibility,”
essentially the linkage of accountability between the executive and the
legislature, was not admitted into American public law and has no immediate
equivalent in American constitutionalism. The modern difficulty of both the
legislative and the executive branches in maintaining effective oversight over
the administration is a shared concern, whether we discuss it under the caption
of “ministerial responsibility” or the non-delegation doctrine.501

495. YOUNG, supra note 355, at 185.
496. Id.
497. See RODNEY BRAZIER, MINISTERS OF THE CROWN 63–64 (1997).
It is an axiom of the British constitution that Ministers must sit in Parliament in order that
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament can be maintained. Only by being
present in Parliament can Ministers adequately defend their policies in the face of
Opposition attacks and, in the end, win parliamentary approval for what they are doing.
Id.
498. See YOUNG, supra note 355, at 185–88. See also 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 418–19 (Jay M. Shafritz ed., 1998) [hereinafter Shafritz];
Gordon, supra note 31, at 343–48 (regarding the British civil service). Civil servants cannot
publicly defend their actions. 3 Shafritz, supra, at 1411.
499. FIDELMA WHITE & KATHRYN HOLLINGSWORTH, AUDIT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND
GOVERNMENT 4 (1999).
500. See 3 Shafritz, supra note 498, at 1411 (describing that chief executives of agencies have
ceased to be anonymous civil servants, even if they do not have quite the same authority as their
American counterparts). See DAINTITH & PAGE, supra note 415, at 2, 5, 29–31, 39, 52, 231, 325–
26, 332, 340, 396; BOGDANOR, supra note 435, at 78–130.
501. See 1 Shafritz, supra note 505, at 498. In the U.S., “the principle of separation of powers
and the omission of public service in the Constitution leads to uncertainty as whether civil
servants are ultimately responsible to Congress or the president.” Id.
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D. The “Divine Rights” Theory in England
1.

Origins of the “Divine Rights” Debate

Critics often intimate a link between sovereign immunity and the “divine
rights of kings” theory. The argument is that, in England, the divine rights
theory precluded government accountability by holding that the king can
literally do no wrong.502 Such an argument is incorrect for several different
reasons.
First, as suggested in earlier parts of this article, the origins of sovereign
immunity were in a procedural bar from the result of feudal conventions.
English common law did not believe the king to be infallible but did view
sovereign immunity as a doctrine of substantive law.
Second, it is, of course, true that monarchy “has always required close ties
with divinity,” and even English law retained vestiges of ecclesiastical
influences.503 The fictions that were required in order to produce the theory of
the king as two bodies suggest some “godlike” features vested in the English
king.504 However, as explained in previous sections, this was not the result of
divine rights theories. These were concepts that enabled continuity in
government while retaining the monarch as the head of state.
Third, the divine rights theory was a familiar issue in European discourse
since early medieval times. Yet the conventional account suggests that the
502. See, e.g., Chrystal Bobbitt, Comment, Domestic Sovereign Immunity: A Long Way Back
to the Eleventh Amendment, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 531, 543–44 (2000); THEODORE R. GIUTTARI,
THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 7–8
(1970); see also David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972); Echols v. DeKalb County, 247 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1978) (Deen, J., dissenting) (“Sovereign immunity is a hybrid form of inherent power or
divine rights of kings, the bureaucracy, the despot or ruling power.”); Borchard, supra note 285,
at 5 (wondering how the king’s “alleged . . . infallibility, the apotheosis of absolutism, have by
evolution devolved upon the democratic American people”); Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No
Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349, 350 (1925) (noting that “an ancient convention based upon the denial
of [citizen’s legal] rights has been preserved and still flourishes under the protection of our
laws[;]” and while well aware of the English history of sovereign immunity, suggesting that the
doctrine is fit for a regime where “the reigning monarch possessed autocratic and unrestricted
powers, claimed divine origin and was the source of all governmental powers . . . . [T]he act of
the monarch, however wanton and arbitrary, was not a matter for redress.”); Harold J. Laski, The
Responsibility of the State in England, 32 HARV. L. REV. 447, 447–48 (1919). But cf. Weldon v.
United States, 845 F. Supp. 72, 76 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
503. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 17 (1988) (“[A]nd, in the Western world at least, politics have mingled
promiscuously with theology.”).
504. Id. (suggesting the fictions that established the corporate nature of the Crown, such as
continuity (i.e., immortality of the Crown) and the maxim that “[the king] could do no wrong”
endow the king with “all the attributes of divinity”). This does not mean that these attributes
established the divine rights of kings as a normative theory of government in England.
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divine rights theory never took hold in English law. Bracton and his
contemporaries manifestly rejected it in the thirteenth century, and only in the
seventeenth century was the divine rights theory advanced as an operative
scheme of government by the Stuart kings. In the ensuing confrontation,
Parliament and its supporters defeated the proponent of divine rights theory,
and laid their claim to rest.505 This account is perhaps too generous toward the
House of Tudor, at the expense of the Stuarts.
The historic and intellectual origins of the divine rights debate are in the
conflicts of the papacy and empire. Imperialist writers had produced countercontentions to papal claims of sovereignty whereby the emperor, not the pope,
is truly sovereign, and he is so by God’s direct appointment.506 Similar
arguments resurfaced from time to time, especially during the Reformation, in
response to papal claims of supremacy. It also served Tudor King Henry VIII
in his struggle with Rome.507 Complementing this argument, some researchers
find the origins of the seventeenth-century struggles between the king and
Parliament in the changing English monarchy during the Tudor reign (1485–
1603). Professor Borchard notes that the legal obligations of the sovereign
changed after the fifteenth century as the regime grew more autocratic.508
Such changes occurred, suggests Borchard, “during the Tudor despotism when
much nonsense about the immaculate king of transcendental prerogatives and
goodness was purveyed.”509 Those changes were “probably to be associated
with the growth of the prerogative, the strengthening of the kingship, the ideas
of divine right and of the absolute sovereign.”510
2.

The Troubles of the House of Stuart

It is true that the tension in the relationship between king and Parliament
was rising in the Tudor era, but both sides kept working together. “[The]
Tudor government had been highly successful in combining the principles of
505. See Bachmann, supra note 431, at 197. The divine rights theory did not take hold in
England as a matter of law and politics. The seventeenth century, which “began with James I
lecturing Parliament about the divine right of Kings,” ended with Parliament firmly in control.
Id.
506. See J. NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 14–15 (1896); see
also LOVELL, supra note 19, at 284.
507. FIGGIS, supra note 506, at 91 (noting “[t]hat compete sovereignty is to be found in some
person or body of persons in the State is a necessity of effective anti-papal argument”).
508. Borchard VI, supra note 295, at 30–31. In this period the maxim “that the king can do
no wrong” attained a meaning “that the king could do no wrong, in the sense that he was
incapable of doing wrong.” Id. at 31. How and when this transition in the meaning of the maxim
occurred is difficult to know. Professor Borchard points to the Tudor period. Id.
509. Id. (finding this change “directly contrary to the cultural tradition and constituted a
perversion of older views of the king’s responsibility”).
510. Id. Cf. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 20–23 (suggesting the Tudors built on and
extended the royalist theories of the royal prerogative).
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royal authority and popular consent.”511 The change came only after the House
of Stuart came to power in 1603, when the conflict between king and
Parliament became public. In fact, the struggle over the structure of the
English government, the powers of king and Parliament, and the religion of the
realm lasted throughout all of the seventeenth century.512 The Stuart kings
raised the divine rights question at the beginning of the seventeenth century as
a theory justifying their efforts to expand royal powers against Parliament. It
then became a major question in English political life of that period.513
There are three things of particular interest in the divine rights debate.
First, while the Stuart kings were the blood-heirs to the Tudors, they were not
Englishmen. Born in 1566, James I became King of Scotland in 1567 and
ascended to the English throne when his cousin, Queen Elizabeth I, died in
1603. By that time, James had a fully developed theory of kingship and an
inclination toward a conception of enlightened absolutism. The opposition the
Stuart kings encountered prevented English constitutionalism from falling into
royal absolutism of the Continental pattern. While Charles II Stuart was
struggling to consolidate his power, his cousin Louis XIV “was establishing
the most absolute regime in French history.”514
Second, it is misleading to view the conflict between the Crown and
Parliament as one between royal tyranny and popular liberties. It is true that
James I was a fervent monarchist and his son, Charles I, was probably not fully
qualified for the throne that he inherited in 1625.515 A deeply religious man,
Charles I pursued his belief in the divine right of kingship with solid

511. KEIR, supra note 432, at 154. “Tudor government . . . reposed on a tacit understanding
that neither would be pressed to an extremity.” Id.
512. To summarize the events of the seventeenth century: James I Stuart came to power in
1603, after Elizabeth I Tudor died; he was succeeded in 1625 by his son Charles I; the latter,
defeated in the civil war that took place in the 1640s, was tried and executed in 1649. The
“Commonwealth,” a republic, was established and dominated by Oliver Cromwell until his death
in 1658; the monarchy was restored in 1660, when Charles II, son of Charles I, ascended to the
throne. Upon his death in 1685, his brother James II became King. James II was unpopular
because of his attempts to increase the power of the monarchy and restore the Catholic faith.
Deposed in the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688–1689, James II fled to France, and was succeeded
by his daughter and son in law who reigned as Queen Mary II and King William III (1689–1702).
See generally ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 248–55.
513. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 12 (1968) (explaining why, in
England, the divine right of kings was a sixteenth-century idea).
514. MORGAN, supra note 503, at 96; see also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 6–11; Cf.
FIGGIS, supra note 506, at 135–36 (stating the background reasons to James I’s belief in the
divine rights theory).
515. See KEIR, supra note 432, at 157–58 (explaining that Charles was James’s second son,
who became heir upon the death of his elder brother and was not bred for kingship).
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conviction, considering the defense of royal authority his sacred trust.516
However, neither James I nor Charles I regarded the divine rights theory as
justifying cruel and tyrannical rule, and they likewise did not believe that the
theory allowed them to flout the law. Moreover, opposition to the Stuarts was
based in great part on self-interested motives.517 The propertied classes who
dominated Parliament and local administration were unsympathetic toward the
development of a centralized government that might challenge their
predominance, a process that began in Tudor days.518 In addition, criticism of
royal policy was often the result of personal and professional rivalries and, at
times, religious zeal.519 “Above all, [opponents of the Stuarts] were reluctant
to assume the additional financial burden imposed by the rising cost of
government.”520 The history of early Stuart government “is largely concerned
with unavailing attempts of an impoverished government to bring home to its
subjects the duty of providing adequately for its reasonable requirements.”521
Third, in seventeenth-century England, “divine rights” was not a question
of legal theory discussed among scholars. It was one of national policy,
demanding resolution. The divine rights argument was a clash between
contrasting legal cultures. Stuart ideas of divine rights and royal prerogative
were raised in direct response to the competing theories of popular sovereignty
and the rule of law. Confronted with divine rights theories, “common law
lawyers and parliamentarians marshaled out Magna Carta” and gave the
modernized reading with which we are familiar.522 The constitutional debate
of the seventeenth century as to where the ultimate sovereignty in the nationstate was situated produced a great number of theories on the nature of the
state and its government. These included books written by King James I, who
forcefully advanced his views on royal powers.
In his book True Law of Free Monarchies, written in 1598, while James I
was king of only Scotland, the king presented his philosophy of royal powers
in a coherent form.523 He also told the English Parliament his view on several
occasions during his reign.524 James rejected the view that it is the law that
516. See id. at 158. His father, James I, is described as a good-natured, peaceable and more
practical person. Id. at 157.
517. KEIR, supra note 432, at 158.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 159.
520. Id. at 158.
521. Id. at 159. “The Tudors had led the country out of the Middle Ages into modern times in
most respects, but they had omitted to modernize their financial arrangements.” LOVELL, supra
note 19, at 283. “Even Elizabeth, with all her parsimony, had been obliged to sell crown lands,
and had died in debt.” HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 6.
522. LYON, supra note 36, at 310.
523. JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES (1598), reprinted in JOSEPH ROBSON
TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, 1602–1625, at 187 (1930).
524. See Berman, supra note 442, at 1667.
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makes the king, who thus is subordinate to the law.525 Monarchy was a divine
institution. God appoints monarchs to carry out his will on earth.526 “Kings
[thus] derive their political power directly from God and not through a social
contract with their people.”527 Therefore, no mortal, not even the king, can
diminish royal powers.528 Any resistance to the king is a sin against God. Yet
such views were not exceptional. At the close of the sixteenth century, many
serious thinkers in Europe supported the divine rights theory as the ethical
justification for royal absolutism.529
3.

“Divine Rights” of King Debate – Resolution

The conventional wisdom that posits the Stuarts as authoritarian kings
against Parliament, the protector of Englishmen’s rights, is probably tilted in
favor of the winning faction. What is quite clear is that the English rejected
the political theory the Stuarts advanced. Legal history records incidents that
demonstrate the rejection of the divine rights of kings doctrine.530 One such
event concerns King James I and the eminent jurist Edward Coke. Another
concerns the trial and execution of King Charles II.
It is unusual enough to have a philosopher king who outlines his political
theory. It is even more unusual to find one of the king’s own legal team
attempt to refute his master’s ideas in open court. Yet, such accounts on an
interaction between James I and Coke exist. Coke was ever loyal to James I
personally, yet this loyalty was not unlimited.531 As royal judge and member
of Parliament, Coke argued that “Parliament and the Common Law remained
the sole sources of the law and that all things must be done by law, particularly
the defining of crimes, the levying of tax, and the judgment of cases.” 532
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. See id.
529. See Berman, supra note 442, at 1668. See also 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 11–14
(discussing TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES, supra note 523, and James I’s previous book,
BASILIKON DORON (1598)). Holdsworth finds the king’s political views to have been “not only
sensible but even in advance of his age.” Id. at 12.
530. See generally FIGGIS, supra note 506, at 138–74 (suggesting that some aspects of the
divine rights theories persisted much longer, finding place in later theories of natural rights and
sovereignty).
531. Steve Sheppard, Introduction to 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, at
xxv (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
532. Sheppard, supra note 531, at xxv. Coke referred to King James as “the fountain of
justice (as opposed to the fountain of law).” Id. Coke considered himself, to use Professor
Berman’s term, “his majesty’s loyal opponent.” Berman, supra note 442, at 1673. Coke (1552–
1634) was called to the bar in 1578 and was considered a brilliant lawyer and acquired a high
reputation. Id. at 1674. He entered public service in the final years of Queen Elizabeth’s reign.
Coke became solicitor-general in 1592 and attorney-general in 1594, and in those roles was
known as a champion of the Crown and its prerogative powers, prosecuting Essex, Raleigh, and
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Reports by Coke and others suggest that in a series of instances, Coke
objected to royal efforts to expand the Crown’s prerogatives.533 In some of
these cases, Coke was stating his mind directly to the king. In 1607, Coke and
his fellow judges informed the amazed king that he does not have the privilege
to sit in person and decide a case at law.534 In essence, Coke was making the
case for an independent judiciary and for the rule of law. In his own account,
Coke tells the king that the law was a golden standard, used to try the causes of
the subjects and protect “his Majesty in safety and peace.”535 Because the
implication that the king is under the law of man was treasonous, Coke
carefully repeated Bracton, “the King ‘is not subject to any man, but to God
and the law.’”536 Several similar incidents occurred in the following years. In
1616, King James I chastised the twelve common law judges for exceeding
their power.537 The judges refused to honor a royal request to stay proceedings
and consult with the king in a pending case involving the royal prerogative
over Church appointments.538 All judges but Chief Justice Coke swore never
again to flout the royal will. For this insult, Coke was removed from the
bench.539 In 1621, Coke became a member of Parliament, and there he played a

others. See generally id. In 1593, Coke was elected speaker of the House of Commons and
showed considerable skill in carrying out royal policies. Coke held this position until 1606 when
King James I appointed him chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas, then chief justice of the
King’s Bench. Id. Holdsworth suggests that once appointed to the bench, Coke found himself
able, for the first time, to freely pronounce his ideas about the position of the common law in the
state. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 428. Coke’s opposition to royal claims of power began
to become clear. Id. His views resulted in temporary removal from the judicial office in 1616
and in his imprisonment in 1622, two years after he entered Parliament. Berman, supra note 449,
at 1673. Coke’s fame also lies on his published case reports, treatises and speeches. These were
influential in both England and in the colonies, where they influenced many of the Founders. See
id.
533. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 428–29.
534. Id. at 430.
535. Id.
536. ABRAHAM, supra note 513, at 12. See also 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 428–31
(noting that “according to James I.’s view the judges were, like other civil servants, the officers of
the crown” and could be superseded by the crown in person). The notion that the king cannot sit
in judgment in royal court in person is conceptually significant. It makes the distinction between
the king’s powers as an individual and the corporate powers of the Crown quite clear. It also
eliminates one of the feudal rationales for sovereign immunity—that the king should not be judge
in his own case.
537. Berman, supra note 442, at 1675.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 1675–76; 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 439–41. There were several other
cases where Coke’s judgment stood in sharp contrast those of the king. In 1610, Coke and the
judges of the Common Pleas found that the ecclesiastical courts did not have the power to
imprison for adultery, thereby giving “a new turn to the theory of subordination of church to state
expressed” by Henry VIII Tudor. This was against the will of James I, but the King was at that
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prominent role in terms of both sheer activity in the House and in leadership
and advocacy of Parliament’s cause.540
Another indication of English opposition to Stuart monarchism took place
during the English Civil Wars of 1642–1660. By the 1640s, Parliament was
powerful enough to challenge the English king and take full control over the
government of the nation.541 Parliament proved stronger, and, in the unusual
circumstances of the time, was willing to allow for the unprecedented measure
of the trial and execution of King Charles I.542 In January 1649, Parliament
established a High Court of Justice. The trial of Charles I was held in
Westminster from January 20 to 27 before some seventy commissioners.
Accused of “a wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and
tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to overthrow the rights and
liberties of the people,”543 the king reaffirmed his belief in his divine right to
rule “and that a King cannot be tried by any superior jurisdiction on earth.”544
Yet he also warned against the tyrannical nature of the new regime and the
danger it poses to fundamental rights and freedoms of Englishmen.545 Charles
I was beheaded January 30, 1649, in Whitehall.546 The king-less regime
become lawless and then crumbled; the Crown, in a more benign form, was
reinstated after the interregnum with the invitation of Charles I’s son back to
England as King Charles II in 1660.547
Coke’s strong opposition to the Stuart views of royal supremacy was a
clear indication that the Stuart theories of royal supremacy could not overcome
obdurate opposition of Parliament and common law jurists.548 The trial and
execution of King Charles I was an even more obvious indication of the
Stuarts’ inability to enforce their views on governance. The gruesome event
prompted one commentator to quip that “[t]he axiom that the King can do no

time still wary of Coke, so Coke was made Chief Justice of another division of the royal courts—
the King’s Bench. See id. at 436–38.
540. STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND “THE GRIEVANCES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH,” 1621–1628, at 27 (1979). See also SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD
COKE, supra note 325, at 1206–09 (discussing Coke’s view on the King’s power over penal
laws), 1213–14 (discussing limitations of royal power regarding marriage), 1264–65 (discussing a
report of conference with Lords).
541. See generally LOVELL, supra note 19, at 315–24.
542. Id. at 324.
543. SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN
REVOLUTION, 1625–1660, at 372 (1936).
544. Charles I, at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=1274.
545. See GARDINER, supra note 543, at 374–76.
546. Charles I, at http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_I_of_England#Trial_and_execution.
547. See generally J.G. MUDDIMAN, TRIAL OF KING CHARLES THE FIRST (1928); see also
www.royal.gov.uk.
548. See generally GORDON, supra note 31, at 223–83; THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 48–52 (Little, Brown and Co. 1956) (1929).
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wrong received a rude shock in the days of Charles the First.”549 The “divine
rights of kings” theory did not take permanent hold in England. The settlement
reached in the English polity several decades after the execution of Charles I
limited royal powers even further. By the early eighteenth century, sixty years
or so before the American Revolution, the old doctrine of divine rights was
finally extinguished.550
V. FINAL WORD GOES TO BLACKSTONE
In the three preceding parts, this Article has explored some of the main
legal-historical steps that England took on the road to democracy and to an
accountable government. We looked at various techniques and unique legal
doctrines developed in English law to curb royal powers. We observed how
they were first introduced in the thirteenth century and then reintroduced and
used most effectively during the seventeenth century. We saw the barons, and
then Parliament, effectively control state finances. We observed Parliament
develop the technique of impeachment to gain control over the government
ministers and noted how the legal doctrine of ministerial responsibility served
to distance the king from the active workings of government bureaucracy and
make ministers accountable to Parliament for government action. Finally, we
saw the “divine rights” theory resolutely rejected in favor of popular
government theories that won the day.
All of this background information was available to the Founding Fathers.
Blackstone’s Commentaries summarized and explained the legal doctrines
concerning government accountability. The Commentaries make several
substantive references to the doctrine “that the king can do no wrong.”551
Blackstone begins his comprehensive discussion of the king’s prerogative
explaining that “one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty . . . was the
limitation of the king’s prerogative.”552
What is an English subject to do “in case the crown should invade their
rights, either by private injuries, or public oppressions?”553 The English
common law, suggests Blackstone, provides remedies in both cases.554 As for
private injuries his answer is double. First, there is a remedy in the petition of
right, and while it is only as “a matter of grace” that the king provides the
compensation requested, he is most likely to permit this charity.555 Second,
Blackstone cites Locke to the effect that the king is unlikely to inflict much

549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.

1 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PEACE TREATIES 438 (1938).
See 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 53–54.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
Id. at *237.
Id. at *243.
Id.
Id.
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damage personally, and immunizing him is a fair price to pay for the benefits
of the regime.556
As for “public oppression,” in most cases the answer is clear: “a king
cannot misuse his power, without advice of evil counsellors, and the assistance
of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and punished.”557 Such
persons could be indicted or impeached by Parliament so “that no man shall
dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land. But it is at the
same time a maxim in those laws, that the king himself can do no wrong”
because, simply stated, there is no redress against the king.558 The results are
less clear in the most severe cases as they tend “to dissolve the constitution,
and subvert the fundamentals of government,” where the branches of
government are in clear dispute.559
Speaking specifically of the king’s political capacity Blackstone famously
stated that the law ascribes to the king “absolute perfection”:
The king can do no wrong. Which ancient and fundamental maxim is not to be
understood, as if everything transacted by the government was of course just
and lawful, but means only two things. First, that whatever is exceptionable in
the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the king, nor is he
answerable for it personally to his people: for this doctrine would totally
destroy the constitutional independence of the crown, which is necessary for
the balance of power, in our . . . compounded constitution. And, secondly, it
means that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury: it is
created for the benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their
prejudice.

556. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *243 (citing JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §205 (1690),
available at www.4lawschool.com/lib/locke18.htm.
In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies,
whereby he is secure, whilst the government stands, from all violence and harm
whatsoever, than which there cannot be a wiser constitution. For the harm he can do in
his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far, nor being able by
his single strength to subvert the laws nor oppress the body of the people, should any
prince have so much weakness and ill-nature as to be willing to do it. The inconveniency
of some particular mischiefs that may happen sometimes when a heady prince comes to
the throne are well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of the
government in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger; it
being safer for the body that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to
suffer than that the head of the republic should be easily and upon slight occasions
exposed.
LOCKE, supra, at § 205.
557. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244.
558. Id.
559. Id.
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The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of
thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly
or weakness.560

The language may seem archaic, the terms technical, and the fictions it
describes mystical. Yet the Commentaries represented the better part of the
founding generation’s legal education, and they were quite fluent in
Blackstonian.
Blackstone’s Commentaries were a comprehensive and
authoritative summary of the English common law.561 English critics scalded
Blackstone for his pretension to freeze the entire ‘living’ common law.562 But
this quality made the books popular with the settlers of the North American
colonies. In addition, the books’ language was approachable for the colonists
with limited legal skills but a great thirst to learn of their legal rights. Finally,
the Commentaries were a timely publication for the colonists, as they were first
issued in the decade preceding the American Revolution (1765–1769). By
1776, American lawyers and many of the Founding Fathers were well-versed
in English law and practice through Blackstone.563 The Commentaries, in
short, were widely known in America and had an enormous influence on
American legal thought.564
This Article has attempted to explain the English legal-historical
foundations of sovereign immunity, with the myriad constraints on royal power
and with the requirement for government accountability in English public law.
560. Id. at *246. “Yet still, notwithstanding this personal perfection, which the law attributes
to the sovereign, the constitution has allowed a latitude of supposing the contrary, in respect to
both houses of parliament; each of which, in its turn, has exerted the right of remonstrating and
complaining to the king.” Id. at *247.
561. See generally HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, THE VINERIAN CHAIR AND LEGAL
EDUCATION (1958) (discussing that Blackstone was the first professor of common law studies in
Oxford, and the Commentaries sum up his entire course). But see 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
11, at 716 (explaining that there are, of course, critics who suggest inaccuracies in Blackstone’s
analysis but, on the whole, he codified English law quite accurately and, moreover, his
interpretation of English law carried some weight in its own right).
562. See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 155–56.
563. See Greg Bailey, Blackstone In America: Lectures by An English Lawyer Become The
Blueprint for a New Nation’s Laws and Leaders, EARLY AM. REV. (1997), available at
http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/spring97/blackstone.html (discussing “the American
Revolution [Blackstone] unintentionally inspired.”). This concise overview of Blackstone’s
career and influence notes the familiarity that Thomas Jefferson, James Wilson, Alexander
Hamilton, John Marshall, and many others had with the Commentaries. Id.
564. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 58 (2d ed. 1998) (“Americans—laymen
and lawyers alike—seized eagerly on the book”); Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (stating the Commentaries were “the most influential law book in
Anglo-American history”); Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An
Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 553 (1997); DAVID A.
LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 177 (1938) (noting that before 1900, almost every
American Lawyer read at least part of Blackstone’s Commentaries).
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These principles of English law, summarized in Blackstone’s Commentaries,
were widely read by the founding generation of the United States. They
significantly influenced the Founders’ knowledge and understanding of
government work. The principles of the English constitution are essential for a
serious analysis of the Founders’ understanding of the core concepts of
sovereignty and sovereign immunity and the accountability of government.

